Mr. JONES of Arkansas. There are certain amendments to be offered which it will take time to consider. The Senate seems reluctant to proceed with the consideration of those amendments this afternoon, and I move to proceed to the consideration of executive business.

The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the consideration of executive business. After five minutes spent in executive session the doors were reopened, and (at 4 o'clock and 45 minutes p. m.) the Senate adjourned until to-morrow, Tuesday, April 17, 1900, at 12 o'clock m.

NOMINATION.

Executive nomination received by the Senate April 16, 1900.

GOVERNOR OF PORTO RICO.

Charles H. Allen, of Massachusetts, to be the governor of Porto Rico, an original appointment, as provided for by an act of Congress entitled "An act temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes," approved April 12, 1900.

CONFIRMATIONS.

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate April 16, 1900.

CONSUL.

Charles E. Barnes, of Illinois, to be consul of the United States at Cologne, Germany.

PROMOTION IN THE NAVY.

Capt. Silas W. Terry, to be a rear-admiral in the Navy, from the 29th day of March, 1900.

POSTMASTERS.

Frank G. Pennell, to be postmaster at Mount Joy, in the county of Lancaster and State of Pennsylvania.

William Krause, to be postmaster at Richland Center, in the county of Bucks and State of Pennsylvania.

Henry D. Ruth, to be postmaster at Lansdale, in the county of Montgomery and State of Pennsylvania.

Henry F. Hershey, to be postmaster at Steelton, in the county of Dauphin and State of Pennsylvania.

Daniel G. Engle, to be postmaster at Marietta, in the county of Lancaster and State of Pennsylvania.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

MONDAY, *April 16, 1900.*

The House met at 12 o'clock m. Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. HENRY N. COUDEN, D. D.

The Journal of the proceedings of Saturday was read and approved.

POSTAL ECONOMIC BILL.

Mr. McPHERSON. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the minority of the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads, six in number, I desire to file a minority report on House bill 9393, and I ask for a reprint of the majority report with the minority report accompanying it. There was an arrangement by which the two were to be filed together, but through forgetfulness the majority report was on file a day before we knew about it.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Iowa asks unanimous consent to file a minority report from the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads on the Post-Office appropriation bill, together with the reprint of the majority and minority report.

Mr. McPHERSON. Not the appropriation bill, Mr. Speaker, but what is called the postal economic bill.

The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman give the number of it?

Mr. McPHERSON. Nine thousand three hundred and ninety-three.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill, and pending that motion, I am instructed by the committee to ask that the general debate be limited to fourteen hours, seven hours upon a side; seven hours to be controlled on that side by the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS], or, if he so elects, to be distributed by the minority members of the committee, and the time on this side to be controlled by the acting chairman of the committee. And, furthermore, that upon the expiration of this time, or in case general debate should be exhausted before the expiration of the time agreed upon, it shall then be in order to call for the reading of the bill and debated under the five-minute rule.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois moves that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill; and, pending that, he asks unanimous consent that general debate be continued for fourteen hours, seven hours on a side, and that the gentleman from Illinois, acting chairman of the committee, shall control one half of the time and the gentleman from New York shall control the other half of the time, with the right to yield to other members of the minority; that when general debate expires, or, if it shall be exhausted before the fourteen hours expire, the bill shall then be considered under the five-minute rule.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I will state that under this arrangement I hope that general debate will be through by to-morrow evening at 5 o'clock, because, although this side will have seven hours, I do not see where the speakers are to come from. I think we shall be able to finish it by that time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Speaker, I am authorized to say that the proposition is acceptable to the minority, with the understanding that each member of the minority has his hour, and members who desire time, consequently, will get their time from the minority members.

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I want to say a word, if I can have the attention of the gentleman from Illinois as well as the gentleman from New York. From glancing at the majority and minority report and the bill itself I can see some very important questions to be determined in Committee of the Whole. Take the coast survey which is proposed by it, for instance, and the question in the minority report of an armor-plate factory, and the question of the utilization of the navy-yards for construction of ships—all very important questions. Now, it seems to me it would be better to have an hour on each side to cover at least these three general questions—an hour on each side of general debate upon the particular measures when they are reached.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. That is what I was going to suggest.

Mr. CANNON. I suggest that we should have an hour on a side, with the assurance that where the debate is in good faith and upon the merits of the proposition it will be a little bit free and easy for time when these measures are reached. I should be glad myself to submit some remarks upon one of these matters, but I should rather not do it to empty benches, and would rather it would be a real debate.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Mr. Speaker, I desire to say something in the line of what the gentleman from Illinois has just said. The armor-plate question has harassed Congress in this general aspect for four or five years. As the gentleman from Illinois has said, if this question is discussed in general debate, the probabilities are that those who speak on the question will speak to empty benches, because the moment we agree upon fourteen hours of general debate on the bill the members drop out and attend to their business in town. It is a live question, one that ought to be settled now, one that is dealing with the building of the United States Navy. The Naval Committee has never brought a more important question before this House, and it is a matter that ought to be settled and settled right. Therefore, I hope the chairman of the committee will agree now that there shall be a liberal debate.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Along the line suggested by the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from Alabama, I desire to say to the House that the differences in the Naval Committee are merely questions of business judgment; and I think I am warranted in the statement that the discussion on general debate on both sides of the House will be confined entirely, or practically so, to matters of difference between members of the committee. I have no desire myself to give the benefit of what real observation and investigation I have made to empty benches and I sincerely hope that the members of the House will not pay us the compliment, but will feel it incumbent on themselves to listen to this discussion. I am satisfied that no member on the other side desires to bring general politics into this discussion. There are no politics in the Naval Committee; the matters of difference are simply questions of what is best for the American people.

Speaking for myself alone, I have absolutely no pride of opinion in regard to my individual views on this question. If the majority of my colleagues differ with me, I shall acquiesce with great pleasure in their judgment. But this is a matter which concerns the people, and, as suggested by the gentleman from Illinois, there are three matters of difference between us that the House alone can determine; and it would be absolute folly for us to indulge in general debate here for two days unless members of the House propose to remain and listen and take part in the discussion.

Mr. HOPKINS. Then why should not the gentleman in charge of the bill move that the general debate be limited to eight hours and provide that two hours shall be allowed for debate on each

proposition suggested by my colleague from Illinois when the bill is before the Committee of the Whole under the five-minute rule?

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, that would be entirely satisfactory to me except for this consideration: I am quite confident that no man can intelligently present under the five-minute rule the objections that we of the minority have to the ideas embodied in this bill, and I should not like to make a speech in sections. I desire to say to the House what I have to say at one time and then quit. I think the other gentlemen of the committee feel the same way; I am quite sure the chairman does. And when the five-minute debate is reached it is my desire that the other members of the House be allowed to present their views fully in this debate. What we of the committee desire to say we want to say now, so that the members of the House may have the benefit of our investigations and of the hearings before the committee. For that reason I sincerely hope that the members of the House will stay here and listen to what we have to say.

Mr. CANNON. I suggest to the gentleman in charge of this bill that when the Coast Survey items are reached he ask unanimous consent that there be general debate of two hours at that time, if desired.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. There is no disagreement in the committee on that question; we are unanimous upon it.

Mr. CANNON. We are not unanimous in the House.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I say the committee are unanimous.

Mr. FOSS. In view of what I have heard here this morning in reference to limiting general debate, I would suggest that a better arrangement might be made in this form: The general debate to continue for to-day, one-half to be controlled by the other side and one-half by this; that then we enter upon the reading and debating of the bill under the five-minute rule, but with the understanding that when we reach these points of disagreement—for instance, the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the question of the manufacture of armor plate, and the question of building ships in the Government navy-yards—we have debate upon those three propositions for two hours each.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Foss] modifies his request for unanimous consent so as to ask that general debate close with this day's session, and that to-morrow the House enter upon the consideration of the bill under the five-minute rule, with the understanding that when the questions of armor-plate manufacture, the building of ships in Government navy-yards, and the Coast and Geodetic Survey are reached there be allowed two hours' debate upon each of those three propositions. Is there objection?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I object. The minority of the committee is instructed to stand by the proposition for seven hours, which they desire for general debate. I have no idea but that when we reach the paragraph to which the gentleman has alluded some understanding can be reached by which debate may be confined to two hours or one hour, or some other definite time satisfactory to the House. But I do think we should stand by the original proposition. I know that members of the minority desire to present their views in general debate in such a way as that they may have ample time, and not have their speeches cut into sections as the bill is when we come to consider it by sections.

The SPEAKER. Objection is made. The question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. CANNON. Then I will ask the gentleman to further modify his proposition——

The SPEAKER. There is now no proposition before the House—only the motion to go into Committee of the Whole.

Mr. CANNON. I suggest that the gentleman ask also that when desired general debate for not exceeding two hours each may be had on the three propositions—the Coast Survey, the armor-plate manufacture, and the building of ships in the navy-yards—the debate to take place as each proposition is reached.

Mr. HEPBURN. Does the gentleman from Illinois suggest three hours' debate on each of those propositions?

Mr. CANNON. Only two hours on each, if that much time be desired.

Mr. HEPBURN. That would be sixteen hours of general debate upon this bill, which would occupy four days.

Mr. CANNON. I propose to have six hours of real debate when the bill is considered.

Mr. HEPBURN. I have no objection to that proposition, if it be coupled by unanimous consent with the further provision that there be no political debate.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Mr. Speaker, I will say that the committee itself requested that no political debate be had and that the debate should be confined to the consideration of the bill as far as practicable——

Mr. CUMMINGS. The committee is unanimous in that.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky (continuing). Except, of course, so far as we can not prevent.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And no objection is made to the proposition of the gentleman from Illinois except to the second one, which limits the general debate to this day.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I desire to state that I submitted the original proposition under the instructions of the Committee on Naval Affairs. The last proposition was simply a suggestion of my own and from hearing the remarks of gentlemen on the other side of the House. I understand, however, that objection is made to that. I will renew, therefore, the first proposition.

The SPEAKER. The request from the gentleman from Illinois is that two days be devoted to the general debate upon the pending bill——

Mr. CUMMINGS. Fourteen hours.

The SPEAKER (continuing). One-half to be controlled by himself and one-half by the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS], making, as the Chair understands, fourteen hours altogether.

Mr. CANNON. Well, Mr. Speaker, I suggest, if there is no leeway for the general debate, that the gentleman go on with the consideration of the bill in Committee of the Whole, and he can tell better at the close of the day's session how much more time will be required. Of course he has it in his power, having the majority, to close debate at any time he desires.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois objects, and the question is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS], that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the naval appropriation bill.

Mr. KITCHIN. I would like to ask a question for information. I want to know whether——

The SPEAKER. Objection has been made to all propositions for unanimous consent, and there is pending now before the House only the motion of the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. KITCHIN. I ask if the particular proposition was made which was practically agreed to in committee?

The SPEAKER. It was made, and objected to.

The question now is on the motion of the gentleman from Illinois, that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole to consider the naval appropriation bill.

The motion was agreed to.

The House accordingly resolved itself into Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, Mr. PAYNE in the chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The House is in Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the bill which the Clerk will report.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 10450) making appropriations for the naval service for the year ending June 30, 1901, and for other purposes.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to state in the beginning of my remarks that I have prepared a careful report on every provision mentioned in this bill, explaining all of the increases in the appropriations and all of the new items embodied in the bill, which I would ask the members of this committee to carefully read.

In presenting this bill to you I realize that I am doing the duty of him whom, unfortunately, illness has now for many weeks prevented from occupying his accustomed place on this floor. No man in Congress to-day has a wider knowledge of the subject of naval affairs than CHARLES ADDISON BOUTELLE. [Applause.] Born with the true naval spirit, his father a shipmaster and himself when but a lad before the mast, he early became conversant with naval affairs and familiar with the seas. Returning from a foreign voyage in the spring of 1862, he volunteered, and was appointed acting master in the United States Navy. He served in the North and South Atlantic and the West Gulf squadrons, took part in the blockade of Charleston and Wilmington, and was conspicuous in other naval engagements.

While an officer on the U. S. S. *Sassacus* he won promotion for gallant conduct in an engagement with the rebel ironclad *Albermarle*, and later took part in the capture of Mobile and the surrender of the Confederate fleet. No man fought with greater bravery than he in the memorable conflict from 1861 to 1865; and when he entered Congress, just at that time when this country was beginning to build up its new Navy, it was but natural that he should be assigned to the important Committee on Naval Affairs.

No man in all the years from that time to this has been more active or devoted to the task of building up a navy that would inspire confidence at home and respect abroad than Mr. BOUTELLE. [Applause.] He was chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs in the Fifty-first, Fifty-fourth, Fifty-fifth, and this Congress, and as such demonstrated his great ability and wise statesmanship in bringing the Navy to that point where it was able successfully to combat the forces of Spain in our recent war. Too much honor and credit can not be given to him. I know that I voice the unanimous expression upon both sides of this Hall when I say that we wish him a speedy recovery and an early return. [Applause.]

Bereft of his counsel and advice, never did men respond better

to the responsibilities suddenly thrust upon them than the members of the Naval Committee, with whom I have the honor to be associated, and to-day, as their representative, I present to you this naval appropriation bill, providing for the maintenance of the naval establishment for the coming fiscal year, the largest naval appropriation bill ever presented to an American Congress since the days of old Jack Barry, who, justly or unjustly I have not now time to discuss, has been called the father of the American Navy. We present it to you as the result of our best work, our best judgment, our best conclusions upon the various questions raised in the bill, and we welcome your most thorough consideration and your most searching scrutiny.

This bill carries a total appropriation of $61,200,000. The naval appropriation act of last year carried $48,100,000. This present bill is an increase over the naval appropriation act of last year of $13,109,000. Our appropriations, all told, from all acts last year for the naval service, amounted to $53,400,000. It will be seen that this bill, therefore, carries an increase over all acts appropriating money for the naval service this year of nearly $8,000,000.

The estimates called for by the Department amounted to $70,000,000. This bill shows a reduction from those estimates of more than $8,000,000; so that, from whichever standpoint you view it, this bill is unique in this respect, that in it there is comfort for the economist and satisfaction for the enthusiast.

This increase of a little over $13,100,000 above that appropriated in the last naval appropriation act is attributable to the necessary increase under the headings of "Public works," "Construction and repair," "Steam engineering," and "Increase of the Navy."

Under the head of "Public works" there is an increase over the appropriation of last year of approximately $2,330,000. The estimates of this Department were nearly $14,000,000; and your committee, after carefully scanning these items, came to the conclusion that while public works needed some substantial improvements in order to economically preserve and maintain our naval establishment, yet the amount called for was larger than that which could be judiciously expended during the coming year, and consequently they reduced this appropriation, and recommended, in all, about $8,000,000.

The increase of $3,000,000 under construction and repair is due to the fact that we have more vessels to repair. There are 42 now assigned to the different navy-yards awaiting repair, and it must necessarily follow that as we are building more ships we will have more ships to repair, and consequently there must be an increase in this appropriation year by year. There is an increase in the Bureau of Steam Engineering of $1,500,000 for practically the same reason.

Then, under the head of increase in the Navy the item of construction and machinery, which is an appropriation for vessels which we are now building; and I may say that there are already authorized, and most of them under construction, about sixty vessels; and the increase in this appropriation this year over that of last year is $6,600,000.

So that, taking all these items into consideration, we make up the total increase of this bill over the last naval appropriation act of over $13,000,000, and every dollar of this increase can be traced, either directly or indirectly, to the one fact that we are building up the American Navy.

Now, while this sum seems to be a large one, $61,200,000, yet I may say that, from editorial comments which I have received from different newspapers all over the country, from the most conservative newspapers in the land, as well as those which are the most enthusiastic for the Navy, such as, for instance, the New York Journal, which says that this appropriation is only half big enough, on all sides there has been favorable criticism, so far as the amount of appropriations involved in this bill is concerned.

While it is true that it carries an increase of $13,000,000 over the corresponding bill of last year, and while, as the minority have stated in their views, it is perhaps double what the naval establishment cost three or four years ago, yet it might also be said that it is a great deal more than that which was appropriated twenty-five and fifty years ago.

In fact, one hundred years ago the naval appropriation bill amounted to only about $3,500,000. But the country has grown since then, and some of its most magnificent strides have been made during the last three or four years; and I believe that the people to-day are in favor of a strong and efficient navy; and not only are the people in favor of it, but they are willing to pay for it.

Mr. CANNON. Will the gentleman allow me, if it is apt at this time, touching the increase of the Navy? I see provision is made on pages 62 and 63 of the naval bill for three battle ships.

Mr. DAYTON. Two battle ships.

Mr. CANNON. Two battle ships, 3 cruisers, 3 cruisers of a smaller size, which, I apprehend, while the armament is not spoken of, would cost in the aggregate from forty to forty-five million dollars—I am not strictly accurate, but in that neighborhood. I believe there is not any appropriation for this work.

Mr. FOSS. There is nothing appropriated for it; we simply authorized it.

Mr. CANNON. And authorized contracts?

Mr. FOSS. Yes; to have them built by private contract, but it takes about a year to get the plans out, and it is not presumed that the contracts will be let under a year, probably.

Mr. CANNON. Now, I notice here, in the gentleman's report, that under the head of "New Navy," I believe it is—I had it a moment ago; I will find it.

Mr. FOSS. Page 20?

Mr. CANNON. Is that the new Navy?

Mr. FOSS. "The cost of our new Navy."

Mr. CANNON. Under the head of "The cost of our new Navy," in the gentleman's report, I find the—

Actual cost of finished vessels	$98,529,511.85
Estimated final cost of vessels now under construction	62,570,610.23

substantially yet remains to be appropriated, and all of it, or most of it, appropriated by bills to follow hereafter and not included in the present bill.

Mr. FOSS. There is an appropriation in this bill of nearly $13,000,000 for that object.

Mr. CANNON. For that object, which will leave, in round numbers, for these new vessels of the Navy now authorized by contract prior to this Congress, after the thirteen millions is appropriated in this, in round numbers, $49,000,000, but yet to be provided for by bills following after this session; and then there is the authorization of the additional ships, and against the time they are armed and ready for service, as authorized in this bill, will amount to about how much—fifty millions or more?

Mr. FOSS. Those authorized in this bill, in round numbers, nearly forty millions

Mr. CANNON. Would that include armor and everything?

Mr. FOSS. The maximum cost of these hulls is put down here at $28,350,000, exclusive of armor and armament.

Mr. CANNON. Then if this bill passes as it now is, carrying the appropriation that it now does toward the construction of new ships not heretofore ordered, there will be, to complete these new ships, to complete the authorization in this bill, in round numbers, something over $90,000,000 to be appropriated finally. About forty-nine millions of that has been authorized, and about forty millions is to follow.

Mr. FOSS. I would state that under the head of "Increase of the Navy" in this bill——

Mr. CANNON. Nothing, I will say, is appropriated in this bill for the ships you propose to authorize.

Mr. FOSS. That is true; but under the head of "Increase of the Navy," on page 16, you will find that this bill carries for construction and machinery $12,740,000.

Mr. CANNON. Yes.

Mr. FOSS. We also recommend $4,000,000 for armor and armament and $250,000 for equipment, making a total of $16,990,000. So that the figure which I mentioned a few moments ago applies purely to construction and machinery for the increase of the Navy, whereas these other figures which appropriate for armament and armor and equipment ought to be included, making $17,000,000, the appropriation in this bill toward finishing these vessels which already have been authorized and which are now in process of construction.

Mr. CANNON. Now, then, you report $62,000,000 to finish these vessels, to finish them entirely, and that would leave in round numbers $44,000,000 to complete the vessels already authorized, and then to that would have to be added, if this bill passes authorizing the additional ships that the bill provides for, in round numbers, $40,000,000 more, making about $84,000,000 to complete the Navy that has been previously authorized and will be authorized by this bill, but not heretofore appropriated.

Mr. FOSS. I would say, practically, yes, taking into consideration the vessels which we authorize in this act, that it will require in the neighborhood of $80,000,000.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is altogether.

Mr. CANNON. That is altogether, to finish the vessels that have been authorized and which you are authorized to contract for and not carried in this bill—that is $80,000,000 to be appropriated hereafter.

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. That would cover a period of some seven or eight years.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. It is an injustice to allow that statement to go against this bill——

Mr. CANNON. I am not making any objection to the bill.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky (continuing). If you mean to give the committee the impression that there is an increase of eighty millions in this bill.

Mr. CANNON. Oh, no; I am not criticising the bill at all or speaking against its policy, but I was trying to see what is to be the appropriation hereafter by virtue of the authorization heretofore made and the authorization in this bill.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Did I understand the gentleman from Illinois to say that the authorization in this bill would entail an expense of forty millions?

Mr. CANNON. That is what my colleague informs me.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I do not think that two battle ships and six cruisers will cost $40,000,000.

Mr. DAYTON. I want to call the attention of the gentleman from Illinois to the fact that if that is true, the total cost of the Navy of the United States, the bulwark of American defense, will only be about forty millions more than the appropriation every year in the annual pension bill.

Mr. CANNON. The gentleman must not misstate me, and I know my colleague, the gentleman occupying the floor, does not misunderstand me. I am in no sense criticising the bill, but I am trying in good faith to ascertain, as far as I can, what is the amount entailed in expense upon the money in the Treasury to be hereafter appropriated, by virtue of this and other legislation, for a new Navy.

Mr. CUMMINGS. A very laudable ambition. [Laughter.]

Mr. FOSS. I want to say to the gentleman from Illinois that I have not the accurate figures here, but that this bill, in authorizing new ships, fixes upon a maximum limit for the cost of construction, and in the figures, which I have presented in this bill for the hull of these vessels, cost, in round numbers, $28,500,000. I am simply taking the maximum limit, the cost of the different vessels authorized. The actual cost will be much lower than that—take, for instance, the hull of the *Indiana*, which costs $3,000,000; the hull of the *Kearsarge*, cost $2,250,000—and so, while we authorize the maximum limit, it does not mean that the limit is the actual cost of the construction of the hull.

Mr. RIDGELY. In this bill have you made any provision for the Government to manufacture armor plate of its own?

Mr. FOSS. I will reach that provision a little later. I will state to the gentleman, however, that we have made no such provision.

Mr. RIDGELY. Do you not think it is time that we should?

Mr. FOSS. I should be pleased to discuss that question a little later on in the debate.

Mr. RIDGELY. I think it is time that we should manufacture our own plate.

Mr. KITCHIN. I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois, the acting chairman of the committee, a question. The limit of construction in the bill does not include the furniture and a great many other things that will probably enhance the cost. For instance, it does not include the machinery.

Mr. FOSS. We appropriate every year anywhere from $250,000 to $400,000 for equipment, and out of that appropriation, I understand, comes the equipment for these vessels—that is, the furniture, and such things as may be necessary in order to put them in condition to live in. Does that answer the gentleman's question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Partially. The point I am getting at is that twenty-eight millions, which is estimated to be the cost of the hulls, does not include the total cost to put them in condition for sea.

Mr. FOSS. No; it does not.

Mr. BROMWELL. On page 16 of the bill is a provision for ocean and lake surveys. I should like to ask the gentleman whether anything in that section is new legislation or whether it follows strictly the provisions in previous bills?

Mr. FOSS. I would state that this is new language, but not new law.

Mr. BROMWELL. Is there not any new law in it at all?

Mr. DAYTON. Not the slightest.

Mr. FOSS. That language, so we were informed by the head of the Bureau, is purely explanatory of what the Navy has been doing all these years.

Mr. BROMWELL. How is it as to the law?

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. It was only for the purpose of more correctly auditing the account.

Mr. BROMWELL. Has the lake survey been in charge of the Navy heretofore?

Mr. FOSS. Always.

Mr. BROMWELL. And the sounding of channels?

Mr. FOSS. Yes; and the ocean survey.

Mr. BROMWELL. But I am speaking more particularly of the lake survey.

Mr. DAYTON. By law there is an office established for doing the work by the Navy Department.

Mr. FOSS. Now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to call the attention of the committee to a few points in connection with this bill. In the first place, there is a provision here for the abolition of the two years' sea course at the Naval Academy. It is necessary that we should have more officers, and in order to get more officers it is necessary to abolish a part of the course—what is known as the sea course—which will give the naval cadets a four years' course, the same as the war college has at West Point.

Now, this provision of two years' sea course was tacked on the four years' regular course at the Naval Academy at a time when our Navy was going into decay—away back in 1870, when we did not need any officers. The time has now come when we need some officers, and the sensible thing, in our judgment, is to abolish the two years' sea course, which will give us an additional number of officers. It will bring in, for instance, I think, about 90 or 100 cadets who are now off on their sea courses, and at the same time will allow each member of Congress to appoint a cadet every four years (the same as he does to the war college) instead of every six years, as now.

There is another provision in this bill to which I desire to call the attention of the committee, and that is the question of armor and armament. While I shall go into a more thorough discussion of this question when we reach that particular provision in the bill which applies to it, yet I want now to make a general statement upon this subject. The committee recommends that the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to contract for armor for the three ships, the *Maine*, the *Missouri*, and the *Ohio*, at a cost not to exceed $545 per ton.

Admiral O'Neil, in a statement which was submitted to the committee, said that this armor was needed now—this year. The ships are already in process of construction, and they will be ready to be supplied with armor before the year is over. And he said that in no case should a Government factory be regarded as a possible source of supply of armor for the *Maine*, the *Ohio*, and the *Missouri*. On page 5 of the hearings before the committee Admiral O'Neil makes this statement:

> I am of the opinion that the rational and most economical course to be followed with regard to procuring armor for three battle ships of the *Maine* class now under construction, and for which the aggregate of about 7,360 tons is required, is to purchase the same by contract at a price not to exceed that asked by the American armor manufacturers—namely, $545 per ton; such armor to be made by the Krupp process, or to be of a quality equal thereto in ballistic and other properties.

Further, he states:

> It is absolutely necessary that the armor for the three battle ships of the *Maine* class should be contracted for at an early date, as the contracts for the hulls and machinery of said vessels were executed October, 1898—sixteen months ago. To defer much longer making the armor contracts will undoubtedly delay the completion of these vessels or some of them beyond the contract date of completion, which expires in June, 1901.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Will my colleague permit me a question right there?

Mr. FOSS. Certainly.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Does not the gentleman think it would be just to the committee (if he proposes to enter into the discussion of the armor-plate question), to state that so far as concerns the procurement of armor for the three battle ships now on the stocks, there is absolutely no difference of opinion in the committee: that we are all in favor of buying the armor for those three battle ships? It is the question of future supply on which we disagree. I think that statement would be but just.

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman that in the statement I have made up to this time I have not criticised at all the views of the minority on this proposition.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I know that; but I think it would be just to make the statement I have indicated.

Mr. FOSS. As the gentleman has stated the matter, I will confirm it—that so far as the provision for armor is concerned for these three vessels which need it now, the *Maine*, the *Missouri*, and the *Ohio*, there is no difference of opinion in the committee. Upon the question of the authorization of an armor-plate factory by the Government, I beg to state that the committee saw fit to leave that matter entirely to the House. In view of the statement——

Mr. UNDERWOOD. Will the gentleman allow me a question?

Mr. FOSS. When I get through with this statement.

The committee did not believe it was wise for them to recommend to this House that the Government should undertake the manufacture of armor. Admiral O'Neil, in his statement, says that the cost of a Government armor plant would be $4,872,285.74. You will find this statement on page 37 of the hearings. He further stated, on page 6 of the hearings:

> I do not think it is expedient for the Government to undertake the manufacture of armor for several reasons, which I will state, though I do not regard it as an impracticable undertaking.

Further, on page 7, he says:

> It is not likely that armor could or would be more cheaply produced by the Government than it could be bought, unless all consideration of interest on the value of the plant and on working capital is discarded.

Now, I simply want to state just for the time being, because I do not care to enter into the discussion of this question at this time, preferring to discuss it when the provision comes up regularly—but in view of those statements, your committee did not see fit to recommend to Congress a provision authorizing a Government armor-plate factory.

Mr. HOPKINS. Will the gentleman allow me a question?

Mr. FOSS. Certainly.

Mr. HOPKINS. The gentleman has given the estimate made by Admiral O'Neil. Does he remember that when Mr. Herbert was Secretary of the Navy an investigation on this subject was had, and it was reported by the Secretary that a Government armor-plate factory could be constructed for $1,500,000 in round numbers?

Mr. FOSS. I would say to my colleague that there have been various estimates made, but this is the last estimate.

Mr. HOPKINS. Was not that estimate made by Secretary Herbert, after a thorough investigation had been made, as to the cost of the manufacture of armor plate and the cost of establishing a plant by the Government?

Mr. FOSS. I do not recollect, Mr. Chairman, the exact estimate that was then submitted. But I know this, that this estimate which has been quoted here in the statement of Admiral O'Neil was made by a board of officers, who presented a very voluminous document upon the subject to Congress.

Mr. BARBER. I would like to ask the gentleman a question.

Mr. FOSS. Certainly.

Mr. BARBER. It is not a fact that this estimate, to which the gentleman has referred, was an English estimate as to the cost of the establishment of such a plant; and whether it is not a fact that the armor-factory board, sent out by the Navy Department, found upon an investigation of the facts that the cost would be in the neighborhood of $3,300,000, instead of that which had been previously reported as to the English cost?

Mr. FOSS. That, I think, is true.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. But the difference, the gentleman will find, as the report of Mr. Herbert will show, contemplated an establishment capable of yielding 3,000 tons, while the statement of the board quoted by the gentleman from Pennsylvania had reference to 6,000 tons.

And I would like to ask the gentleman from Illinois a question. The gentleman, as I understand it, has stated that the committee desired to leave the subject of the establishment of an armor-plate factory or plant for the future. I want to ask if he, as the acting chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, is willing to adopt that suggestion and establish such a plant.

Mr. FOSS (interrupting). I would state, Mr. Chairman, to my friend from Alabama that when we reach that point in the bill I shall be moved largely by the considerations of the hour.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. The gentleman recognizes, of course, that he can submit the point of order, and we can not get at the question on such an amendment.

Mr. FOSS. At this time I will not state whether I shall raise the point of order at that time or not. When we reach that point, as I have already said to the gentleman from Alabama, we will consider the question then presented.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. But it would be quite satisfactory for this side of the House to hear the gentleman say that it is desirable that Congress should take the action proposed, and that he would not submit the point of order.

Mr. FOSS. But, Mr. Chairman, there is another branch of Congress where it will not be subject to the point of order.

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I was only hoping that the House might have an opportunity of coming to a direct vote upon that question without the submission of the point of order.

Mr. OLMSTED. If the gentleman from Illinois will allow me, I would ask if it is not true that the cost of labor, the cost of material, and other matters entering into the construction of an armor plant have so increased as to largely increase the question of cost, and whether this increase has not grown up in the question of armor plate and armor manufacture since either or both of the reports to which reference has been made were submitted—that is, the report of Secretary Herbert and the other report to which the gentleman has referred?

Mr. FOSS. I will say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that the board which was appointed by Secretary Long went into the matter thoroughly of the advisability of the Government constructing a factory for the manufacture of armor plate, and made a careful and thorough report on the subject. They went all over the country, as I know to be a fact, and reported back that the estimate for a factory of that character would involve a cost of about $3,747,000. Then Admiral O'Neil states that, owing to a marked increase in the cost of structural material, especially of steel, since the dates of the different reports, it was probable that the cost of construction of a plant should be increased to not less than 30 per cent, making a total of $4,872,000.

Mr. OLMSTED. Then the report of Secretary Herbert to which the gentleman from Illinois—your colleague, Mr. HOPKINS—called attention is not a proper comparison with the present prices of labor and material, both of which have increased largely since that report was made. Is that not a fact?

Mr. FOSS. I think so.

Mr. OLMSTED. I am satisfied from the statements made that the cost of labor and the cost of material have both increased largely since those reports were made.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I desire to call the attention of members of the committee to another matter of importance in connection with the pending bill. We have authorized here, under the head of "Increase in the Navy," 2 battle ships, 3 armored cruisers, and 3 protected cruisers. We believe that in this report we meet the just demands of the public sentiment in that regard. The committee has seen fit to authorize the building in private yards, by contract, of these vessels, because they do not think it advisable to recommend to Congress that these ships shall be built in the navy-yards of the Government, and without going into a general discussion of the matter, which I shall do when the provision comes up in the ordinary procedure in the consideration of the bill, I desire to say here and now only a word, and in that connection to quote from the testimony of Secretary Long on that proposition to show what moved in the minds of the committee in the preparation of this provision of the bill.

In answer to a question by one of the members of the committee upon this subject as to advisability of building ships in the navy-yards, Secretary Long, on page 11, says:

> My general impression is that it is not desirable, as it costs twice as much and takes twice as long. I think the records show that. In the next place, I think it is not desirable to introduce into our navy-yards something which is not permanent and continuous. There is a great desire among the laboring men in our navy-yards that we shall build these ships in them, but that will not increase the general employment of labor at all, because if the labor is not employed in the yards it will be employed outside, etc. I think, too, that there is more danger of a navy-yard becoming a factor in politics if the number of employees is so largely increased as it would be if shipbuilding were added to repairing.
>
> If we build a ship at New York we must build one at Norfolk, and there will be a pressure to build one at Boston, and one at Mare Island, and one at Philadelphia, and one at Port Royal and Key West and Portsmouth. Then will follow a demand for new buildings, machinery, plant, etc. If you start a ship at any one of these places you must employ a great many men, and as soon as it is finished all these must be discharged; and then there is trouble, especially for you. On the other hand, in the business of repairing ships there is regular, steady employment. I really think it is a great deal better in the interest of labor as it is.

Upon the statement of Secretary Long that it would practically cost the Government of the United States twice as much to build ships in Government navy-yards as it does in private yards and take a great deal longer; in view of that testimony, and in view of an abundance of other testimony which I desire to present when this provision comes up, the Naval Committee, charged with the great responsibility of appropriating the people's money and seeing to it that every dollar of that money appropriated should go the farthest, did not see fit to recommend to this House that we build our ships in Government navy-yards.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I desire to call the attention of the committee to a part of this report which relates to the comparative strength of foreign navies with our own. You will see from a perusal of the different charts and maps that every nation in the world to-day is building upon a more gigantic scale than ever known before.

I may say that I have here in my hand a bill which is to-day pending in the Reichstag of Germany, and which is likely to pass, a bill which, if passed, will add to the German navy 422,000 tons of battle ships, armored cruisers, and protected cruisers, a larger tonnage than the German navy has to-day, a larger tonnage than we ourselves have; and if France and Russia and our own country do not keep up the pace, in 1916 the German nation will be the second great naval power upon the face of the globe.

Mr. KITCHIN. May I ask my colleague a question, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. FOSS. Certainly.

Mr. KITCHIN. As I understand, that German plan which you have just referred to covers a period of sixteen years?

Mr. FOSS. Sixteen years.

Mr. KITCHIN. Not a present appropriation.

Mr. FOSS. So far as the navies stand to-day, England is the first, France is the second, Russia is third, and the United States is fourth, by just about 2,720 tons ahead of Germany. Just a cruiser, for instance, the size of the *Atlanta*, one of the first cruisers which we authorized in the building up of the new Navy.

Now, I would like to say a few words in conclusion upon the general question, What are we building the Navy for? In the first place, we are building a navy for peace; not to provoke war, but to conserve international concord. That nation which is the best fitted to fight is the least likely to enter upon fight.

The international peace conference held at The Hague this last summer adopted a resolution that the peace conference is of the opinion that the governments taking into consideration the propositions made in this conference should make a study of the possibility of and agreement concerning the limitation of armed forces on land and sea, and of naval budgets.

It is a singular fact that after the adoption of that resolution the most gigantic naval programmes have been promulgated by some of the leading countries of the world. The German Emperor was not far from right when he said, "The best peace conference is a strong and efficient navy." Sea power is recognized more and more as the strength of a great nation.

And so we are building the Navy for peace. We are building the Navy also to maintain our foreign policy. We are building the Navy to maintain the Monroe doctrine, which a few years ago was resurrected into newness of life and clothed in the vigorous language of Richard Olney.

We are building the Navy to defend the proposed Nicaragua Canal, which, I trust, will never be built unless the American

Navy has the right, as it has the ability, to defend it against all comers. [Loud applause.] We are building the Navy for commerce. For a hundred years all the thought and purpose of this country has been devoted toward the development of our own resources.

Mr. HEPBURN. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman from Illinois permit me to ask him a question there? When you speak of defending that great enterprise by the Navy, can you tell the committee the relative value of guns of the same caliber, one on land and the other on sea? Is it not true that one on land is said to be six times as effective as one on sea?

Mr. FOSS. I am not informed as to that.

Mr. HEPBURN. One having a permanent, stable platform and the other a constantly moving, oscillating platform.

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. It can not go into so many places to meet the enemy.

Mr. FOSS. There would be some advantage in the one on land, but, as my friend from Michigan suggests, it could not go into so many places to meet the enemy.

Mr. HEPBURN. But if the enemy has an objective point, it might be there.

Mr. FOSS. True.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I would suggest to my friend from Iowa that I have read that it was estimated that a gun under those circumstances on land was three times as effective, but this is the first time I have heard that it was six times.

Mr. HEPBURN. If the gentleman from Illinois will excuse me, I will state that I had a conversation with one of the most distinguished naval officers we have living to-day, and he told me that the relative effectiveness was 1 to 6.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I would rather have the opinion of Admiral Farragut than that of Admiral Dewey.

Several members rose.

Mr. FOSS. I am very sorry that I can not yield to everybody.

Mr. BARTLETT. The court, in the claim of Admiral Dewey for prize money, decided that it was about three times, less than six months ago.

Mr. FOSS. I will say, gentlemen, that the great victories will be won hereafter on the sea.

We are building the Navy for commerce. For a hundred years this country has lived largely within itself and for itself, and all our thought and purpose has been devoted toward the building up of our own resources. Under the wise and beneficial system of protection this country has practically to-day made itself industrially independent of all the countries of the world. Protection has been the watchword of the past century—protection to American labor, to American industry, and to American homes—but I say to you that the watchword of the coming century will be "commerce."

Commerce will mean all that protection has meant and a great deal more. It will mean that we will not only build our own railroads, but at the same time we will send our locomotives to draw trains across the transcontinental roads of Asia and Europe. We will not only build our own bridges, but will build bridges to span the streams of Africa. It will mean that we will not only hold on to this home market of ours, the best in the world, but we will seek the markets of the Orient, and in the development of our commercial supremacy, which, in my mind, is sure to come, the Navy will play an important part.

By the mere logic of circumstances this country is bound in the next few years to be the greatest shipbuilding country on the face of the globe. I have here a statement which goes to prove that fact:

The foundation of steel and iron products is coal and iron ore. The total area of the British coal fields is 9,300 square miles. The total area of the United States coal fields is 197,000 square miles. In 1898 Great Britain consumed, in round figures, 18,000,000 tons of iron ore, of which one-third was imported—nearly 6,000,000 tons. Shipbuilding depends upon the development and expansion of the iron and steel industry. We now make 50 per cent more pig iron than either Great Britain or Germany, or more than one-third of the iron made in the world.

We make half as much steel as all the other nations put together; and when you take into consideration the fact that the raw material for our ships and the ships of the world is iron and coal, I say to you that by reason of our large supply here and the small supply over there, this country is to-day upon the eve of the greatest progress in the shipbuilding industry ever made.

Why, when we think that seventeen years ago we had practically no shipbuilding industry in this country, and find that which we had was discredited, that we had to go abroad for all the materials which enter into their construction and for the forgings, armor, and everything, almost, and that to-day we are not only supplying American ships, fashioned by American hands out of American raw material for ourselves, but at the same time building them for Japan, and building them for Russia and some of the other nations of the world, this country has made tremendous progress in the march of naval construction.

We are building the Navy for peace, for the maintenance of our foreign policy, for commerce, and then we are building our Navy for civilization. This country embarked in the war with Spain for the purpose of freeing the suffering Cubans from the tyranny of Spanish rule.

Under the rules of war, to fight our enemy where she was the most vulnerable was one of the first principles of successful warfare; and so, forced by the canons of international law to leave the harbor of Hongkong, the fleet of Dewey made for the harbor of Manila, and there in the memorable engagement with the Spanish fleet won the day, and the Spanish sovereignty of the Philippines passed by the rules of war over to ourselves. This was later ratified by the treaty of peace.

Whether it would have been better for Dewey to have sailed away and left these islands and those people to the jarring of domestic tribes, to become eventually the spoils of other nations, it is too late now to discuss. What their future may be I do not know. Perchance we may annex them permanently to ourselves, or we may civilize them until they arrive at that stage of civilization and of progress where they can erect a government of their own, a republic whose influence will penetrate through all the darkened portions of the Orient and start the fires of liberty on every altar. But that I leave to destiny and the future to reveal.

This I know, that our duty now is clear; our duty is to civilize those people, and toward that end there will be ten thousand ministering angels. The American school-teacher with her spelling book may enlighten the mind; the American missionary with his Bible may soften the heart; the American tourist and the American traveler may teach them the rules of living and the laws of trade; but I say to you that in the immediate years, while these people are barbarous as they are to-day and half civilized—when they recognize no virtue that is not accompanied by force—that the American battleship, fashioned by American hands, filled by American seamen, answering to every call and command, with an American flag above it that never waved over any people but to bless and save. [Applause.] I say that the American battle ship, that never bore a commission of duty but what it carried a message of hope, will do more to civilize these people than the ten thousand sweeter and gentler influences which mold the minds of more civilized people. [Applause.] It will teach them that liberty is not license, but that all true liberty is liberty under law, respect for order, and reverence for justice.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has expired.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman be allowed to conclude his remarks.

There was no objection.

Mr. FOSS. I thank the gentleman. I say, Mr. Chairman, we are building up our Navy, building it up for peace, for the maintenance of our national honor, for commerce, for civilization, these mighty human instrumentalities which to-day are moving in the world and working out "that perfect liberty of mankind," the liberty of enlightened conscience, the liberty of regenerated humanity, the liberty of Christian statesmanship—that liberty, in short, which, under the benign rulings of Almighty God, is the great and peculiar mission of our country to advance. [Applause.]

APPENDIX.

[House Report No. 960, Fifty-sixth Congress, first session.]

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FOSS, from the Committee on Naval Affairs, submitted the following report, to accompany H. R. 10450:

The Committee on Naval Affairs, to whom was referred so much of the President's annual message as relates to the naval establishment, together with the annual estimates of the Navy Department, submit herewith a bill (H. R. 10450) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, with the following statement:

The amount carried by this bill is $61,260,916.67, the largest ever reported to the House from the Committee on Naval Affairs.

Appropriations for current fiscal year.

Naval appropriation act, March 3, 1899	$48,099,969.58
Urgent deficiency act, February 9, 1900	4,255,000.00
Urgent deficiency (reappropriated)	350,000.00
Additional urgent deficiency	645,000.00
Total	53,344,969.58

The total estimates of the Department, supplemental and otherwise, amounted to $69,885,634.67. In the Book of Estimates they appear much larger, but this is due to a clerical error of $3,982,402, which was made at the Department but afterwards rectified. The committee carefully scrutinized the estimates of the different bureaus, and without curtailing the work or usefulness of any, made such deductions, after hearing the several bureau chiefs, as in its judgment it believed to be in accordance with careful and judicious expenditure of money during the coming fiscal year. These deductions amounted to $8,675,718.

This bill, therefore, carries a proposed increase of appropriations over the naval appropriation act of last year of $13,109,947.09, and a total increase over all acts of $7,864,947.09. This increase, as will be seen from the table of estimates, is due largely to the improvements of our yards and docks, the construction and repair of our vessels, and the increase of the Navy.

This bill, following the custom of years, is divided into general headings, making appropriations for the different bureaus and departments of the naval establishment, as follows.

Comparative statement.

	Supplemental estimates as per H. Doc. 398.	Total Department estimates, 1901.	Proposed appropriations, 1901.	Appropriated, 1900.
Pay of the Navy	$5,600.00	$12,810,897.00	$12,810,897.00	$13,500,171.00
Pay, miscellaneous	----------	500,000.00	500,000.00	500,000.00
Contingent, including emergency	500,000.00	510,000.00	520,000.00	10,000.00
Bureau of Navigation	9,550.00	463,925.00	566,425.00	505,125.00
Bureau of Ordnance	----------	2,503,124.00	2,388,124.00	3,143,124.00
Bureau of Equipment	321,577.52	3,564,052.52	3,464,052.52	2,765,455.10
Bureau of Yards and Docks	220,000.00	753,322.83	608,439.83	453,442.23
Public works, yards and docks	----------	13,768,674.32	7,797,467.32	5,465,286.50
Public works, Naval Academy and Observatory	----------	2,051,500.00	690,000.00	730,000.00
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery	40,000.00	220,000.00	220,000.00	192,500.00
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts	10,800.00	3,231,232.03	2,731,232.03	3,220,432.03
Bureau of Construction and Repair	500,000.00	6,735,824.25	6,235,824.25	3,273,407.00
Bureau of Steam Engineering	----------	2,774,200.00	2,774,200.00	1,209,200.00
Naval Academy	----------	207,813.45	199,685.45	195,153.45
Marine Corps	25,000.00	2,740,370.27	2,712,870.27	2,544,271.27
Increase of the Navy	----------	16,990,699.00	16,990,699.00	10,392,402.00
Total	1,632,527.52	69,885,634.67	61,209,916.67	48,099,969.58

PAY OF THE NAVY.

The pay of the Navy in this bill is $12,810,897, which is made up from the following table:

Pay of 1,751 officers on the active list	$4,104,899
Commutation of quarters for officers	200,000
Pay of 284 naval cadets under instruction	142,000
Pay of 536 officers on the retired list	1,190,801
Pay of Admiral's secretary	2,500
Pay of 140 clerks	184,800
Pay of 17,500 petty officers, seamen, and other enlisted men	6,300,000
Pay of 2,500 apprentice boys at training stations and on board training ships	450,000
Pay of 20 mates (section 1408, Revised Statutes)	18,000
Pay of enlisted men on the retired list	40,210
Extra pay of petty officers and seamen reenlisting under honorable discharge	164,687
To pay interest on deposits by enlisted men (act February 9, 1889)	13,000
Total	12,810,897

This is a decrease of $689,274 from the last naval appropriation act, by reason of the fact that the appropriation made last year was based upon the hurried estimates prepared in accordance with the personnel act, which was passed on the last day of the session, the same day on which the naval appropriation act was passed, and also for the reason that an additional amount was required last year to pay officers and men who were engaged in temporary service in the Navy during the late war with Spain.

Under "Pay, miscellaneous," the appropriation this year is the same as that of last year, with the exception that there has been an additional appropriation of $10,000, to enable the Secretary of the Navy to transport home the remains of officers and enlisted men of the Navy and Marine Corps who die or are killed in action outside of the United States. Following this is a provision providing for an emergency fund of $500,000, which is necessary to meet unforeseen contingencies constantly arising in view of the unsettled condition in our insular possessions. This sum is to be expended in the discretion of the President.

Comparative statement.

	Estimates, 1891.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
For commission, interest, etc.	$500,000	$500,000	$500,000
Contingent	10,000	20,000	10,000
Emergency	500,000	500,000	----------
Total	1,010,000	1,020,000	510,000

BUREAU OF NAVIGATION.

This Bureau has general jurisdiction over the officers and men of the Navy, their training and assignment; also the movement of vessels in the Navy and their complement of officers and men. It has charge of the compilation of the Naval Register and preparation, revision, and enforcement of all tactics, drill books, signal codes, cipher codes, and the uniform regulations. It also has general supervision of the Naval Academy and technical school for officers (except the War College and Torpedo School).

The following is a statement of the estimates of the Bureau for the fiscal year 1901, with the appropriations carried by this bill and the appropriations for the current fiscal year:

	Estimates for 1901.	Appropriated, 1901.	Appropriated, 1900.
Transportation, recruiting, and contingent	$80,000	$80,000	$60,000
Gunnery exercise	12,000	12,000	12,000
Outfits for naval apprentices	112,500	112,500	112,500
Outfits for landsmen	----------	112,500	----------
Naval training stations:			
California, maintenance	30,000	30,000	30,000
California, buildings	34,750	34,750	50,000
Rhode Island, maintenance	45,000	45,000	30,000
Rhode Island, buildings	54,500	54,050	125,000
Naval War College, Rhode Island, maintenance	9,200	9,200	9,200
Naval Home, Philadelphia	76,425	76,425	76,425
Supplemental estimate (H. Doc. No. 398)	9,550	----------	----------
Total	463,925	566,425	505,125

The total increase of appropriations under this Bureau amounts to $61,300. This increase is more than accounted for by the provision inserted in the bill appropriating for outfits for landsmen training for seamen, which is earnestly recommended by the Secretary of the Navy and the chief of the Bureau. In view of the fact that it has been found difficult to enlist the full quota of men, some encouragement of this character has become necessary. It is believed that this provision will not only provide the full quota of enlisted men, but at the same time will have a tendency to improve the character of the applicants and also induce a larger number of our own citizens to become part of the personnel of the Navy. At the present time 88 per cent of the whole number of our petty officers and enlisted men are citizens of the United States, while 65 per cent of the remainder have declared their intention to become citizens. Of the other enlisted men 75 per cent are citizens and of the remainder 48 per cent have declared their intention to become citizens, while as to apprentices, over 91 per cent are native born.

Provision is made under this Bureau for the maintenance of our two important naval training stations, one at Yerba Buena Island, California, and the other at Coasters Harbor Island, Rhode Island, where our young men are trained in the duties of seamen. The training station in California has been recently established, and provision is made in this bill for a completion of the work. The training station at Newport, R. I., has been established for some years, and during the last year the number of apprentices under instruction was 1,027. Provision has also been made for the maintenance of the War College at Newport.

BUREAU OF ORDNANCE.

This Bureau has general charge of the ordnance of the Navy and the armor and armament of vessels, the torpedo station and magazines on shore, and designs the interior arrangements of all buildings erected for its use at navy-yards, as well as the machinery used for handling ammunition on ship, the interior of the turrets, and the arrangement of guns, and the distribution of armor thereon. All torpedoes, powder, guns, and war explosives of all kinds, and armor plate, are bought and manufactured under its supervision. It has control of all details of its own administration.

The following table gives the estimates for the next fiscal year, the amount carried by this bill, and the amounts appropriated for the current fiscal year:

	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill, 1901.	Appropriated, 1900.
Ordnance and ordnance stores	$1,805,500	$1,705,500	$1,875,000
Reserve guns for auxiliary cruisers	250,000	250,000	250,000
Smokeless powder factory	----------	----------	25,000
Torpedo station, Newport, R. I.	65,000	65,000	65,000
Repairs, Bureau of Ordnance	30,000	30,000	30,000
Puget Sound Naval Station, buildings	80,000	80,000	----------
Arming and equipping naval militia	60,000	60,000	60,000
Contingent, Bureau of Ordnance	30,000	30,000	15,000
Naval magazine, Norfolk, Va	20,000	20,000	27,500
Naval magazine, Dover, N. H	100,000	100,000	----------
Naval magazine, Fort Lafayette, N. Y	15,000	15,000	5,000
Naval proving ground, Indian Head, Md	15,000	----------	----------
Civil establishment	32,624	32,624	32,624
Naval magazine, New York Harbor	----------	----------	600,000
Naval magazine, Fort Mifflin, Pa	----------	----------	68,000
Machinery for ordnance building, League Island	----------	----------	60,000
Steam lighter, navy-yard, League Island	----------	----------	30,000
Total	2,503,124	2,388,124	3,143,124

It will be seen from the above table that the total appropriations for this Bureau are $755,000 less than that appropriated for the present fiscal year. There is an increase in the appropriation for the improvement of the gun factory at Washington, made necessary by the expansion of the Department incident to the increase in the Navy, while there is a decrease of the appropriation for the purchase of smokeless powder to $500,000, which, it is believed, will satisfy the demands of the Department for the coming year. An ordnance shop and two magazine buildings are required at Puget Sound naval station, owing to the fact that there are no facilities at this station for ordnance material, and an appropriation of $80,000 has been recommended therefor. Also the improvements in connection with the naval magazine at Norfolk are strongly recommended by the Department, and for which an appropriation of $20,000 is urged.

The naval magazine at Dover, N. J., which is the main depot of supplies, is in need of new storehouse, magazine, light, heat, and power plant, and other improvements, for which the committee recommend an appropriation of $100,000. The regular appropriations for providing reserve guns for auxiliary cruisers, the torpedo station at Newport, arming and equipping Naval Militia, and the maintenance of the Ordnance Department are the same, while the items carried by the last act, but omitted from this bill, will be seen in the above table.

BUREAU OF EQUIPMENT.

The duties of this Bureau consist in furnishing the coal and general equipment of vessels. It also has charge of the manufacture of rope, anchors, cables, rigging, sails, galleys, and cooking utensils, and a portion of the electrical machinery for ships; also of the Naval Observatory, Nautical Almanac and compass offices, and all details of its own administration. The following table shows the estimates, the amount of appropriations proposed in the bill, and the amounts carried by the last appropriation act:

Comparative statement.

	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
EQUIPMENT.			
Equipment of vessels	$2,600,000.00	$2,600,000.00	$2,225,480.10
Ocean and lake surveys	100,000.00	100,000.00	100,000.00
Contingent Bureau	25,000.00	25,000.00	22,500.00
Depots for coal	500,000.00	700,000.00	400,000.00
Civil establishment	17,475.00	19,052.52	17,475.00
Supplemental estimate (H. Doc. 398):			
Coal wharf, Cavite	300,000.00	----------	----------
Equipment plant, Cavite	20,000.00	20,000.00	----------
Civil establishment	1,577.52	----------	----------
Total	3,564,052.52	3,464,052.52	2,765,455.10

As will be seen from the above table, there is an increase in the appropriations for this Bureau of $698,597.42, owing to the increase in the number of ships, and also to the necessity of establishing coaling stations in our insular possessions; $375,000 of this increase is in the item of equipment of vessels. The appropriation for this year was $375,000 short of what was absolutely necessary, and this amount was appropriated in the urgent deficiency act. There is an increase of $300,000 over that of the present year for coaling stations. A part of this appropriation, if made, will be spent in establishing coal sheds and a wharf at Cavite, P. I., capable of holding 25,000 tons of coal. This is made necessary by the fact that we have a large number of the ships of the Navy there, and between five and six thousand tons of coal per month are required for them. Coal is now stored in the open, and is consequently liable to rapid deterioration. An appropriation of $20,000 is strongly urged for the purchase of the necessary tools and appliances for the enlargement and increased facilities of the equipment plant at Cavite, which the committee favorably recommend. This is done in view of the fact that without it our vessels would be obliged to go to Hongkong, some 700 miles away, in case of needed repairs.

The appropriation of $100,000 for ocean and lake surveys is the same as that in the last naval appropriation act. The Navy Department has been making surveys on the coast of Cuba and Guam, the Philippines, and the Hawaiian Islands, and are in condition to continue this work, which is so important to navigation.

The Navy has done this work ever since its establishment, and it is the peculiar province of the Navy to do it. They are the men who sail the seas and whose duty it is to know every shoal, reef, and rock. They can do it more economically than any other bureau or department of the Government, because their ships carry on board all the instruments for making proper surveys, and in time of peace the Navy can be usefully employed in this important work. The other appropriations under this bureau are practically the same as those for the current year, including the civil establishment.

BUREAU OF YARDS AND DOCKS.

This is the civil engineering bureau of the Department and has charge of the construction of buildings and their maintenance in the several navy-yards, also of all docks and shore structures of all kinds, such as quay walls, wharfs, etc., for which it estimates. It also has charge of all topographical improvements in such yards, Newport, R. I., Annapolis, Md., and the Naval Home, Philadelphia, the magazines and hospitals outside of navy-yards, and the buildings for which it does not estimate being excepted from its jurisdiction. The part of the naval appropriation bill under public works is estimated for by this bureau.

The following table shows the estimates for the fiscal year 1901, the proposed appropriations in this bill, and the amounts carried by the last appropriation act:

Comparative statement.

	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
YARDS AND DOCKS.			
Maintenance	$420,000.00	$475,000.00	$350,000.00
Contingent	30,000.00	50,000.00	20,000.00
Civil establishment	83,322.83	83,439.83	83,442.23
House Document No. 398:			
Maintenance	100,000.00	----------	----------
Repairs and preservation	100,000.00	----------	----------
Contingent	20,000.00	----------	----------
Total	753,322.83	608,439.83	453,442.23

As will be seen from the above table, the increase this year over that of the last appropriation act is $154,997.60. Of this increase $125,000 is for the maintenance of yards and docks, which is made necessary in view of the fact that the Navy Department has taken possession of the naval stations in Habana, Cuba; San Juan, Porto Rico; Manila, Philippine Islands, all of which require to be maintained and kept in a proper state of preservation. There is also an increase under the item of contingent expenses of $30,000, due partly to the fact that there is a deficiency in the present fiscal year. The other items under this Bureau are substantially the same as the last year.

PUBLIC WORKS.

	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Portsmouth	$902,000.00	$361,000.00	$306,000.00
Boston	1,798,300.00	866,300.00	379,000.00
New London, Conn	50,000.00	----------	25,000.00
New York	1,977,000.00	1,300,200.00	612,062.00
League Island	1,963,092.00	939,500.00	800,767.00
Washington	875,017.32	414,102.32	205,000.00
Norfolk	1,649,000.00	466,500.00	645,687.50
Port Royal	882,000.00	227,000.00	145,000.00
Key West	117,000.00	97,000.00	112,520.00
San Juan	52,000.00	52,000.00	----------
Pensacola	29,500.00	9,500.00	----------
Algiers	145,000.00	145,000.00	----------
Mare Island	1,152,700.00	563,200.00	935,750.00
Puget Sound	223,065.00	206,165.00	48,500.00
Dredging, Dry Tortugas	200,000.00	100,000.00	----------
Habana, naval station	50,000.00	----------	----------
Dry dock, Algiers	650,000.00	650,000.00	----------
Four dry docks	900,000.00	900,000.00	800,000.00
Repairs and preservation	450,000.00	500,000.00	450,000.00
Total	13,768,674.32	7,797,467.32	5,465,286.50

The necessity for increased appropriations in this important branch of the naval establishment has been set forth in the able report of the Secretary of the Navy, on page 41, in which he says:

"The operations of the various bureaus at the yards during the war show that in very many respects the public works were not adequately equipped for the prompt and proper conduct of the work of repairing and fitting out vessels of war. Even in such navy-yards as New York, Norfolk, and Mare Island, the best equipped in the country, many deficiencies were found to exist. This was the experience of every bureau, and the importance of modernizing the navy-yard plants, erecting new storehouses and shops, providing adequate docking facilities, and thereby enabling the yards to meet the great increased requirements of the Navy was strongly impressed upon the Department."

The following table shows the value of the real estate, chattels, and machinery plants at the various yards and stations June 30, 1899:

Statement showing the value of real estate and chattels and machinery plant at the several yards and stations June 30, 1899, as per appraisal under Department's circular No. 94.

Navy-yards and stations.	Real estate and chattels.	Machinery plant.
Navy-yard, Portsmouth, N. H	$2,684,627.32	$243,063.00
Navy-yard, Boston, Mass	12,295,181.10	539,180.28
Naval War College, Newport, R. I	100,422.00	----------
Naval training station, Newport, R. I	313,005.60	7,315.00
Naval torpedo station, Newport R. I	239,576.38	45,060.90
Naval station, New London, Conn	131,146.52	900.00
Navy-yard, New York, N. Y	19,165,023.79	543,277.68
Navy-yard, League Island, Pa	2,523,566.27	126,349.60
Naval Home, Philadelphia, Pa	901,944.45	----------
Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md	569,268.40	21,432.50
Naval Observatory, Washington, D. C	869,948.77	----------
Navy-yard, Washington, D. C	4,375,091.61	1,746,562.57
Marine headquarters, Washington, D. C	220,203.50	----------
Navy-yard, Norfolk, Va	5,649,554.37	560,544.70
Naval proving ground, Md	272,084.00	5,500.00
Naval station, Port Royal, S. C	906,630.75	55,226.63
Naval station, Key West, Fla	497,837.31	37,474.48
Navy-yard, Pensacola, Fla	1,710,821.00	51,754.00
Navy-yard, Mare Island, Cal	4,127,611.48	435,420.00
Naval training station, Cal	578,023.50	----------
Naval station, Puget Sound, Wash	798,550.55	----------
Naval station, San Juan, P. R	193,143.83	6,000.00
Naval station, Honolulu, H. I	595,762.32	----------
Total	59,719,004.82	4,425,061.34

The above indicates the magnitude of these yards and stations. It is here that the ships are taken for repair and fully equipped for further service, and as the number of ships increases a corresponding improvement in our yards and stations follows as a necessary sequence in order that they may be able to meet the requirements of a growing navy. The two must go hand in hand. While the committee has not seen fit to recommend what has been asked for to the full extent, yet they have made provision for that amount of public works which can be judiciously carried on during the coming fiscal year. Under the head of public works is that of the completion of the dry docks which are now being built at Portsmouth, Boston, League Island, Mare Island, and the floating dock at Algiers, La., requiring an appropriation of $1,550,000. There has already been appropriated for these docks $1,800,000, making a total of $3,250,000, and $1,800,000 more will be required to complete them.

This bill also provides for the beginning of construction of two more stone dry docks, one at New York and the other at Norfolk, Va. These are urgently demanded by the Department in view of the importance of these two yards, that of New York being the largest and most important and that of Norfolk next. At the present time we have no docks at either place large enough to take in our largest battle ships with safety.

Under "Public Works" is a provision for barracks for enlisted men at New York and Mare Island, to take the place of receiving ships. The *Vermont* is the receiving ship at New York, and is in extremely bad shape and unfit for the purpose for which it is used. The one at Mare Island, the *Independence*, is but little better. Our Government is the last of the maritime nations to adopt the barracks system for its seamen. Every other nation has them. The British Government has already expended $7,600,000 for the purpose of properly housing their seamen. France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Austria, Japan, have already constructed barracks for their seamen.

There are many reasons which are urged in support of the establishment of barracks; among others, that of the health of the men, economy of administration, and the proper recreation for the men. Indeed, it has been estimated that there will be an annual saving to the Government of $150,000 if barracks were substituted in the place of receiving ships at Boston, New York, League Island, Norfolk, and Mare Island.

NAVAL ACADEMY.

The Naval Academy was founded in 1845 by the Hon. George Bancroft, Secretary of the Navy in the Administration of President James K. Polk, and was located at Annapolis, Md., on land occupied by Fort Severn, which was given up by the War Department for the purpose, where it has since remained, except for a short period during the civil war, when it was removed to Newport, R. I.

Reports of the Department and Boards of Visitors have been made from time to time as to the inadequacy and unsafe condition of many of the buildings, some of them being 50 years old, and in the act of May 4, 1898, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Navy to erect a building for an armory at a cost not to exceed $300,000, a boathouse at a cost not to exceed $300,000, a power house at a cost not to exceed $100,000, four double houses for officers' quarters to cost not more than $60,000; for grading, electric-light wiring, removing old buildings, and preparing plant at a cost not to exceed $90,000, and to construct a line of sea wall and for dredging and filling, $150,000, and appropriated $500,000 toward the construction of such work. In the last act, for the purpose of continuing such work, Congress appropriated $720,000 more, making a total of $1,220,000 already appropriated for new work at the Academy.

Naval Academy.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS.			
For completion of buildings, and other works	----------	----------	$720,000
Cadets' quarters	$850,000	$350,000	----------
Power house	200,000	----------	----------
Foundations for general storehouse and engine building	----------	50,000	----------
General storehouse	200,000	----------	----------
Sea wall	200,000	200,000	----------
Foundations for gun battery	90,000	----------	----------
Subway	25,000	----------	----------
Restoration of colonial building	40,000	25,000	----------
Relaying walks	5,000	2,500	----------

Naval Academy.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS—continued.			
Sewerage system	$10,000		
Temporary warehouse	15,000		
Additional land	80,000		
Officers' houses	75,000		
Additional land	181,000		
Grading, paving, etc	50,000	$50,000	
Total	2,021,000	677,500	$720,000

In this bill the committee recommend an appropriation of $350,000 to begin the erection of a building suitable for cadets' quarters at a cost not exceeding $2,500,000. The present cadets' quarters have already been condemned, and the Board of Visitors in their report strongly recommend that new cadets' quarters should be begun as soon as possible. While the Department recommend in their estimate a building to cost not exceeding $3,595,000, which would accommodate cadets to the number of about 500, yet the committee concluded that a building costing $2,500,000 could be built sufficiently large for all present and immediate future needs upon a plan which would allow the addition of wings to be built, as any future increased number of cadets might require. They also recommend the appropriation of $50,000 for foundations for a general storehouse and building for department of steam engineering, which can be made to greater advantage and economy now than later. Two hundred thousand dollars is also recommended for building the sea wall, which is necessary at this time.

The committee also recommend an appropriation of $25,000 for the restoration of the colonial and historical building now used as a library building, but which shall hereafter be used as a residence for the superintendent of the Academy; and for grading and paving, electric-light wiring, and the erection of a temporary electric-light plant, etc., $50,000. The estimates of the Department call for an appropriation of $261,000 toward the purchase of additional lands along the southeasterly line of the Academy grounds, and the Board of Visitors in their report recommend "That, in view of the prospective need of the Academy, it seems to be absolutely necessary that the southeasterly line of the Academy grounds be extended so as to include within the grounds" certain blocks of land, which in their report it is estimated would cost $461,000, including the removal of buildings, grading, etc.

In view of this recommendation made by the board and the estimates asked for in this connection by the Department the committee have seen fit to recommend that—

"The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized and directed to ascertain and report to Congress at its next session what additional grounds, if any, are, in his judgment, needed for the uses of the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis, Md., and to embody in such report a statement showing the estimated actual value of any additional land required in the aggregate, the value, respectively, of the separate parcels into which such lands may be divided, and the prices in detail, at which all additional lands needed, whether acquired as a whole or in separare tracts, can be obtained."

Your committee, while recognizing the importance of rebuilding this institution, have felt constrained to recommend an appropriation somewhat smaller than the estimates, believing that the amount herein recommended is all that can be judiciously expended during the coming fiscal year and that the continuation of the work by degrees from year to year under a careful scrutiny of expenditure will result in the ultimate completion of these new buildings with much more economy than if large appropriations are made.

NAVAL OBSERVATORY.

The appropriation recommended for grounds and roads at the Naval Observatory is the same this year as last, namely, $10,000. The only new provision is that for a building suitable for a dwelling for the foreman and captain of the watch, $2,500, which is urgently needed.

Naval Observatory.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Grounds and roads	$10,000	$10,000	$10,000
New buildings	2,500	2,500	
Do	18,000		
Total	30,500	12,500	10,000

BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY.

The duties of this Bureau are implied in its title, and comprise all that relates to laboratories, naval hospitals, and dispensaries. It designs various buildings erected within the navy-yard for its own purposes, so far as their internal arrangements are concerned, and has control of the same after completion. It designs, builds, and maintains all buildings erected for its own purposes outside of navy-yards, and generally, estimates for and controls all the details of its own organization.

The following table shows the appropriation for last year, the estimates for the fiscal year 1901, and the appropriation recommended by this bill:

Medicine and Surgery.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Medical Department	$75,000	$95,000	$75,000
Naval hospital fund	20,000	40,000	20,000
Contingent	30,000	30,000	30,000
Repairs	20,000	20,000	20,000
Naval hospital, New York	5,000	5,000	
Naval hospital, Newport, R. I	20,000	20,000	
Naval hospital, Mare Island	10,000	10,000	
H. Doc. 398:			
Medical Department	20,000		
Naval hospital fund	20,000		
Cemetery, Chelsea, Mass			2,500
Naval hospital, Chelsea, Mass			45,000
Total	220,000	220,000	192,500

The total increase for this Department amounts to $27,500. This is due to the fact that the necessities of the Bureau are growing in consequence of the increase in the number of men, and also for the reason that supplies have to be sent to our men abroad.

Improvements and additions to our naval hospitals at Newport, New York, and Mare Island are also herein recommended.

A new provision has been inserted providing for an increased number of surgeons, passed assistant and assistant surgeons in the Navy. The surgeons hereafter shall consist of 55. This will be an increase of 5 as now allowed by law. The number of passed assistant and assistant surgeons shall be 110, who shall have rank with the assistant surgeons in the Army. This will be an increase of 20; and it is provided that the assistant surgeons who have made a creditable record during the war with Spain, now in the volunteer service, may be given permanent commissions without limitation as to age.

In recommending this increase the Surgeon-General in his letter to the Secretary of the Navy states that the increased number asked for is imperatively necessary. "In view of the large addition to the enlisted force of the Navy and the establishment of hospitals and sick quarters in the Philippines, Porto Rico, Guam, and Habana, it is simply impossible with the present force to provide adequate medical attendance. Ships and stations are left without assistant surgeons, and the Medical Department of the Navy can not be conducted in the efficient condition that it is the desire of the Department to maintain."

The committee recommend a provision in the nature of an amendment to section 13 of the personnel act, providing that nothing therein contained shall operate to reduce the pay which but for the passage of such act would be received by any commissioned officer. There was such a provision in the personnel act, but under the construction placed by the Comptroller of the Treasury there are a few officers in the Medical Corps whose pay is very materially cut down, as, for instance, that of Passed Assistant Surgeon Urie, whose pay is cut down $600 a year and is likely to continue so for some four or five years.

BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS.

Generally speaking, this is the financial Bureau of the Department. Its duties comprise all that relates to requiring for or preparing provisions, clothing, small stores, and contingent stores of the Pay Department; the purchase of all supplies for the naval establishment except medicines and surgical appliances and instruments and supplies for the Marine Corps, and the keeping of a proper system of accounts of the same. Like the other bureaus, it estimates for and controls its own administration.

The following statement shows the estimates, the amount carried by this bill, and the amount appropriated for the current fiscal year:

Supplies and Accounts.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Provisions, Navy	$3,000,000.00	$2,500,000.00	$3,000,000.00
Contingent	150,000.00	150,000.00	150,000.00
Civil establishment	70,432.03	81,232.03	70,432.03
H. Doc. 398, civil establishment	10,800.00		
Total	3,231,232.03	2,731,232.03	3,220,432.03

From the above table it will be seen that the amount carried by this bill is decreased $489,250 from that of the current year. The appropriations carried by the last act were somewhat larger than necessary, and it is likely that a large balance will be left over. Consequently the committee thought it advisable to reduce the appropriation to what is believed to be the actual needs and necessities of the Bureau.

BUREAU OF CONSTRUCTION AND REPAIR.

The duties of this Bureau comprise all that relate to the designing, building, fitting, and repairing the hulls of ships, their turrets, spars, capstans, windlasses, steering gear, and ventilating apparatus, and, in conjunction with the Bureau of Ordnance, designing the construction of ammunition hoists, their shafts, machinery, and appurtenances; placing and securing armor; placing and securing on board ship the armament and its accessories as manufactured and supplied by the Bureau of Ordnance. It has charge of the care and preservation of ships in reserve, the docking of ships, the designing of slips, and the internal arrangement of the various buildings and shops under its control, and estimates for and controls its own administration.

The following table shows the estimates for 1901, the amount carried by this bill, and the amounts appropriated for 1900:

Construction and Repair.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Construction and repair of vessels	$6,000,000.00	$6,000,000.00	$3,000,000.00
Steel lighters:			
Navy-yard, Portsmouth	50,000.00		
Navy-yard, Boston	10,000.00		
Construction plant:			
Portsmouth	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
Boston	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
New York	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
League Island	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
Norfolk	25,000.00	25,000.00	55,000.00
Pensacola	5,000.00	5,000.00	25,000.00
Mare Island	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
Port Royal	5,000.00	5,000.00	25,000.00
Algiers	25,000.00	25,000.00	
Puget Sound	25,000.00	25,000.00	25,000.00
Civil establishment	25,824.25	25,824.25	23,407.00
Construction plant, Key West			25,000.00
H. Doc. 398, construction and repair	500,000.00		
Total	6,795,824.25	6,235,824.25	3,273,407.00

From the above table it will be seen that there is a large increase in the appropriation proposed for this Bureau, or, in other words, $2,962,407.25 over that of the current year. This increase is practically in one item, that of construction and repair of vessels. As we are increasing the number of our vessels we must necessarily provide for the r preservation and repair. We have also to consider in this connection that our vessels have just come out of a war in need of a larger measure of repair than would be necessary in time of peace.

BUREAU OF STEAM ENGINEERING.

The duties of this Bureau comprise all that relates to designing, building, fitting out, and repairing the steam machinery used for the propulsion of ships, and practically all of the machinery for which steam is the motive power on board ship. Like the other bureaus, it designs the internal arrangement of its various shops at the navy yard and estimates for and controls its own administration.

The following table shows the estimates for the fiscal year 1901, the amount carried by this bill, and the amounts appropriated for the current fiscal year:

Steam Engineering.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Completion, repairing, etc	$1,585,000	$1,585,000	$880,000
Purchasing, handling stores, etc	960,000	960,000	400,000
Incidental expenses	15,000	15,000	10,000
Contingent	1,000	1,000	1,000
Machinery plant:			
Portsmouth	25,000	25,000	
Boston	50,000	50,000	
Mare Island	50,000	50,000	
Algiers	25,000	25,000	
Honolulu	25,000	25,000	
San Juan	25,000	25,000	
Civil establishment	13,200	13,200	13,200
Machinery plant:			
Norfolk			15,000
Puget Sound			25,000
League Island			15,000
New York			50,000
Total	2,774,200	2,774,200	1,209,200

The above table indicates an increase in the appropriation over that of the current year of $1,565,200. The same reasons which are urged in support of the increase under the Bureau of Construction and Repair apply to this Bureau as well. Appropriations are also recommended for machinery plants at Portsmouth, N. H., and Boston, Mass., of $25,000 and $50,000, respectively; $50,000 for machinery plant at Mare Island, Cal.; $25,000 for machinery plant at the naval station, Algiers, La., and $25,000 each for machinery plants at the naval stations at Honolulu and San Juan, in order to fully equip them for the needs of the service.

NAVAL ACADEMY (CIVIL ESTABLISHMENT).

The following table shows the estimates for 1901, the amount carried by the bill, and the amount appropriated for the fiscal year 1900:

Naval Academy.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Pay of professors and others	$57,650.00	$59,991.00	$55,459.00
Pay of watchmen, mechanics, and others	45,529.95	44,069.95	44,069.95
Pay of steam employees	7,824.50	7,824.50	7,824.50
Pay of special course	3,000.00	3,000.00	3,000.00
Repairs	25,000.00	21,000.00	21,000.00
Heating and lighting	20,000.00	20,000.00	20,000.00
Contingent	48,800.00	43,800.00	43,800.00
Total	207,813.45	199,685.45	195,153.45

This is the regular appropriation for the civil establishment of the Academy, and the increase over that of the current year will be seen to amount to $4,532. This is due to the addition of a professor in Spanish, at $2,200, and increase in the salary of the assistant librarian of $400; an increase in the pay of 21 first-class musicians from $340 each to $420 each, and that of 7 second-class musicians from $300 to $360 each.

NAVAL CADETS.

The same provision providing for the restoration of the title of midshipman and the abolishment of the two years' course at sea, as contained in the personnel bill of last year, is herein inserted in this bill. This provision passed the House, but failed to become a law. It restores the time-honored title of midshipman, which was abolished by act of March 5, 1882. Midshipman was a term used to designate the young men who were being trained for naval officers, and is deemed more appropriate than the present appellation.

The discontinuance of the two years' course at sea is something that has been felt by naval officers for many years to be desirable. It gives the cadets their commissions at the end of four years, the same as at West Point, instead of at the end of six years, as now allowed by law, but the abolition of the two years' sea course becomes all the more necessary at this time by reason of the fact that we have to-day a scarcity of officers. In 1872 we added on this two years' sea course for the reason that owing to the decadence of our Navy we did not need officers; but now things have changed. In Senate Document No. 168 in this Congress, the Secretary of the Navy shows in a tabulated statement prepared by the Bureau of Navigation that we need an increase of 697 officers in addition to those we have already on the active list to give a full complement to all ships now in commission and those which could be placed in commission within thirty days in case of urgent necessity. This provision will give a most substantial increase, and in the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation is strongly recommended in these words:

"One of the most important features of the bill (personnel bill) was stricken out, however, before it became a law, and by the omission of this feature—the change from the six-year to the four-year course at the Naval Academy—the number of commissioned officers intended to be provided was so largely reduced that it becomes necessary to ask that some relief be immediately furnished. The Bureau recommends that this serious omission be corrected and that the largely increased demands for officers for important service be met by increasing the number of officers in each grade by 10 per cent and by providing for the four years' course at the Naval Academy."

The Marine Corps is the military branch of the naval service and has made a commendable record.

The following table shows the estimates for 1901, the amounts carried by this bill, and the amounts appropriated for the current fiscal year:

Marine Corps.	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Pay	$1,694,054.23	$1,694,054.23	$1,597,879.23
Provisions	371,071.50	371,071.50	366,071.50
Clothing	290,199.54	290,199.54	290,199.54
Fuel	30,000.00	30,000.00	25,000.00
Military stores	46,297.00	46,297.00	46,297.00
Transportation and recruiting	35,000.00	35,000.00	25,000.00
Repair of barracks	20,000.00	20,000.00	13,600.00
Provisions, clothing, etc			20,400.00
Additions to barracks, New York	15,000.00	15,000.00	
Additions to barracks, Portsmouth	5,000.00	5,000.00	
Building for band, Washington	4,500.00	4,500.00	
New barracks, League Island	100,000.00	100,000.00	
Naval prison, Mare Island	15,000.00	15,000.00	
Officers' quarters, Sitka, Alaska	3,500.00	1,000.00	
Rent, building, Philadelphia	3,300.00	3,300.00	3,300.00
Forage	6,000.00	6,000.00	6,000.00
Hire of quarters	14,748.00	14,748.00	12,624.00
Repair of barracks, Annapolis, Md			50,000.00
Officers' quarters, Annapolis, Md			9,000.00
Grading, etc., Annapolis, Md			8,000.00
Officers' quarters, Annapolis, Md			14,000.00
Contingent	61,700.00	61,700.00	57,500.00
H. Doc. 398:			
Fuel	1,000.00		
Stores	5,000.00		
Transportation and recruiting	5,000.00		
Repair of barracks	7,000.00		
Hire of quarters	2,000.00		
Contingent	5,000.00		
Total	2,740,370.27	2,712,870.27	2,544,271.27

The above table shows an increase over that of the current year of $167,599. This is due to the fact that under the personnel law the Marine Corps was increased in the number of officers and men. At the present time the Marine Corps consists of 1 brigadier-general commandant, 1 adjutant and inspector (colonel), 1 assistant adjutant and inspector (major), 1 quartermaster (colonel), 2 assistant quartermasters (majors), 3 assistant quartermasters (captains), 1 paymaster (colonel), 1 assistant paymaster (major), 4 colonels, 5 lieutenant-colonels, 10 majors, 37 captains, 44 first lieutenants, 37 second lieutenants, and noncommissioned officers and musicians and privates aggregating 4,537 as the number comprised in the corps on the 31st day of January, 1900.

An increase of $7,000 has been made in the appropriation over that of the current year for the renting, leasing, improvement, and erection of barracks in view of the necessities in our foreign stations, where a large number of marines are now doing efficient service. Appropriations are further recommended for additions to barracks at New York, Portsmouth, and Washington, and the erection of new barracks at League Island, and an increase in the size of the prison at Mare Island, and for officers' quarters at Sitka, Alaska, $1,000, in addition to the unexpended balance of an appropriation made in the act of June 10, 1896; in all, $140,500.

INCREASE OF THE NAVY.

This is the last general heading of the naval appropriation bill and one which appeals more strongly to the interest and sentiment of the people. It will be observed by an examination of the following table that the committee has recommended an appropriation to the full amount of the estimates asked for by the Department:

	Estimates, 1901.	Carried by bill.	Appropriated, 1900.
Construction and machinery	*$12,740,699	$12,740,699	$5,932,402
Armor and armament	4,000,000	4,000,000	4,000,000
Equipment	250,000	250,000	400,000
Total	16,990,699	16,990,699	10,332,402

*This was originally $18,733,101, but was corrected by the Department.

We already have under construction, as shown by the Department's report of last December, 61 vessels, as follows:

Vessels authorized and under construction—United States Navy.

	Name.	Speed.	Builder, etc.
	Battle ships (3).		
		Knots.	
No. 5	Kearsarge	17	Newport News.
No. 6	Kentucky	17	Do.
No. 7	Illinois	17	Do.
No. 8	Alabama	17	Cramp & Sons.
No. 9	Wisconsin	17	Union Iron Works.
No. 10	Maine	18	Cramp & Sons.
No. 11	Missouri	18	Newport News.
No. 12	Ohio	18	Union Iron Works.
	Sheathed battle ships (3).		
	Pennsylvania	19	Designs in preparation.
	New Jersey	19	Do.
	Georgia	19	Do.
	Sheathed armored cruisers (3).		
	West Virginia	22	Designs in preparation.
	Nebraska	22	Do.
	California	22	Do.

Vessels authorized and under construction—United States Navy—Continued.

	Name.	Speed.	Builder, etc.
	Sheathed protected cruisers (7).		
		Knots.	
	Albany	20	Armstrong's, England.
No. 14	Denver	17	Neafie & Levy.
No. 15	Des Moines	17	Fore River Engine Co.
No. 16	Chattanooga	17	Lewis Nixon.
No. 17	Galveston	17	Wm. R. Trigg Co.
No. 18	Tacoma	17	Union Iron Works.
No. 19	Cleveland	17	Bath Iron Works.
	Monitors (4).		
No. 7	Arkansas	12	Newport News.
No. 8	Connecticut	12	Bath Iron Works.
No. 9	Florida	12	Lewis Nixon.
No. 10	Wyoming	12	Union Iron Works.
	Gunboat.		
	For Great Lakes. Authorized by act of May 4, 1898. Action suspended.		
	Training vessel for Naval Academy.		
	Chesapeake	(*)	Navy-yard, Boston.
	Torpedo-boat destroyers (16).		
No. 1	Bainbridge	29	Neafie & Levy.
No. 2	Barry	29	Do.
No. 3	Chauncey	29	Do.
No. 4	Dale	28	Wm. R. Trigg Co.
No. 5	Decatur	28	Do.
No. 6	Hopkins	29	Harlan & Hollingsworth.
No. 7	Hull	29	Do.
No. 8	Lawrence	30	Fore River Engine Co.
No. 9	Macdonough	30	Do.
No. 10	Paul Jones	29	Union Iron Works.
No. 11	Perry	29	Do.
No. 12	Preble	29	Do.
No. 13	Stewart	29	Gas Engine and Power Co.
No. 14	Truxtun	30	Maryland Steel Co.
No. 15	Whipple	30	Do.
No. 16	Worden	30	Do.
	Torpedo boats (17).		
No. 9	Dahlgren	30	Bath Iron Works.
No. 10	T. A. M. Craven	30	Do.
No. 19	Stringham	30	Harlan & Hollingsworth.
No. 20	Goldsborough	30	Wolff & Zwicker.
No. 21	Bailey	30	Gas Engine and Power Co.
No. 24	Bagley	28	Bath Iron Works.
No. 25	Barney	28	Do.
No. 26	Biddle	28	Do.
No. 27	Blakely	26	Geo. Lawley & Sons.
No. 28	De Long	26	Do.
No. 29	Nicholson	26	Lewis Nixon.
No. 30	O'Brien	26	Do.
No. 31	Shubrick	26	Wm. R. Trigg Co.
No. 32	Stockton	26	Do.
No. 33	Thornton	26	Do.
No. 34	Tingey	26	Columbian Iron Works.
No. 35	Wilkes	26.5	Gas Engine and Power Co.
	Submarine torpedo boat.		
No. 1	Plunger	8	Columbian Iron Works.

*Sailing vessel.

The above accounts for the large increase in the appropriation of $6,748,297 over that of the last appropriation act under the head of "Construction and machinery," which is used toward the completion of vessels now in process of construction. This work must go on year by year until the vessels are in commission. Since that time the *Kearsarge* has been put in commission. She is regarded as having the most powerful ordnance of any battle ship in the Navy at the present time. The distinctive feature of her armament is that of four 13-inch guns, with four 8-inch guns in superposed turrets. She is probably the most powerful fighting ship afloat, and is the acme of modern naval architecture and mechanism.

ARMOR AND ARMAMENT.

Under the act of May 4, 1898, the battle ships *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri* were authorized, and the provision was inserted in that act providing that $400 per ton should be the maximum price to be paid for armor. Harveyized armor could have been purchased for the battle ships at that price, but it was the opinion of the Department that the best armor was none too good. The act of March 3, 1899, provided that no armor for the ships above mentioned, as well as for those authorized by that act, should be purchased unless at a price not exceeding $300 per ton. This is the situation to-day. As regards these ships, it is important that the Secretary of the Navy should have authority to contract for their armor at once, otherwise their construction will be delayed at a great loss to the Government.

The battle ships above mentioned—the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*, now in process of construction—require 7,359.42 tons of armor, or 2,453.14 for each vessel. It is believed by the committee that these battle ships of nearly 13,000 tons displacement, the largest in design which have ever been planned by the Navy Department, should have the best obtainable armor, and accordingly your committee recommend that the Secretary of the Navy be authorized to contract for such armor at a cost not to exceed $545 per ton. The best obtainable armor at the present time is, according to all naval authorities, the so-called Krupp armor, which is, at least, and has been so proven by ballistic tests, of 25 per cent greater efficiency than that of the harveyized armor. Every nation in the world is using the Krupp armor to-day. Your committee believe that it is little short of disloyalty to recommend any other than the best protection and the best armor for these battle ships to be placed between the bodies of our officers and men and the bullets of the enemy.

Under the last naval appropriation act Congress authorized the construction of the three battle ships *Georgia*, *Pennsylvania*, and *New Jersey*, and three armed cruisers, *West Virginia*, *Nebraska*, and *California*, but inserted a provision therein as follows:

"That no contracts for the armor for any vessels authorized by this act shall be made at an average rate exceeding $300 per ton of 2,240 pounds, including royalties, and in no case shall a contract be made for the construction of the hull of any vessel authorized by this act until a contract has been made for the armor of such vessel."

Your committee recommend that this restriction be removed and that contracts be authorized so that the construction of the hulls of these vessels may go on without further delay.

NAVAL PROGRAMME.

For the purpose of increasing the naval establishment of the United States the committee recommend that the President be authorized to have built by contract two seagoing coast-line battle ships, carrying the heaviest armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class upon a trial displacement of about 13,500 tons, and to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not exceeding $3,600,000 each; three armored cruisers of about 13,000 tons trial displacement, carrying the heaviest armor and most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, and to have the highest practicable speed and great radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armor and armament, not exceeding $4,250,000 each, and three protected cruisers of about 8,000 tons trial displacement, carrying the most powerful ordnance for vessels of their class, and to have the highest speed compatible with good cruising qualities and great radius of action, and to cost, exclusive of armament, not exceeding $2,800,000 each.

The maximum cost of the ships herein authorized, exclusive of armor and armament, will be $28,350,000. This is the largest naval programme ever submitted by the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House and is in accord with the wishes and recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy and Admiral Dewey and will, we believe, meet the just demands of public sentiment. The past year in naval construction has been marked by the most liberal naval programmes on the part of all foreign nations. At the present time there is pending in the Reichstag of Germany a naval bill which, if passed, will increase the tonnage of the present German navy 422,000 tons, a larger tonnage than that of her present navy.

In the apt words of our able Secretary of the Navy—

"Not only is the importance of sea power recognized in our own country, but it is recognized abroad. If you are simply going to keep pace with other nations you will recognize the importance of an immense naval increase. * * * The public mind expects that you will do something toward giving us a navy commensurate with the present and increasing needs of the country."

OUR PRESENT NAVY.

Our Navy at the present time, including all ships authorized as well as those under construction, will be seen by the following table:

Summary showing the number of vessels in the United States Navy.

REGULAR NAVY.

First-class battle ships	15
Second-class battle ship	1
Armored cruisers	5
Armored ram	1
Steel single-turret monitors	4
Double-turreted monitors	6
Iron single-turret monitors	9
Protected cruisers	21
Unprotected cruisers	4
Gunboats	12
Light-draft gunboats	3
Composite gunboats	6
Training ship (Naval Academy)	1
Special class	2
Gunboats under 500 tons	19
Torpedo-boat destroyers	16
Steel torpedo boats	36
Submarine torpedo boat	1
Wooden torpedo boat	1
Iron cruising vessels	5
Wooden cruising vessels	7
Sailing vessels, wooden	6
Tugs	17
Wooden steam vessels unfit for sea service	11
Wooden sailing vessels unfit for sea service	6
Total number of vessels in Regular Navy	215

Of these we have recovered and added to the Navy the following vessels, which were sunk during the war with Spain:

Name.	Type.	Name.	Type.
Reina Mercedes	Cruiser.	Isla de Cuba	Gunboat.
Don Juan de Austria	Gunboat.	Isla de Luzon	Do.

AUXILIARY NAVY.

Merchant vessels converted into auxiliary cruisers	7
Converted yachts	25
Converted tugs	27
Steamers converted into colliers	17
Special class	12
Total number of vessels in Auxiliary Navy	88
Grand total	303

The names, types, size, speed, batteries, and armor of the vessels will be more clearly understood by an examination of the table hereinafter annexed:

Our Navy to-day ranks fourth among the navies of the world—England first, France second, Russia third, United States fourth, and Germany fifth. We are ahead of Germany to-day only by 2,720 tons—a cruiser about the size of the *Atlanta*.

In view of the fact that seventeen years ago, when we started in to build up a new navy, our rank was that of twentieth, and that to-day we stand fourth, no one will dispute but that in the intervening years we have made magnificent progress.

THE COST OF OUR NEW NAVY.

The cost of our Navy, as shown by table hereinafter annexed, from the time we authorized its first vessels—the *Atlanta*, *Boston*, *Chicago*, and *Dolphin*—on March 3, 1883, including vessels authorized and under construction, is as follows:

Actual cost of finished vessels	$98,529,511.85
Estimated final cost of vessels now in course of construction	62,570,610.23
Total	161,100,122.08

And the Secretary of the Navy in his report says:

"The total for finished vessels of $98,529,511.85 and the estimated total for unfinished vessels of $62,570,610.23 make not a large amount comparatively in view of the result, which is a new navy of efficient and powerful vessels prepared for the emergencies of national defense. It is hardly more than the sum paid in a single year for pensions to the soldiers and sailors who served a generation ago in the late civil war."

OUR NAVAL POLICY.

It will be seen from an investigation of the following table, showing the amounts carried by the annual naval appropriation acts from 1883 down to the present time, that our policy has been to gradually build up the Navy year by year. Each naval appropriation act has usually been marked by a considerable increase in the amount of appropriations over that of the preceding year, and also in the number of new ships. During the last few years the increased number of ships has been larger, owing to the recognized growing importance of sea power the world over.

Amounts carried by the naval appropriation bills since 1883.

	Appropriation.
1883	$14,819,976.80
1884	15,894,434.23
1885	14,980,472.59
1886	15,070,837.95
1887	16,489,907.20
1888	25,767,348.19
1889	19,942,835.25
1890	21,692,510.27
1891	24,136,035.53
1892	32,541,654.78
1893	23,543,385.00
1894	22,104,061.38
1895	25,327,126.72
1896	20,416,245.31
1897	30,582,660.95
1898	33,006,234.19
1899	56,098,783.68
1900	48,099,969.58

It may be said that the country has been fortunate in having men at the head of the naval administration who have given direction and made wise recommendations in building up the new navy. The first authorization for new ships was during the administration of Secretary Chandler. Under Whitney the first battle ships, the *Maine* and *Texas*, called second-class battle ships, also some of the large cruisers and monitors, were authorized. Under Tracy we commenced to build first-class battle ships, the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, *Iowa*, and *Oregon*, as well as cruisers.

Under Herbert there was authorized a number of torpedo boats and gunboats, as well as the construction of more battle ships. Under Long we have authorized and are building battle ships, cruisers, monitors, gunboats, torpedo boats, and torpedo-boat destroyers, as well as building dry docks and making improvements in the navy-yards necessary to the proper maintenance of our naval establishment. We have a navy to-day which includes a considerable number of vessels of every class, and ship for ship it will equal that of any navy in the world.

Seventeen years ago we had practically no facilities for building ships, and what we had were discredited. We were obliged to buy our armament and armor, and even in one case our plans, from foreign countries. To day we are not only building ships in American shipyards, of American material, by American labor, on American plans for ourselves, but also for some of the leading nations of the world. Such has been the advance which has been made in naval progress in our own country.

The question may be asked, What shall be our future naval policy?

Let us build as we have been building—gradually, on broad lines and upon the most advanced ideas of naval construction; not so fast that we will be ahead of the advance of naval progress, but slow enough to secure all the benefits of new improvements and new inventions; or, better still, to do as the American Navy has always done, when given an opportunity, to lead the march of the best naval construction, which it demonstrated its ability to do on at least one memorable occasion in American history—when the little "cheese box of Ericsson" in that great contest with the *Merrimac* blazed the pathway for the mighty battle ship of to-day.

THE PRINCIPAL NAVIES.

The following data are taken from a British parliamentary paper entitled "Return, showing the fleets of Great Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, United States of America, and Japan, distinguishing: Battle ships, built and building; cruisers, built and building; coast-defense vessels, built and building; torpedo vessels, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo boats, built and building," which, as therein stated, is compiled from the "official list of each navy," and has been supplemented by some fuller and later data on hand in the Office of Naval Intelligence (United States). It is therefore correct.

It must be clearly borne in mind that there are in every navy certain classes of vessels which appear in the official navy list, but which can not be considered as forming part of that navy's fighting force.

These are:

(*a*) Obsolete ships;
(*b*) Receiving ships;
(*c*) Sailing and training ships, brigs, etc.;
(*d*) Tugs and miscellaneous.

All these classes are omitted from the tonnage given below.

Neither are there included in these data any auxiliary vessels, such as yachts or merchant vessels, for it would mean practically the addition of the merchant marine of the several countries, all of which is available.

The table and diagram give tonnage, then, only of vessels actually constructed for war purposes.

Fig. I. Table I.

This second table (construction since 1890) was felt necessary for two reasons:

(1) It eliminates all obsolete vessels and makes a comparison of modern construction possible;

(2) It also gives the construction of the several countries from a date which marks the intense revival of naval construction everywhere.

From these tables the position occupied by the United States is fourth, with Germany a very close fifth. But this close relative position is not likely to be long occupied by these two countries, because there is included in the tonnage of the United States 23,000 tons of old monitors, which should be removed as useless.

Also, Germany has incalculable advantage of a definite building programme, which is given on page 26. From this it is seen that Germany will certainly construct as new tonnage the following:

	Tons.
13 battle ships of 11,000 tons	143,000
9 battle ships of 11,000 tons to replace old	99,000
8 battle ships of 11,000 tons to replace old	88,000
9 large cruisers of 5,500 tons, new tonnage	49,500
16 small cruisers of 2,000 tons, new tonnage	32,000
30 torpedo-boat destroyers of 350 tons, new tonnage	10,500
Total	422,000

This construction is only such as is to be provided for by the naval programme of this year. Should any excitement or threat of war arise, the additions to this programme can not be estimated. And the advantage in time and efficiency of ship construction that will result from such a programme must always be kept in mind. Every ship built improves the facilities for the construction of the next one.

The average tonnage is obtained by dividing the total tonnage by the number of vessels. In the case of England and the United States the large average is due to the relatively small number of torpedo vessels.

The position of Italy is sixth, with Japan a pressing rival; for, on carefully examining the table of construction since 1890, we find that Japan is much ahead of Italy, and the construction in the last ten years is practically the available force in case of emergency. This is a good illustration of the fact that "tonnage" is by no means a definite measure of strength, as out of 148,588 tons of Italian B. S., 108,189 tons were constructed between 1863 and 1888, the older vessels are obsolete, and the later so nearly so that they are being tinkered with and remodeled, at enormous expense and with entirely unsatisfactory results. The compact, homogeneous Japanese fleet of battle ships would doubtless be superior.

FIG. II.

This figure gives the construction for each year from 1890 to 1900, inclusive. It is almost impossible to obtain the data for ships "laid down" each year, for in so many cases, especially France and Italy, the delay in actually laying the keel after the order has been given frequently amounts to several years. The data concerning "vessels launched" are more definite, and Table II has been constructed accordingly from the data on vessels launched.

In the case of the year 1900 the data mean vessels building and not yet launched, a portion of which will be launched in 1900 and others laid down. For purposes of comparison the plan adopted is believed to be the better.

Table I gives in tabular form the tonnage of vessels of each class: (*a*) built, (*b*) building, and (*c*) built since 1890. This table is but Fig. II amplified.

The Germany navy in 1916 will be about as given on page 27. All these vessels are to be vessels available for "active service." Now, rule 2 of the German shipbuilding law of 1898 provides for substitute vessels as follows:

Battle ships and armored coast-defense vessels must be replaced after twenty-five years.

Large cruisers after twenty years.

Small cruisers after fifteen years.

These periods run from the year in which the first installment of the displaced vessel is paid to the time of the first payment of the substitute vessel.

Germany has four vessels of the *Sachsen* class, built in 1877 and 1878 and remodeled in 1894-95; the *Oldenburg*, a very old vessel; six of the *Siegfried* class, 1889-1892; two of the *Odin* class; the *Kaiser* and *Deutschland* of 1875; all of which are to be replaced by first-class battle ships, and the four vessels of the *Wörth* class of 1891-92, which also will have to be replaced. In the cruiser class there are a number of vessels built between 1889 and 1897 which will similarly be replaced. Hence, to complete the programme of 1916 more vessels will be constructed than appears by a mere examination of the table.

	England.	France.	Russia.	United States.	Germany.	Italy.	Japan.
Built:							
B. S	584,855	295,834	117,240	48,519	112,239	148,588	31,970
Ar. Cr	131,660	44,080	68,216	17,415	24,713	17,203	21,950
Pr. Cr	484,165	125,888	11,977	61,659	53,389	42,112	51,602
Unpr. Cr	38,510	44,063	8,400	14,397	43,590	2,279	23,776
C. D	50,080	43,328	44,200	51,884	12,001	None.	10,280
Spec	15,660	5,994	5,160	929	4,026	11,542	4,120
Torp. Ves	27,790	8,898	14,391	None.	1,832	11,672	850
T. B. D	23,375	590	240	273	300	None.	2,300
T. B	7,650	15,222	11,456	1,891	12,993	8,218	2,109
Subs	None.	436	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
Total	1,363,745	584,333	281,280	193,967	265,113	241,614	148,957
Building:							
B. S	238,750	43,765	145,672	135,625	102,620	44,516	60,450
Ar. Cr	167,600	111,207	19,964	36,000	19,342	21,882	38,534
Pr. Cr	44,005	18,311	44,516	25,200	19,180	5,082	5,500
Unpr. Cr	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
C. D	None.	None.	4,126	12,940	None.	None.	None.
Spec	None.	None.	5,000	None.	None.	None.	6,740
Torp. Ves	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
T. B. D	10,820	3,022	6,970	7,607	4,550	3,673	1,200
T. B	None.	3,945	1,000	2,186	None.	1,360	3,054
Subs	None.	936	None.	None.	None.	None.	None.
Total	461,175	181,186	227,248	219,558	145,692	76,513	115,478
Grand total	1,824,920	765,519	508,528	413,525	410,805	318,127	264,435
Built since 1890:							
B. S	532,350	173,083	205,822	184,144	177,169	71,223	85,200
Ar. Cr	167,600	136,814	43,197	53,415	19,342	39,085	60,484
Pr. Cr	429,750	97,196	48,344	59,794	61,449	19,285	40,408
Unpr. Cr	None.	None.	None.	9,687	9,549	None.	1,800
C. D	None.	3,534	18,346	19,179	None.	None.	None.
Spec	None.	5,994	8,605	None.	2,322	None.	None.
Torp. Ves. of all classes	52,425	21,319	15,070	11,926	10,882	15,739	8,504
Total	1,182,125	437,940	339,384	338,145	280,713	145,332	196,396

B. S.=Battle ships, i. e., vessels usually of large tonnage (the present practice giving between 10,500 and 15,000 tons), with maximum offense and defense; protection to hull by vertical side armor; protective deck; coal bunkers

and cellulose; guns protected by barbettes, turrets, casemates, and shields.

Ar. Cr.=Armored cruisers, i. e., vessels of moderate to large tonnage, with protection to hull and battery similar to that of battle ships, except that the thickness of metal in all cases is much less, which with the weight saved by carrying lighter guns gives opportunity to make the speed and steaming radius of the armored cruiser much greater than the battle ship.

Pr. Cr.=Protected cruisers, i. e., vessels usually of small to moderate tonnage, with protection to hull by protective deck, coal bunkers, and cellulose. No side armor. No turrets or barbettes or casemates; guns protected by gun shields.

Unpr. Cr.=Unprotected cruisers, i. e., vessels without any of the protection of the above classes. It will be noticed that no country has constructed a vessel of this class for many years.

C. D.=Coast defense, i. e., vessels with many of the characteristics of B. S. in having thick armor for hull and battery protection; large guns; small speed; limited coal supply, which means small steaming radius. Usually these vessels have low free-board and are not good seagoing vessels.

Especial attention is invited to the fact that no country, except the United States and Russia, has constructed such a vessel for many years. This point is regarded as very important in estimating the naval strength of the several powers.

The expression "coast defense" as applied to ships is almost unknown abroad. It appears in the United States in the construction of the monitor class and in France in the furor with which the construction of submarine boats is undertaken.

A study of the policy of *the* real maritime nations—England and Germany—shows that the defense is always to be offense. Both these countries are building only *seagoing battle ships, large cruisers*, and all torpedo *boat* construction has been abandoned for the construction of *torpedo boat destroyers*.

Torp. Ves.=Torpedo vessels, a class, 700 to 1,000 tons, which experience has shown to have neither the merits of gunboats nor of sufficient speed to catch torpedo boats; and therefore construction of this class has ceased.

T. B. D.=Torpedo-boat destroyers, vessels of 200 to 400 tons, strong construction good seagoing qualities, very high speed, and large steaming radius.

T. B.=Torpedo boats, vessels from 30 to 200 tons, no longer being built in England or Germany, which, as above stated, are building only the destroyer.

The above explanation is considered necessary to an understanding of naval strength.

MEMORANDUM OF INFORMATION FOR HON. GEORGE EDMUND FOSS, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF NAVAL COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

The accompanying memorandum, prepared for transmittal to Hon. GEORGE EDMUND FOSS, acting chairman of the Naval Committee, House of Representatives, is in response to a request addressed by him to the Chief Intelligence Officer on February 23, 1900.

The present statement of the comparative strength of the principal navies supplements one of February 17, 1900 (O. N. I., 1172). The earlier statement was based upon tonnage; the present one is based upon the number of ships of the various types in the principal navies.

C. D. SIGSBEE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Chief Intelligence Officer.

FEBRUARY 27, 1900.

Comparative strength of the principal navies.

[Statement based on the numerical strength in ships.]

Nation.	Battle ships.		Armored cruisers.		Protected cruisers.		Unprotected cruisers.		Coast defense and special service.	
	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.
		Tons.		*Tons.*		*Tons.*		*Tons.*		*Tons.*
England	70	823,605	31	299,290	116	528,170	15	38,510	16	65,740
France	35	339,599	20	155,287	40	144,199	14	44,063	15	51,316
Russia	24	262,912	12	88,180	11	53,493	3	8,400	23	58,486
United States	16	184,149	5	53,145	21	86,859	6	11,397	24	65,753
Germany	27	214,859	5	44,055	23	53,389	21	43,590	14	16,026
Italy	19	193,104	7	39,085	18	47,194	1	2,279	2	11,542
Japan	7	92,429	7	60,484	17	57,102	24	23,776	6	21,180

Nation.	Torpedo vessels.		Torpedo-boat destroyers.		Torpedo boats.		Sub marines.		Grand total.	
	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.	No.	Total displacement.
		Tons.		*Tons.*		*Tons.*		*Tons.*		*Tons.*
England	25	27,790	108	34,195	95	7,650	0	0	488	1,824,920
France	15	8,898	12	3,612	267	19,167	12	1,372	429	765,519
Russia	17	14,391	36	7,210	180	12,436	0	0	306	508,528
United States	0	0	20	7,880	30	3,977	0	0	122	413,525
Germany	2	1,862	15	4,850	112	12,993	0	0	220	410,805
Italy	15	15,345	11	3,673	154	9,578	0	0	227	318,127
Japan	1	850	12	3,500	58	5,163	0	0	132	264,435

The diagram which follows shows graphically the number of vessels of the several classes for seven countries; the armored cruisers, protected cruisers, unprotected cruisers, and torpedo vessels are grouped into two general classes, called cruisers and gunboats, all above 2,000 tons being cruisers, and from 2,000 to 400 tons gunboats.

The tabular statement gives vessels built and actually under construction; the diagram presents the same information graphically.

FOREIGN NAVAL PROGRAMMES.

ENGLAND.

A yearly programme in accordance with a carefully devised plan for the construction of a homogeneous fleet. Parliament and the nation have long accepted the principle that her naval strength must be equal in numbers and superior in power to that of the two strongest navies in the world, and the British estimates, which include the naval programme, are framed on this principle.

During the present fiscal year it was proposed to lay down—
Two battle ships (design not decided).
Two armored cruisers, 9,800 tons each.
Three small cruisers (design not decided).
Two gunboats.
Two first class torpedo boats.

FRANCE.

A shipbuilding programme drawn up in 1891, modified in 1896, covering a period extending to 1907, provided for the construction of 204 ships. Owing to recent events and the disorganized state of French finances, this programme has been practically abandoned after being about half carried out.

France is at present without a definite policy beyond finishing the ships already in hand. The minister of marine proposes a building programme which will supply the number of vessels necessary to make the French navy a homogeneous force. This programme comprises the laying down, beginning this year, of the following vessels:

Six battle ships of 14,865 tons each.
Five armored cruisers of 12,600 tons each.
Twenty-eight torpedo destroyers.
One hundred and twelve torpedo boats.
Twenty-six submarine boats.

These 177 units will cost 476,000,000 francs, and are to be completed by 1907. A further sum of 235,000,000 francs is to be added to complete the ships now building, which will be finished by 1903, so that, up to 1907, France proposes to spend 711,000,000 francs in the construction of her fleet.

GERMANY.

In 1898 a shipbuilding programme, known as the "Sexennate law," provided for a definite yearly increase of the German navy up to 1904. The Emperor, is actively agitating the subject of a further increase, and a new programme, which practically doubles the fleet, is now before the Reichstag, which will probably be adopted.

According to this programme the following table shows the present strength and as projected in 1916:

	1900.	1916.
Battle ships	17	40
Armored ships	8	8
Large cruisers	11	20
Small cruisers	27	48
Gunboats	5	
Torpedo boats	84	114
Total	152	230

ITALY.

Programme of 1899-1904. The purpose of the Government is to expedite the ships in hand in such a way that they may be completed within four years, together with two new battle ships to be laid down. Under existing conditions a period of six years will be required to complete the seven ships now building, and to augment the credits in the present financial state of the country is declared to be impossible. In order that the work may go on it is proposed that the treasury shall advance money to the navy, to be repaid in installments out of the money voted for naval purposes up to the year 1905. In this way the Italian fleet would possess in July, 1904, 21 battle ships fully completed.

JAPAN.

The naval programme of 1895 of new construction is to be completed by April 1, 1906. By 1901 there are to be 54 ships in readiness; by 1906, 63 more; or a total of 117 war ships. These are divided as follows:

Four battle ships.
Four first-class armored cruisers.
Three second-class armored cruisers.
Two third-class armored cruisers.
Fifteen torpedo cruisers.
Eighty-nine torpedo boats.

All these vessels are at present either completed or in process of construction.

RUSSIA.

According to the Russian programme the expenditure for new construction for the seven years 1898-1904 is placed at 157,000,000 roubles (about $81,000,000).

UNITED STATES.

The act of Congress making appropriation for increase of the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, provided for the construction of three seagoing coast-line battle ships, sheathed and coppered; three armored cruisers, sheathed and coppered, and six protected cruisers, sheathed and coppered.

Expenditure on new construction for five years.

[In million dollars.]

Nation.	1895-96.	1896-97.	1897-98.	1898-99.	1900.	Total.	Remarks.
England	27.9	37.8	36.8	39.2	45.0	186.7	
France	16.9	17.4	20.2	19.8	21.0	95.3	
Russia	10.3	9.3	7.7	9.8	17.3	54.4	Includes repairs.
United States	8.1	11.2	6.4	13.6	6.0	45.3	
Germany	3.9	4.7	9.0	9.7	10.6	37.9	
Italy	4.4	4.3	3.5	4.2	4.1	20.5	
Total	71.5	84.7	83.6	96.3	104.0		

FEBRUARY 17, 1900.



AVERAGE TONS DISPLACEMENT
- TOTALS IN BLACK FACE TYPE -

	TABLE No. I				TABLE No. II			
	GRAND TOTALS (BUILT AND BUILDING)			No. of vessels	TOTALS (BUILT SINCE 1890)			No. of vessels
England	1,824,920 tons	3,626 tons	aver.	506	1,182,125 tons	4,380 tons	aver.	270
France	765,519 "	1,836 "	"	417	437,940 "	2,000 "	"	219
Russia	508,528 "	1,718 "	"	294	339,384 "	2,900 "	"	117
U.S.	413,525 "	3,390 "	"	122	338,145 "	3,559 "	"	95
Germany	419,805 "	1,867 "	"	220	280,713 "	3,000 "	"	94
Italy	318,127 "	1,401 "	"	227	145,332 "	1,371 "	"	106
Japan	264,435 "	2,003 "	"	132	196,392 "	2,455 "	"	80

No 2

NEW CONSTRUCTIONS

In Tons Displacement, 1890-1900

(Including Torp. Ves. and T.B.D., but not T.B.)




COMPARATIVE STRENGTH
NUMBER of VESSELS
(Full Lines = Built
(Broken " = Building
Battle Ships
Cruisers
Gun Boats
Coast Defence & Special
Torpedo Boat Destroyers
Torpedo Boats
NATIONS
England
France
Russia
Italy
Germany
U.S.
Japan

FIRST-CLASS BATTLE SHIPS.

Name.	Type.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Armor.		
		Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Sides.	Turrets.	Barbettes.
		Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inches.*	*Inches*	*Inches*
Alabama	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets	368 0	72 2½	23 6	*11,565	†16	4 13″ B. L. R. 14 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. R. F. 6 1-pdr. R. F. 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 long Whitehead.	Top 16½ Bottom 9½ Water line 13½	14	15 10
Illinois	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets	368 0	72 2½	23 6	*11,565	†16	4 13″ B. L. R. 14 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. R. F. 6 1-pdr. R. F. 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 long Whitehead.	Top 16½ Bottom 9½ Water line 13½	14	15 10
Indiana	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets 4 8″ barbette turrets	348 0	69 3	25 1½	10,810	15.547	4 13″ B. L. R. 8 8″ B. L. R. 4 6″ R. F. guns	20 6-pdr. R. F. 7 1-pdr. R. F. 2 3″ R. F. field	2 Whitehead.	18	15 6	17 8 6
Iowa	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 12″ barbette turrets 4 8″ barbette turrets	360 0	72 2½	24 0	11,340	17.087	4 12″ B. L. R. 8 8″ B. L. R. 6 4″ R. F. guns	20 6-pdr. R. F. 4 1-pdr. R. F. 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 Howell	14	15 8 7	15 8 6
Kearsarge	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets 2 8″ turrets superposed	368 0	72 2½	23 6	11,525	16.816	4 13″ B. L. R. 4 8″ B. L. R. 14 5″ R. F. guns	20 6-pdr. R. F. 6 1-pdr. R. F 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 long Whitehead.	Top 16½ Bottom 9½ Water line 13½	17 15 11 9	15 12½
Kentucky	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets 2 8″ turrets superposed	368 0	72 2½	23 6	11,525	†16	4 13″ B. L. R. 4 8″ B. L. R. 14 5″ R. F. guns	20 6-pdr. R. F. 6 1-pdr. R. F 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 long Whitehead.	Top 16½ Bottom 9½ Water line 13½	17 15 11 9	15 12½
Maine	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 12″ barbette turrets	388 0	72 2½	23 6	12,300	†18	4 12″ B. L. R. 16 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. Maxim-Nordenfelt. 4 1-pdr. automatic 2 1-pdr. R. F. guns 2 3″ R. F. field 2 Colt automatic.	2 submerged.	Top 11 Bottom 7½ §	12 11	12 8
Massachusetts	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets 4 8″ barbette turrets	348 0	69 3	25 1½	10,810	16.21	4 13″ B. L. R. 8 8″ B. L. R. 4 6″ R. F. guns	20 6 pdr. R. F. 8 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	2 Whitehead.	18	15 6	17 8 6
Missouri	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 12″ barbette turrets	388 0	72 2½	23 6	12,230	†18	4 12″ B. L. R. 16 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. Maxim-Nordenfelt. 4 1-pdr. automatic 2 1-pdr. R. F. guns 2 3″ R. F. field 2 Colt automatic.	2 submerged.	Top 11 Bottom 7½ §	12 11	12 8
Ohio	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 12″ barbette turrets.	388 0	72 2½	23 6	12,440	†18	4 12″ B. L. R. 16 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. Maxim-Nordenfelt. 4 1-pdr. automatic 2 1-pdr. R. F. guns. 2 3″ R. F. field 2 Colt automatic.	2 submerged.	Top 11 Bottom 7½ §	12 11	12 8
Oregon	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets 4 8″ barbette turrets	348 0	69 3	25 4½	11,000	16.79	4 13″ B. L. R. 8 8″ B. L. R. 4 6″ R. F. guns	20 6-pdr. R. F. 2 1-pdr. R. F. 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	2 Whitehead.	18	15 6	17 8 6
Wisconsin	Seagoing coast-line battle ship. 2 13″ barbette turrets	368 0	72 2½	23 6	*11,565	†16	4 13″ B. L. R. 14 6″ R. F. guns	16 6-pdr. R. F. 6 1-pdr. R. F 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 long Whitehead.	Top 16½ Bottom 9½ Water line 13½	14	15 10
Georgia	Authorized, but not contracted for.				13,500							
New Jersey	do				13,500							
Pennsylvania	do				13,500							

SECOND-CLASS BATTLE SHIPS.

Texas	Armored battle ship. 2 12″ turrets.	301 4	64 1	22 6	6,315	17.8	9 12″ B. L. R. 2 6″ B. L. R.	12 6-pdr. R. F 6 1-pdr. R. F 4 37mm H. R. C. 2 Colts 1 field gun	2 Whitehead.	12	12	

ARMORED CRUISERS.

Brooklyn	Armored cruiser. 4 8″ barbette turrets	400 6	64 8½	24 0	9,215	21.91	8 8″ B. L. R. 12 5″ R. F. guns	12 6-pdr. R. F 4 1-pdr. R. F 4 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	4 Whitehead.	3	5½	8 and 4
New York	Armored cruiser. 2 8″ barbette turrets	380 6½	64 10	23 8½	8,200	21	6 8″ B. L. R. 12 4″ R. F. guns	8 6-pdr. R. F. 2 1-pdr. R. F. 2 Colts 2 3″ R. F. field	2 Whitehead.	4	5½	10
California	Authorized but not contracted for.				12,000							
Nebraska					12,600							
West Virginia					12,000							

* With two-thirds of ammunition and two-thirds of stores. † Estimated. § Above main belt.

ARMORED STEEL VESSELS—SINGLE-TURRET HARBOR-DEFENSE MONITORS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped, ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Armor.			Protective deck.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Sides.	Turrets.	Barbettes.	Slopes.	Flat.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inches.*	*Inches.*	*Inches.*	*Inches.*	*Inches.*
Arkansas	252 0	50 0	12 6	3,235	*11½	2 12″ B. L. R 4 4″ R. F	6 6-pdr. R. F 5 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	None	11	10	11	.....	1½
Connecticut	252 0	50 0	12 6	3,235	*11½	2 12″ B. L. R 4 4″ R. F	6 6-pdr. R. F 5 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	None	11	10	11	.....	1½
Florida	252 0	50 0	12 6	3,235	*11½	2 12″ B. L. R 4 4″ R. F	6 6-pdr. R. F 5 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	None	11	10	11	.....	1½
Wyoming	252 0	50 0	12 6	3,235	*11½	2 12″ B. L. R 4 4″ R. F	6 6-pdr. R. F 5 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	None	11	10	11	.....	1½

*Estimated.

ARMORED VESSELS—DOUBLE-TURRETED MONITORS.

Name.	Type.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Armor.		
		Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Sides.	Turrets.	Barbettes.
		Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inches.*	*Inches.*	*Inches.*
Amphitrite	Iron low-freeboard coast-defense monitor. 2 steel barbette turrets	259 6	55 6	14 6	3,990	10.5	4 10″ B. L. R 2 4″ R. F. guns	2 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 5 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 3″ R. F. Field. 1 Colt	.....	9 5	7½	11½
Miantonomoh	Iron low-freeboard coast-defense monitor. 2 compound armor turrets.	259 6	55 6	14 6	3,990	10.5	4 10″ B. L. R	2 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 3-pdr. R. F. G. 6 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Gatling	.....	7	11½	.....
Monadnock	Iron low-freeboard coast-defense monitor. 2 steel barbette turrets.	259 6	55 6	14 7	4,005	12	4 10″ B. L. R 2 4″ R. F. guns	2 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 2 1-pdr. R. F. G.	.....	9 5	7½	11½
Monterey	Steel low-freeboard monitor. 2 steel barbette turrets	256 0	59 0	14 10	4,084	13.6	2 12″ B. L. R 2 10″ B. L. R	6 6-pdr. R. F 4 1-pdr. R. F 2 Gatlings 1 field gun	.....	13 8 6	Forward 8 Aft 7½	Forward 13 Aft 11½.
Puritan	Iron low-free board coast-defense monitor. 2 steel barbette turrets	290 3	60 1½	18 0	6,060	12.4	4 12″ B. L. R 6 4″ R. F. guns	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 2 1 pdr. R. F	.....	14 10 6	8	14
Terror	Iron low-freeboard coast-defense monitor. 2 steel turrets	259 6	55 6	14 6	3,990	10.5	4 10″ B. L. R	2 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 2 1-pdr. R. F	.....	7 4	11½	.....

UNARMORED PROTECTED CRUISERS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Protective deck.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Slopes.	Flat.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inches.*	*Inches.*
Atlanta	271 3	42 1½	16 10	3,000	15.60	6 6″ R. F. guns 1 8″ B. L. R	6 6-pdr. R. F 4 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	.....	1½	1½
Baltimore	327 6	48 7½	20 0	4,570	20.096	4 8″ B. L. R 6 6″ B. L. R	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 4 37mm H. R. C 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	.....	4	2½
Boston	271 3	42 1½	17 0	3,035	15.60	6 6″ B. L. R 2 8″ B. L. R	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 47mm H. R. C 2 37mm H. R. C 1 Gatling	.....	1½	1½
Charleston	312 7	46 2	18 7	3,730	18.20	2 8″ B. L. R 6 6″ B. L. R	4 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 4 37mm R. C 1 3″ R. F. field	.....	3	2
Chicago	325 0	48 2	20 4½	5,000	*18	4 8″ B. L. R 14 5″ R. F. guns	7 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	.....	1½	1½

UNARMORED PROTECTED CRUISERS—continued.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Protective deck.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Slopes.	Flat.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inches.*	*Inches.*
Cincinnati	300 0	42 0	18 0	3,213	*19	11 5″ R. F. guns	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field		2½	1
Columbia	412 0	58 2½	22 6	7,375	22.8	1 8″ B. L. R 2 6″ B. L. R 8 4″ R. F. guns	12 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	4 Whitehead.	4	2½
Minneapolis	412 0	58 2½	22 6	7,375	23.073	1 8″ B. L. R 2 6″ B. L. R 8 4″ R. F. guns	12 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	4 Whitehead.	4	2½
Newark	311 7	49 2	18 9	4,098	19	12 6″ R. F. guns	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 2 37mm R. C		3	2
Olympia	340 0	53 0½	21 6	5,870	21.686	10 5″ R. F. guns 4 8″ B. L. R. mounted in barbette turrets, armor 3½ and 4½ inches.	14 6-pdr. R. F 7 1-pdr. R. F 1 Gatling	6 Whitehead.	4½	2
Philadelphia	327 6	48 7½	19 6	4,410	19.678	12 6″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F 4 3-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 2 37mm R. C 1 3″ R. F. field		4	2½
Raleigh	300 0	42 0	18 0	3,213	†19	10 5″ R. F. guns 1 6″ B. L. R	8 6-pdr. R. F 4 1-pdr. R. F 1 Colt 1 3″ R. F. field		2½	1
San Francisco	310 0	49 2	18 9	4,098	19.525	12 6″ B. L. R	12 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	4 Whitehead.	3	2
Albany	346 0	43 9	18 0	3,769	†20	6 6″ R. F 4 4.7″ R. F	10 6-pdr. R. F 8 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt's	3	3	1½
New Orleans	346 0	43 9	18 0	3,769	†20	6 6″ R. F 4 4.7″ R. F	10 6-pdr. R. F 8 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt's	3	3	1½
Chattanooga	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½
Cleveland	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½
Denver	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½
Des Moines	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½
Galveston	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½
Tacoma	292 0	44 0	*†15 9	*†3,200	†16.5	10 5″ R. F	8 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colt aut		2 and 1	½

*With two-third stores. †Estimated.

UNARMORED UNPROTECTED CRUISERS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.			Water-tight deck.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.	Slopes.	Flat.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*				*Inch.*	*Inch.*
Detroit	257 0	37 0	14 7	2,089	18.71	10 5″ R. F. guns	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts 1 3″ R. F. field	2 Whitehead.	1⅛	1⅛
Marblehead	257 0	37 0	14 7	2,089	18.44	10 5″ R. F. guns	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	2 Whitehead.	1⅛	1⅛
Montgomery	257 0	37 0	14 7	2,089	19.05	10 5″ R. F. guns	6 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	2 Whitehead.	1⅛	1⅛
Reina Mercedes*	279 9½	43 3	19 1½	3,090	†17.05					

*Captured during war with Spain. †Estimated.

UNARMORED GUNBOATS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.		
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*			
Bancroft	187 6	32 0	12 2	839	14.37	4 4″ R. F. guns	8 3-pdr. R. F 1 1-pdr. R. F 1 Colt	1 Whitehead.
Bennington	230 0	36 0	14 0	1,710	17.5	6 6″ B. L. R	2 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 2 Gatlings	

UNARMORED GUNBOATS—continued.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.		
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.	Torpedo tubes.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*			
Castine	204 0	32 1½	12 0	1,177	16.032	8 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. 2 1-pdr. R. F. 1 Colt	
Concord	230 0	36 0	14 0	1,710	16.8	6 6″ B. L. R	2 6-pdr. R. F. 2 3-pdr. R. F. 2 37mm H. R. C 2 Gatlings	
Don Juan de Austria *†	210 0	32 0	12 6	1,130	‡14			
Isla de Cuba *	192 0	30 1½	11 6	1,030	‡14	6 4.7″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F 4 Nordenfelts	
Isla de Luzon *	192 0	30 1½	11 6	1,030	‡14	6 4.7″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. Q. F 4 Nordenfelts	
Machias	204 0	32 1½	12 0	1,177	15.46	8 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 1 Colt	
Petrel	176 3	31 0	11 7	892	11.79	4 6″ B. L. R	2 3-pdr. R. F 1 1-pdr. R. F 2 37mm H. R. C 2 Gatlings	
Topeka §	250 0	35 0	15 5	1,814	‡16	6 4″ R. F. guns	6 3-pdr. R. F 2 1-pdr. R. F 1 Colt	
Yorktown	230 0	36 0	14 0	1,710	16.14	6 6″ R. F. guns	2 6-pdr. R. F 2 3-pdr. R. F 4 1-pdr. R. F 2 Colts	
Gunboat No. 16								

UNARMORED COMPOSITE VESSELS—GUNBOATS.

Annapolis	168 0	36 0	12 5	1,060	13.17	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1 pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt
Marietta	174 0	34 0	12 0	1,000	13.03	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6 pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt 1 3″ R. F. field
Newport	168 0	36 0	12 0	1,000	12.29	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt
Princeton	168 0	36 0	12 9½	1,100	‡12	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt
Vicksburg	168 0	36 0	12 0	1,000	12.71	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt
Wheeling	174 0	34 0	12 0	1,000	12.88	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt

TRAINING SHIP—NAVAL ACADEMY.

Chesapeake	175 0	37 0	16 6	1,175	10.86	6 4″ R. F. guns	4 6-pdr. R. F. G. 2 1-pdr. R. F. G.

*Captured during war with Spain. †Iron gunboat. ‡Estimated. §Sailing ship.

UNARMORED STEEL VESSELS—SPECIAL CLASS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Main.	Secondary.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*		
Dolphin	240 0	32 0	14 3	1,486	15.50	3 4″ R. F. guns	2 14-pdr. R. F. G. 2 6 pdr. R. F. G. 2 3-pdr. R. F. G. 2 Gatlings.
Vesuvius	252 4	26 6½	10 7½	929	21.42	3 15″ dynamite guns	5 3-pdr. R. F. G. 1 Colt.

UNARMORED VESSELS—GUNBOATS UNDER 500 TONS.

Name.	Material.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour.
		Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.	
		Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*
Albay *						
Alvarado †	Steel	110 0	15 6½	5 6	106	‡19
Belusan *						
Calamianes *						
Callao †	Steel	119 1	17 7	6 8	208	‡9.7
El Cano †						
Guardoqui *						
Leyte †	Iron	98 5	16 6	7 3	151	‡8
Manileño *						
Mariveles *						
Mindanao †	Wood	92 2	17 10	5 6	83	‡8

*Purchased by War Department. †Captured from Spain. ‡Estimated.

UNARMORED VESSELS—GUNBOATS UNDER 500 TONS—continued.

Name.	Material.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour.
		Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.	
		Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*
Mindoro*						
Pampango*						
Panay*						
Paragua*						
Samar*						
Sandoval†	Steel	110 0	15 6½	5 6	106	‡19
Urdaneta*						
Vasco*						

*Purchased by War Department. †Captured from Spain. ‡Estimated.

UNARMORED STEEL VESSELS—TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.	Batteries.	
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft.	Displacement.		Torpedo tubes.	Guns.
	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*		
Bainbridge	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Barry	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Chauncey	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Dale	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*28	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Decatur	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*26	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Hopkins	244 0	24 6	6 0	408	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Hull	244 0	24 6	6 0	408	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Lawrence	242 3	22 3	6 2½	400	*30	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Macdonough	242 3	22 3	6 2½	400	*30	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Paul Jones	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Perry	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Preble	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Stewart	245 0	23 7½	6 6	420	*29	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Truxtun	248 0	23 3	6 0	433	*30	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Whipple	248 0	23 3	6 0	433	*30	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.
Worden	248 0	23 3	6 0	433	*30	2 long 18″ Whitehead	2 14-pdr. R. F. and 5 6-pdr. R. F.

*Estimated.

UNARMORED STEEL VESSELS—TORPEDO BOATS.

	Ft. in.	*Ft. in.*	*Ft. in.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*		
Bagley	157 0	17 0	4 7½	167	*28	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Bailey	205 0	19 2½	6 0	235	*30	2 18″ Whitehead	4 6-pdr. R. F.
Barcelo *a*	124 7	11 0	6 11		*17		
Barney	157 0	17 0	4 7½	167	*28	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Biddle	157 0	17 0	4 7½	167	*28	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Blakely	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Cushing	138 9	14 3	4 10½	105	22.5	3 18″ Whitehead	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Davis	146 0	15 4	5 10	154	23.41	3 18″ Whitehead. Long	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Dahlgren	147 0	16 4½	4 7½	146.4	*30.5	2 18″ Whitehead. Long	4 1-pdr. R. F.
De Long	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Du Pont	175 0	17 8½	4 8	165	28.58	3 18″ Whitehead	4 1-pdr. R. F.
Ericsson	149 7	15 6	4 9	120	24	3 18″ Whitehead	4 1-pdr. R. F.
Farragut	213 6	20 7½	6 0	279	30.13	2 18″ Whitehead	4 6-pdr. R. F.
Fox	146 0	15 4	5 10	154	23.13	3 18″ Whitehead. Long	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Foote	160 0	16 0½	5 0	142	24.534	3 18″ Whitehead	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Goldsborough	194 8	20 5	5 0	247.5	30	2 18″ Whitehead. Long	4 6-pdr. R. F.
Gwin	99 6	12 6	3 3	45.78	20.88	2 18″ Whitehead	1 1-pdr. R. F.
Mackenzie	99 3	12 9½	4 3	65	20.11	2 18″ Whitehead	1 1-pdr. R. F.
Manly†	60 8	9 5	2 10½				
McKee	99 3	12 9½	4 3	65	19.82	2 18″ Whitehead	2 1-pdr. R. F.
Morris	138 3	15 6	4 0½	104.75	24	3 18″ Whitehead. Long	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Nicholson	174 6	17 0	4 6	174	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
O'Brien	174 6	17 0	4 6	174	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Porter	175 0	17 8½	4 8	165	28.630	3 18″ Whitehead	4 1-pdr. R. F.
Rodgers	160 0	16 0½	5 0	142	*24.5	3 18″ Whitehead	3 1-pdr. R. F.
Rowan	170 0	17 0	5 11½	182	27.074	3 18″ Whitehead	4 1-pdr. R. F.
Shubrick	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Somers†	149 3½	17 4½		145	*23		
Stockton	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Stringham	225 0	22 0	6 6	340	*30	2 18″ Whitehead. Long	7 6-pdr. R. F.
T. A. M. Craven	147 0	16 4½	4 7½	146.4	*30.5	2 18″ Whitehead. Long	4 1-pdr. R. F.
Talbot	99 6	12 6	3 3½	46.5	21.15	2 18″ Whitehead	1 1-pdr. R. F.
Thornton	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Tingey	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Wilkes	175 0	17 6	4 8	165	*26½	3 18″ Whitehead	3 3-pdr. R. F.
Winslow	160 0	16 0½	5 0	142	24.82	3 18″ Whitehead	3 1-pdr. R. F.

a Captured during war with Spain. *Estimated. †Purchased during war with Spain.

UNARMORED STEEL VESSEL—SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT.

Name.	Ship fully equipped ready for sea, all stores on board. Normal coal supply.				Speed per hour on trial.
	Length on load water line.	Extreme breadth.	Mean draft from line tangent to bottom of screw and forefoot.	Displacement.	
	Ft. In.	*Ft. In.*	*Ft. In.*	*Tons.*	*Knots.*
Plunger	85 3	11 6		168	8

WOOD TORPEDO BOAT.

Stiletto	88 6	11 0	3 0	31	18.22

SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT.

Name.	Water-tight deck.		Batteries.	
	Slopes.	Flat.	Torpedo tubes.	Guns.
Plunger			2 Whitehead	

WOOD TORPEDO BOAT.

Stiletto			2 Howell	

For summary of all vessels in Navy see table on page 19, under "Our present Navy."

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," in each act of Congress since and including the act of March 3, 1883 the vessels authorized, the amounts appropriated, the amount expended upon each vessel authorized, the total actual cost of finished vessels, including armament and equipment, to June 30, 1899, and the estimated amount to be expended upon unfinished vessels from that date.

FINISHED VESSELS.

Vessels authorized and dates of acts of Congress.	Amounts authorized for hull and machinery, including hull armor.	Amounts appropriated—		Amounts expended—					Total cost of finished vessels.
		For hull and machinery.	For armor, armament, and equipment.	For hull and machinery, including hull armor.	For armor for gun protection.	For speed premiums, trial-trip expenses, etc.	For armament.	For equipment, Bureaus of Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering.	
March 3, 1883.									
Chicago, Atlanta, Boston, Dolphin	$4,268,801.80			$4,268,801.80		Included in total cost.			$4,268,801.80
For above vessels		$1,300,000.00							
For above vessels, including their armament and equipment, by acts of July 7, 1884, Mar. 3, 1885, July 26, 1886, and Mar. 30, 1888		2,968,801.80							
March 3, 1885.									
Newark	1,300,000.00			1,386,196.86		$53,185.34	$265,256.19	$125,478.81	1,830,117.20
Charleston	1,100,000.00			1,161,504.10		21,462.84	290,997.51	122,893.75	1,596,858.20
Yorktown	520,000.00			505,880.45		43,026.16	156,722.64	62,401.34	768,030.59
Petrel	275,000.00			307,996.55		1,985.10	81,736.08	72,317.79	464,035.52
For above-named vessels		1,895,000.00							
August 3, 1886.									
Baltimore	1,500,000.00			1,434,129.93		120,354.01	301,194.72	121,050.69	1,976,729.35
Vesuvius	350,000.00			357,255.33		2,669.89	11,865.29	8,500.25	380,290.76
Cushing	100,000.00			98,666.29			16,641.56	2,798.46	118,106.31
Maine	2,500,000.00			3,685,797.27	$358,389.45		517,397.85	116,224.18	4,677,788.75
Texas	2,500,000.00			3,227,085.12	411,199.87		477,429.94	86,406.56	4,202,121.49
Puritan, Monadnock, Amphitrite, Terror	3,178,046.00			1,800,094.24	274,421.63		251,977.87	76,990.00	2,403,483.74
				1,752,418.76	174,046.07		139,907.21	67,682.44	2,134,054.48
				1,213,891.10	160,745.40		143,133.19	57,735.28	1,575,504.97
				1,274,244.08	144,664.64		133,853.68	64,489.17	1,617,251.57
For all above-named vessels		2,275,000.00							
March 3, 1887.									
Miantonomoh	758,517.85			758,517.85			239,211.68	39,506.53	1,057,236.06
For all above-named vessels		2,420,000.00							
Philadelphia	1,500,000.00			1,443,964.85		117,427.62	295,406.69	101,861.22	1,958,660.38
San Francisco	1,500,000.00	1,500,000.00		1,612,811.50		125,446.32	272,876.54	124,168.95	2,135,303.31
Concord	550,000.00			557,607.83		8,748.38	126,736.75	72,190.76	765,283.72
Bennington	550,000.00			568,455.30		10,351.07	125,998.09	64,513.25	769,317.71
Monterey	2,000,000.00	1,000,000.00		2,066,199.95	190,534.38	11,547.42	344,795.13	115,471.18	2,728,548.06
Armament of all vessels authorized			$2,128,362.00						
Armor and gun steel of all vessels authorized			4,000,000.00						
September 7, 1888.									
New York	3,500,000.00			3,486,118.36	170,299.03	241,422.93	341,626.43	107,175.64	4,346,642.39
Olympia	1,860,000.00			1,970,709.97	141,522.62	371,794.95	343,343.84	151,912.00	2,979,283.38
Cincinnati	1,100,000.00			1,995,773.30	27,553.61		232,116.93	116,460.68	2,371,904.52
Raleigh	1,100,000.00			1,839,965.23	27,969.09		232,465.97	99,329.51	2,199,729.80
Montgomery	700,000.00			810,681.65	13,010.67	237,241.22	162,257.26	53,918.91	1,267,109.71
Detroit	700,000.00			898,782.04	13,154.14	182,775.47	176,150.44	52,177.81	1,233,039.90
Marblehead	700,000.00			900,391.85	11,918.56	149,115.89	172,458.20	57,278.43	1,291,162.93
For all above-named vessels		3,500,000.00							
Bancroft	260,000.00	260,000.00		308,318.07		54,186.98	47,559.50	21,217.08	431,281.63
Armament of all vessels authorized			2,000,000.00						
March 2, 1889.									
Machias	350,000.00			438,702.62		53,799.70	102,278.81	62,879.94	657,661.07
Castine	350,000.00			452,763.78		58,114.35	104,975.13	55,610.94	671,464.20
Katahdin	1,513,691.31			1,504,404.17		9,287.14	12,661.20	3,474.84	1,529,827.35
For all above named vessels		4,055,000.00	2,500,000.00						
June 30, 1890.									
Armor and armament of all above-named vessels			2,500,000.00						
Indiana	4,000,000.00			4,300,149.62	977,134.02	56,424.41	553,972.48	95,691.45	5,983,371.98

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

FINISHED VESSELS—continued.

Vessels authorized and dates of acts of Congress.	Amounts authorized for hull and machinery, including hull armor.	Amounts appropriated—		Amounts expended—					Total cost of finished vessels.
		For hull and machinery.	For armor, armament, and equipment.	For hull and machinery, including hull armor.	For armor for gun protection.	For speed premiums, trial-trip expenses, etc.	For armament.	For equipment, Bureaus of Equipment, Construction and Repair, and Steam Engineering.	
Massachusetts	$4,000,000.00			$4,254,910.66	$1,030,051.58	$116,882.73	$564,572.92	$80,700.06	$6,047,117.95
Oregon	4,000,000.00			4,617,345.01	1,029,591.42	267,085.47	585,598.77	75,412.09	6,575,032.76
Columbia	2,750,000.00			3,045,164.47	31,795.79	385,000.00	288,506.77	158,544.23	3,909,011.26
Ericsson	125,000.00			123,484.75			14,423.25	6,234.08	144,142.08
For all above-named vessels		$5,475,000.00							
September 29, 1890.									
Nickel matte for armor of all ships			$800,000.00						
March 2, 1891.									
Minneapolis	2,750,000.00			2,927,030.82	31,205.27	445,470.98	275,847.35	170,442.02	3,849,996.44
For all above-named vessels		12,107,000.00	4,000,000.00						
For equipment of new vessels (Bureau of Equipment)			400,000.00						
March 3, 1891.									
For all above-named vessels		1,000,000.00							
July 19, 1892.									
Brooklyn	3,500,000.00			3,254,019.37	323,552.21	367,249.15	341,639.32	137,330.04	4,423,790.09
Iowa	4,000,000.00			3,971,502.44	956,460.65	234,624.03	583,859.48	124,759.72	5,871,206.32
For all above-named vessels		7,000,000.00	2,000,000.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			400,000.00						
March 3, 1893.									
Nashville	400,000.00			419,700.50	11,041.56	45,980.00	58,326.61	51,319.48	586,368.15
Wilmington	400,000.00			374,435.83	8,920.82	41,512.00	58,978.12	53,328.10	537,174.87
Helena	400,000.00			371,892.21	8,834.44	49,942.40	57,707.92	52,689.36	541,066.33
Plunger (see unfinished vessels)	200,000.00								
For all above-named vessels		6,875,000.00							
For equipment of above-named vessels			250,000.00						
July 26, 1894.									
For all above-named vessels		5,955,025.00	4,000,000.00						
Foote	150,000.00			118,710.38		506.36	14,742.30	3,314.24	137,273.28
Rodgers	150,000.00			110,214.26		506.37	15,289.47	2,505.23	128,515.33
Winslow	150,000.00			103,288.39		506.37	15,027.63	2,783.32	121,605.71
Remission of time penalties, Vesuvius		39,700.00							
March 2, 1895.									
Annapolis	230,000.00			277,659.80		471.72	40,837.15	56,448.54	375,417.21
Vicksburg	230,000.00			285,579.20		471.72	46,772.18	55,927.51	388,750.61
Newport	230,000.00			298,143.42		471.72	44,217.10	61,124.09	403,956.33
Princeton	230,000.00			312,704.95		471.73	45,548.07	35,891.63	394,616.38
Wheeling	230,000.00			255,597.46		471.73	47,720.46	44,726.31	348,515.96
Marietta	230,000.00			260,100.29		471.73	46,914.25	43,938.35	351,424.62
Porter	175,000.00			199,036.69		285.04	15,425.98	2,154.67	216,902.38
Du Pont	175,000.00			165,204.39		285.04	13,535.30	2,043.02	181,067.75
Rowan	175,000.00			180,531.36		285.04	13,895.70	1,802.93	196,515.03
Kearsarge (see unfinished vessels)	4,000,000.00								
Kentucky (see unfinished vessels)	4,000,000.00								
For all above-named vessels		8,364,851.30	4,837,670.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			125,000.00						
Remission of time penalties		40,350.00							
February 26, 1896.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			50,000.00						
June 10, 1896.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			237,000.00						
Illinois (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Alabama (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Wisconsin (see unfinished vessels)	3,750,000.00								
Dahlgren (see unfinished vessels)									
Craven (see unfinished vessels)	800,000.00								
Farragut (see unfinished vessels)									
Mackenzie (see unfinished vessels)									
Fox (see unfinished vessels)									
Morris				94,575.23		348.64	17,069.44	2,717.77	114,711.08
Talbot	500,000.00			41,334.36		348.64	10,392.51	1,950.14	54,025.65
Gwin				41,319.60		348.64	10,263.25	2,068.98	54,000.47
Davis				93,892.30		348.63	17,320.05	2,403.19	113,964.17
McKee				58,139.95		348.69	9,962.73	1,889.44	70,340.81
For all above-named vessels		6,870,600.00	4,371,454.00						
Total	85,954,056.96	74,901,328.10	34,599,486.00	74,556,797.91	6,527,996.92	3,881,061.76	9,949,398.88	3,614,256.38	98,529,511.85

Statement showing the amounts authorized for new vessels under "Increase of the Navy," etc.—Continued.

UNFINISHED VESSELS.

Vessels authorized and dates of acts of Congress.	Amounts authorized for hulls and machinery, including hull armor.	Amounts appropriated— For hull and machinery.	Amounts appropriated— For armor, armament, and equipment.	Expended for hull and machinery to June 30, 1899.	Estimated amounts to be expended for completion in addition to expenditures to June 30, 1899. Bureau of Equipment.	Bureau of Ordnance.	Bureau of Construction and Repair.	Bureau of Steam Engineering.	Estimated total cost.
Plunger				$99,238.74	$1,500.00		$32,142.00	$26,100.00	$159,080.74
Kearsarge				3,760,322.77	35,000.00	$1,230,270.00	237,998.00	310,827.00	5,574,417.77
Kentucky				3,591,275.43	35,000.00	1,313,959.00	263,566.00	337,579.00	5,531,379.43
Illinois				1,947,306.42	34,000.00	2,701,063.00	820,538.00	366,361.00	5,869,268.42
Alabama				2,579,815.90	34,000.00	2,668,343.00	370,213.00	341,950.00	5,994,321.90
Wisconsin				2,272,706.68	34,000.00	2,576,652.00	872,024.00	285,344.00	6,040,726.68
Dahlgren				167,046.28	5,000.00	14,890.00	14,223.00	31,145.00	232,304.28
Craven				166,884.11	5,000.00	14,890.00	14,661.00	30,900.00	232,335.11
Farragut				229,074.24	5,000.00	16,412.00	17,350.00		267,836.24
Mackenzie				42,017.09	3,000.00	19,345.00	8,285.00		72,647.09
Fox				88,055.67	3,000.00	12,983.00	11,415.00		115,453.67
March 3, 1897.									
For equipment of above-named vessels			$162,628.00						
Stringham	$800,000.00			183,046.55	3,000.00	25,320.00	24,282.00	46,985.00	282,583.55
Goldsborough				140,130.69	3,000.00	23,630.00	29,244.00	45,581.00	241,585.69
Bailey				139,993.45	3,000.00	25,350.00	31,058.00	53,080.00	252,481.45
For above-named vessels		$6,425,359.00	7,220,796.00						
Chesapeake	250,000.00	250,000.00		108,235.55	56,144.48	50,000.00	193,620.00		408,000.30
May 4, 1898.									
Maine	3,000,000.00			186,232.81	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,056,700.00	830,500.00	5,676,432.81
Missouri	3,000,000.00			9,526.34	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,184,467.00	877,000.00	5,673,993.34
Ohio	3,000,000.00			184,291.12	50,000.00	2,553,000.00	2,202,929.00	816,130.00	5,806,350.12
Arkansas	1,250,000.00			3,784.00	30,000.00	584,739.00	759,742.00	285,500.00	1,663,765.00
Connecticut	1,250,000.00			90,062.68	30,000.00	584,739.00	680,890.00	274,580.00	1,660,271.68
Florida	1,250,000.00			45,756.42	30,000.00	584,739.00	689,744.00	279,650.00	1,629,889.42
Wyoming	1,250,000.00			135,269.17	30,000.00	584,739.00	670,436.00	261,425.00	1,681,869.17
Bainbridge				1,561.36	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,890.00	143,500.00	330,451.36
Barry				1,546.36	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,904.00	143,500.00	330,450.36
Chauncey				1,456.71	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,957.00	143,500.00	330,413.71
Dale				24,765.82	3,500.00	30,000.00	119,692.00	130,000.00	307,957.82
Decatur				24,633.48	3,500.00	30,000.00	119,770.00	130,000.00	307,903.48
Hopkins				28,000.51	3,500.00	30,000.00	144,726.00	132,700.00	338,926.51
Hull				27,970.19	3,500.00	30,000.00	144,678.00	132,700.00	338,848.19
Lawrence				27,115.49	3,500.00	30,000.00	114,279.00	127,946.00	302,840.49
McDonough				27,346.01	3,500.00	30,000.00	114,278.00	127,940.00	303,064.01
Paul Jones				52,358.43	3,500.00	30,000.00	135,846.00	111,910.00	333,614.43
Perry				52,301.92	3,500.00	30,000.00	134,118.00	113,710.00	333,629.92
Preble				52,295.67	3,500.00	30,000.00	134,118.00	113,710.00	333,623.67
Stewart				367.30	3,500.00	30,000.00	151,669.00	143,500.00	329,036.30
Truxtun	6,900,000.00			1,486.49	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,692.00	143,500.00	333,158.49
Whipple				1,408.61	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,736.00	143,500.00	333,144.01
Worden				1,366.02	3,500.00	30,000.00	154,772.00	143,500.00	333,138.02
Bagley				574.65	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,589.00	83,000.00	200,013.65
Barney				494.66	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,820.00	83,000.00	200,164.66
Biddle				478.43	2,500.00	25,350.00	88,838.00	83,000.00	200,166.43
Blakeley				30,247.37	2,500.00	25,350.00	72,804.00	68,685.00	199,586.37
De Long				30,199.81	2,500.00	25,350.00	72,200.00	69,095.00	199,344.81
Nicholson				32,087.31	2,500.00	25,350.00	64,681.00	65,450.00	190,068.31
O'Brien				32,171.19	2,500.00	25,350.00	64,592.00	65,450.00	190,063.19
Shubrick				48,842.54	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,271.00	44,525.00	169,488.54
Stockton				48,723.81	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,375.00	44,525.00	169,473.81
Thornton				48,598.29	2,500.00	25,350.00	48,475.00	44,525.00	169,448.29
Tingey				31,933.32	4,000.00	25,350.00	76,918.00	70,904.00	209,105.32
Wilkes				1,511.49	4,000.00	25,350.00	72,681.00	83,000.00	186,542.49
Gunboat No. 16*a*	200,000.00								
For above-named vessels		13,648,473.00							
For vessels authorized since, and including, the act of July 26, 1894			7,162,800.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			415,000.00						
March 3, 1899.									
Georgia	3,600,000.00								
New Jersey	3,600,000.00								
Pennsylvania	3,600,000.00								
California	4,000,000.00								
Nebraska	4,000,000.00								
West Virginia	4,000,000.00	Contracts not yet awarded.							
Chattanooga	1,141,800.00								
Cleveland	1,141,800.00								
Denver	1,141,800.00								
Des Moines	1,141,800.00								
Galveston	1,141,800.00								
Tacoma	1,141,800.00								
For above-named vessels		5,902,402.00							
For vessels authorized since, and including, the act of July 26, 1894			4,000,000.00						
For equipment of above-named vessels			400,000.00						
Total	51,860,800.00	26,316,234.00	19,361,224.00	16,801,944.75	618,644.48	21,465,263.00	15,253,846.00	8,430,912.00	62,570,610.23

a Contract not yet awarded.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I would be untrue to myself if I did not congratulate the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS] who has just taken his seat upon the masterful showing which he has made in his report, and upon the conclusion of the arduous labors in committee that have accompanied the birth of this bill. That the committee itself did not come to a unanimous agreement is to me a matter of regret. I myself agree in some things with the minority and agree in others with the majority. But I believed it to be my duty, if I had any fight to make, to make it upon the floor of this House, as I have heretofore done, and I declined to sign the minority report.

Mr. Chairman, the past shows that a powerful navy for the

American nation is a vital necessity. Without it we may become the prey of the robber nations of the earth; without a great navy, I will undertake to say, we to-day might be at war with Great Britain over the Alaska boundary. Her rapacity toward the Boers is due to her greed for gold; and there is as much gold in Alaska as in the Transvaal. It is the fact that we are prepared for war that saves us from trouble with the powers of Europe. From the days of the battle of Salamis down to the present a strong navy has been the safety of a maritime nation. It was the battle of Salamis that drove Xerxes from Greece, not the fight at the pass of Thermopylæ. It was the battle in the bay that sent him whirling back across the Hellespont into Asia, where he belonged.

When Hannibal invaded Italy and maintained himself there for seventeen years without reenforcement, it was not the Roman legions that drove him to Africa; it was the Roman ships which conveyed Scipio's army there and forced Hannibal to follow it in a vain effort to defend Carthage. It was the navy that made Venice the supreme mistress of the commerce of the world for centuries. The Mediterranean Sea was practically a Venetian lake, because of the Venetian navy. It was her navy that afterwards made Holland the mistress of the sea. And it was not until the English navy had been built to proper proportions that Von Tromp was compelled to pull down his broom and acknowledge its supremacy. It was our Navy that won the most brilliant victory in the Revolution. Admiral Paul Jones in his fight with the *Scrapis* and the *Countess of Scarborough* gave the Revolution an impetus that put behind our forefathers not only the sympathy of Europe, but substantial aid in the way of dollars and of French battle ships.

Paul Jones, an American admiral, was the only man in either Army or Navy who had invaded England since the days of the battle of Hastings. The whole British coast was in alarm. He landed at different places, and drew in plunder the same as the English themselves drew it in when they sacked the city of Pekin.

It was by the aid of the French navy that we achieved the final triumph of the American Revolution—the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown. Without the activity of the French fleet under the Count de Grasse, Cornwallis would have escaped. A British fleet was hastening to his succor; but when its commander learned that a French fleet of superior force was already in the Chesapeake, it turned back to New York.

It was Nelson, and not Wellington, who was the leading factor in the downfall of Napoleon. The victories of the British navy at Aboukir, Copenhagen, Cape St. Vincent, and Trafalgar destroyed all his hopes. France was practically cut off from the rest of the world. Her commerce was utterly ruined, and she was compelled to feed upon herself until her resources were exhausted.

It was the American Navy that gave us peace in the treaty of Ghent in the war of 1812. Hull had surrendered an American army at Detroit. Commodore Perry, within 100 miles of that city, demolished a British fleet—the first time that American vessels had met an English fleet—and sent to Washington the immortal dispatch, "We have met the enemy, and they are ours." [Applause.]

Scott had been driven back at Niagara and Lundy's Lane; Wilkinson had made a fiasco on the northern border; but the guns of the American Navy were heard on Lake Champlain, where Commodore McDonough sent the English fleet to the bottom. [Applause.]

Washington, your own proud capital, had been captured by the British, and this building burned, our monuments defaced, the White House destroyed, your President became a fugitive in the forests of Virginia; but the victories of Decatur, of Commodore Stewart, of Bainbridge, and of old Isaac Hull in the *Constitution* were a sufficient recompense for the destruction of the city of Washington. [Applause.] In only one instance in that war did the army achieve a victory, and that was at the Saranac, for the battle of New Orleans, it will be remembered, was fought long after the treaty of peace was signed.

The total destruction of the Turkish navy by the allied fleets at Navarino rescued Greece from the clutches of the followers of the Prophet and restored to her her freedom.

It was the American Navy that gave us the victory in the war with Mexico. Taylor had marched across the Nueces, across the Colorado, across the Rio Grande; he had taken Monterey; he had reached the plains of Buena Vista and wiped out Santa Anna's army; but it was Scott who went to the city of Mexico through the aid of the American Navy, which bombarded the castle of San Juan de Ulloa and gave him a landing place at Vera Cruz. [Applause.]

It was the American Navy that sounded the knell of doom for the Confederacy when gallant old Farragut broke the iron barrier, passed the forts of Jackson and St. Philip, and captured the city of New Orleans. And it was all done before McClellan left the Peninsula. The Confederacy was split in twain when the Mississippi was opened. The fate of the Confederacy was sealed the instant the ports of the South were declared under blockade by President Lincoln. If the Confederacy had had a navy, and if things had been more equal both on sea and on land, we would have had two nations in existence to-day where there is only one.

It was the Navy, I may add, that won the Spanish war. I believe that if Schley and Sampson had been left to their own inspiration, or had received the orders that Dewey received, they would have gone into Santiago Harbor without sending an army down there to storm San Juan and El Caney.

It was the Navy, under Dewey, that destroyed the Spanish fleet and won the empire in the East; and it was the Navy that finally brought proud Spain to her knees with her hands held upward, acknowledging her subjugation. [Applause.]

So, Mr. Chairman, I say that the Navy is a vital necessity to the United States as well as to all other maritime nations. This vital necessity is recognized by the people of the country—North and South, East and West. The people to-day are clamoring for an increase of the Navy because they know its usefulness, because they know it is a never-failing defender, because they know it is a never-failing aggressor, when war breaks out. In a multiplicity of ships there is safety.

Now, what have we done, and what are we doing, to carry out the wishes of the people? We have three battle ships on the stocks, and no method of procuring armor for them. We have three more battle ships and three armored cruisers authorized, and a string attached to each in the shape of a provision that they shall not be even contracted for unless the best armor manufactured can be obtained at $300 a ton. We propose to authorize in this bill the building of two more battle ships, three more armored cruisers, and three protected cruisers. Shall there be a string attached to them also? Can men face their constituents after authorizing the construction of these battle ships and cruisers, and then refusing to provide the money for furnishing the armor for them? Why, sir, it seems to me like voting for a declaration of war and refusing the funds necessary to carry on the war. I believe that the people demand to-day not only the prompt construction of the ships already authorized but also the construction of as many more vessels.

For nearly five years have some of these ships remained without armor. I well remember speeches on this floor in which we were told that we could get armor for $200 a ton. Very well; we tried it. No ships were built. The man wanted a twenty-year contract, with a pledge that a fleet of ships should be built each year, and went back on his promise; he could not furnish armor at $200 a ton. Then we reached a point where, after authorizing the construction of ships, we attached a string to the authorization in another manner—this was June 10, 1896:

Provided, That the Secretary of the Navy is hereby directed to examine into the actual cost of armor plate and the price for the same which should be equitably paid, and shall report the result of his investigation to Congress at its next session, at a date not later than January 1, 1897; and no contract for armor plate for the vessels authorized by this act shall be made until such report is made to Congress.

That was the condition then, and a similar condition exists to-day. The ships are authorized by you, and then you attach a string and by pulling it get no ships at all. The ships are still unbuilt. We have gone through a war since then, and not one of these ships was built before war was declared, and not one was available during the war. [Applause.]

Mr. RIDGELY. Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Oh, yes, with pleasure.

Mr. RIDGELY. Did we not at a later date legislate on this matter of the price of the armor plate for our naval increase?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, at the next session of Congress you provided that the price should not exceed $400 per ton for armor inferior to the Krupp armor, but at the last session of Congress you provided that superior armor should not be obtained unless it could be had at $300 a ton—an impossible price. If you pay $400 a ton for the old harveyized armor, certainly the new Krupp armor is worth at least as much, and yet you *limited* the price to $300 a ton. In other words, you provide that the best armor shall be furnished at $100 per ton less than the sum you have expressed yourselves willing to pay for inferior armor. You practically determined, as I said before, that you would authorize the ships, but you took special care to prevent the building of them. [Applause.]

Mr. RIDGELY. In view of the statement of the gentleman as to the armor heretofore provided, which has been termed "rotten," is it not about time that the Government should undertake to make its own armor and prevent that abuse to which the gentleman has referred?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why did you vote to put the price of this "rotten armor" at $400 a ton——

Mr. RIDGELY (interrupting). It was not done by my vote. The question I have asked the gentleman is, if he does not think it about time that we make our own armor?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think that it is time, Mr. Chairman, that

this country understood that the lives of its sailors, its marines, and others connected with the naval service have been endangered and menaced when this Government found itself involved in war by the action of Congress in regard to this question of armor plate. [Applause.] I say that the men who fought with Dewey at Manila and with Schley at Santiago are entitled to the best protection the Government can give, by placing the best armor on its battle ships that can be made, by metallic furniture, and by all other life-saving devices.

Mr. RIDGELY. And is not the best protection possible guaranteed by making our own armor at home, by our own Government, and under our own supervision, to the end that no contractor be allowed to impose on us?

Mr. CUMMINGS (continuing). We authorize two battle ships here to-day, and six cruisers, and here is the same old story and the same old string over and over again. We will not contract for them, gentlemen say, until we build an armor-plate factory and can manufacture the armor for them ourselves. We will delay the construction three years more, taking in the three battle ships and three cruisers authorized in the last session, and the three battle ships under contract, authorized in the first session of the Fifty-fifth Congress, thus making a total delay of eight years in the construction of some of these ships. On the score of alleged economy you are opposing expenditure that the world recognizes as an absolute necessity. [Applause.]

Mr. RIDGELY. Does not the gentleman think it will be better to have even some little delay than to authorize the continuous purchase of the rotten armor which endangers the lives of our seamen and officers and adds no credit to our Navy, but squanders the people's money?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ah, Mr. Chairman, this is not the rotten armor. The gentleman is mistaken in that. It is the Krupp armor to which I have referred. It has been approved by the Navy Department after the most careful tests. It is an armor that is subjected to seven different treatments before its completion, and not heated once or twice, as was the case with the old harveyized armor. It is one-third lighter than the harveyized armor, with an equal power of resistance. The world has moved. There has been some progress in armor-plate making, as the gentleman will learn if he examines the subject carefully. The hardening process in the harveyized plate did not—could not—extend more than an inch below the surface, no matter how thick the plate. In this Krupp armor the hardening process penetrates the plate one-third of its thickness. It is of a fibrous nature where it is not hardened, while the other is granulated. There is as much difference between them as there is between paper and sheet iron.

Mr. RIDGELY. Have we ever had any evidence of fraud demonstrated by turning in armor for our battle ships that was not up to the standard?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the gentleman is circling around in the same groove. [Laughter.] He comes back to the point he started from. I have stated that the armor provided here is not the old harveyized armor which was at one time found to be defective, but an armor of entirely different material.

Mr. RIDGELY. I have been suggesting my inquiries to the gentleman in all courtesy to him. My point is that we are liable to have frauds committed upon us as long as we are willing to accept the armor plate manufactured by outsiders. Their object is simply to swell their profits; my plan is to make the armor ourselves and save this exorbitant cost and enjoy the knowledge that we are doing the very best we can for the Government and for the people.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I have answered the gentleman in the same spirit. I have answered the point he is making. His suggestion for a Government plant, if carried out, would involve a long delay and the presence of a score of naval inspectors in each factory to watch the progress of this work, after it is constructed.

Mr. RIDGELY. Is that not true now, as far as the inspection is concerned?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Ah, there is an inspection, of course. But there are only one or two inspectors in each factory. It would require a dozen or twenty in a Government manufactory. Now, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. GAINES and Mr. GRIFFITH rose.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, Mr. Chairman, I am perfectly willing to stand here by the hour answering questions if they are pat. I will yield to my distinguished friend from Nashville.

Mr. GAINES. The same men who made the rotten armor plate, which you reported should be condemned, are to make the Krupp armor plate, are they not?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I know nothing whatever concerning that; but if it is made, and made cheaper than any nation in Europe pays for it, and the Government inspectors do their duty, we shall have done our duty to the men behind the guns when our battle ships and armored cruisers are engaged with the enemy.

Mr. GAINES. The fact is that the same company that owns the Krupp process and is to make this armor plate is composed of the same men who made the rotten armor plate which you condemned in a report to the Fifty-third Congress.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Oh, no; the Bethlehem Company own the Krupp process as well as the Carnegie Company.

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. And that process has been tested again and again.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. And Congress has been paying willingly $400 a ton for the inferior armor, and now it is proposed to limit the Krupp armor to $300 per ton.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I disagreed with the policy of the Naval Committee in some respects, but I propose to stand by it as far as my conscience will allow.

I disagreed with the committee when they refused to provide for the building of gunboats. The Secretary of the Navy had asked for the construction of 13 gunboats. When Admiral Dewey came before the committee he testified that he thought he would rather have battle ships than gunboats. We had captured four Spanish gunboats when Manila was taken—that is, Dewey had raised the wrecks. Since then we have bought a lot of little gunboats—some not as large as canal boats—from the Spanish Government. Admiral Dewey, while before the committee, said he thought we did not want any more gunboats, and he would take two or three battle ships in the place of them. Well, the committee gave him two battle ships, although the Secretary had not asked for them; but while Secretary Long was before the committee he said he would have asked for them if he had thought he could get them.

Now, I believe in gunboats. I think that boats the size of the *Helena* and vessels of that class are the very thing that the nation needs. We must continue a protectorate over Cuba at least until they form a government, and it looks to me now as though they would not be able to form one for the next five years, and we must have ships for service on the coast of Porto Rico and among the islands of Hawaii. There is nothing so useful in such waters as gunboats. We certainly need them for the Philippines. Those bought and captured from the Spaniards may suffice for the present, as Admiral Dewey suggests. I am in favor of keeping these gunboats in the Philippines just as long as there is a rebel in arms in those islands. [Applause.] When the islands are conquered, I am in favor of treating them exactly as we treat Cuba. They were both in rebellion against Spain, and of the two possibly the Filipinos were a little more gallant in fighting the Spaniards—at least fully as gallant as were the Cubans—and they are entitled to the same treatment. Sure it is that Aguinaldo and his Tagals supported Dewey's attack on Manila as heartily as did Garcia the assault of Shafter and Wheeler on Santiago. Gunboats are needed there and are certainly needed elsewhere. I think it unwise to lop them off entirely in view of the recommendation of Secretary Long. We ought at least to split the difference with him, and give him half of what he asked for.

I differed with the committee on the question of sheathed ships. While they took Dewey's word with regard to the battle ships and gunboats, they refused to take his word as to sheathed ships. He said that a sheathed ship would run two years and maintain her speed without docking, whereas an unsheathed ship had to be docked at least once in every nine months. He acknowledged that the *Charleston* was lost on a sunken reef in the Philippine Islands because she was not sheathed. When asked whether, in his opinion, she could have been saved if she had been sheathed, he replied that at that same time a British war vessel ran upon an unknown reef and was pulled off in safety because she was sheathed. That seemed to me conclusive evidence that the battle ships which we were authorizing in this bill should be sheathed.

But I compromised. We agreed to leave the matter to the Secretary of the Navy, and if the Secretary thinks it best to have them in the docks once in nine months instead of once every two years he may sit down upon the project. I am willing to trust John D. Long, and I believe the people are willing to do so.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. If it was demonstrated to the satisfaction of the committee that the sheathed ships were the best, why did not the committee report that way?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, they did not. It was demonstrated to my satisfaction.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Why did they not?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Because we did not have the votes to carry it, and some of the gentlemen who signed the minority report did not vote for it.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Have you got a proposition in here to have sheathed ships?

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, sir; I have not. I agreed to compromise, and I am man enough to stand by it. It may become an expensive compromise for the nation; but if so, the committee and John D. Long must bear the responsibility. My skirts are clear.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. It seems to me that while we are spending the money to build ships it is good sense to build the

very best ships that it is possible to build with the light that you have before you now.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Will my colleague permit me to make a statement?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Certainly.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. The gentleman from New York, inadvertently, no doubt, has failed to state the exact position of the committee on this question. There is a controversy in the Navy Department. The gentleman omitted to state that. There is a difference of opinion in the Department as to whether it is best to sheathe our ships or not.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I will state it now. The Navy Department is peculiarly constructed. One year its board decides it best to have sheathed ships. That was done a year or two ago. Afterwards England built some unsheathed battle ships; ships intended for use on her own coast, and not to be sent to foreign harbors. Of course, our Navy was compelled to follow the example set by England. [Laughter.] Whether the Secretary of State was consulted or not I can not say. [Laughter and applause.]

Mr. HOPKINS. Does the gentleman mean to say that this new board simply followed the example of England?

Mr. CUMMINGS. The new board decided that sheathed ships were not needed. Boards are at times necessary contrivances, but not necessarily useful. Take the case of the *Holland*. Here was a board that were to make a report on the submarine boat *Holland*. Under a bill, passed by Congress two or three years ago, it was provided that so much money should be paid for a submarine boat if she fulfilled specified requirements. Well, the board tested her to see whether she did fulfill the requirements. They came back and reported that she did, but at the same time expressed the opinion that submarine boats were useless—England was not building any of them. [Laughter.] The Navy Department, however, has bought the boat, and I have had the honor of introducing a bill providing for the purchase of 20 more of them. I am strongly of the opinion that the provision ought to have been inserted in this appropriation bill, and I think those who have seen the Holland's surprising performances will agree with me. I will answer for Admiral Dewey.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Does the evidence before your committee show that sheathed ships are better than unsheathed ships?

Mr. CUMMINGS. In my opinion it does.

Mr. CLARK of Missouri. Then there ought not be any attention paid to the board.

Mr. DAYTON. I know my friend from New York is frank enough to say that there is a vast deal of testimony in regard to that, and there is a difference of opinion on it—some just as sincere in saying that the unsheathed ship is better and a saving of expenditure, and therefore a compromise was reached, leaving it to the Navy Department to decide upon all the evidence as to what should be done.

Mr. HOPKINS and others rose.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Let me reply to my friend from West Virginia. The evidence in my opinion shows that the sheathed ship is far better, but that it does cost much more to build it.

Mr. DAYTON. My friend will allow me. All the evidence, in my judgment, leaves it exceedingly doubtful whether the sheathed ship is not better, but it is clear that it costs hundreds and hundreds of thousands of dollars more to sheath it.

Mr. HOPKINS. Now, if the gentleman from New York will allow me.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, how much time have I?

Mr. HOPKINS. We will give you all the time you want.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But I agreed to give some of my time to other gentlemen.

Mr. DAYTON. I want to say, Mr. Chairman, at present, in the absence of the acting chairman, that the gentleman shall be yielded from our side any additional time he needs.

Mr. HOPKINS. Now will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOPKINS. As I understand the statement, it is, with this conflict of evidence as to the proper construction of the vessels, the matter is left to the Navy Department?

Mr. CUMMINGS. To the Secretary of the Navy, not the Navy Department.

Mr. HOPKINS. That is what I wanted to get at, because under the statement of the gentleman from New York we would have one class of vessels sheathed, as I understand, one year, and then the other board would decide differently on another class.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is the difference. It all rests, however, with the Secretary. He may, and probably will, refer it to the board, but is not forced to abide by its decision.

Mr. DAYTON. Permit me to say to the gentleman that it might be a very desirable thing to have some vessels sheathed. For certain purposes, at different parts of the earth, they may be very desirable, and at others unsheathed might be desired.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is a fact. A sheathed vessel would undoubtedly be far more useful a thousand miles from a dock than one unsheathed.

Mr. THROPP. Can you give us a statement of the cost of a sheathed vessel as against an unsheathed—that is, the increase in percentage?

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. A quarter of a million of dollars to sheathe a battle ship.

Mr. CUMMINGS. A quarter of a million of dollars to sheathe a battle ship.

Mr. THROPP. About 5 per cent.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes. Now, Mr. Chairman, the committee was unable to agree as to the question of building ships at the navy-yards. Well, there is a great deal to be said on both sides of this question. I thought that with three battle ships and three armored cruisers not contracted for, and with two more battle ships and six more cruisers, armored and protected, but not contracted for, we could afford at least to again try the experiment of building them in the navy-yards. It is a favorable time for doing so. The Secretary of the Navy, however, is opposed to it. He says they will cost twice as much as vessels built elsewhere and take twice the time for construction. He also thought the yards would be more or less susceptible to political influences. Possibly he is right. He undoubtedly knows far more about that than I do. I have no doubt that it will cost more to build these ships in the navy-yards than it would to build them under contract, and for this reason: The work of the Government is done under the eight-hour system; the contractors work their men from nine to ten, eleven to twelve hours. So that of necessity it must cost more to build the ships in the navy-yards than it would under contract. But I took occasion to get a statement from Captain Sigsbee concerning the construction of vessels in the English, the French, and the German navy-yards. The period covered is approximately five years for France and Germany, and a little less for England, but in all cases the period for dockyard and private construction is the same. The rate of wages was comparatively the same in both the Government and private yards. It took much longer to construct the vessels in the Government than in the private yards. I will not read the figures but will insert Captain Sigsbee's statement and figures at the close of my remarks as an appendix.

Mr. BELL. Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes.

Mr. BELL. I want to suggest that all the officers in the Navy Department say that they can build guns much cheaper in the navy-yards than by contract. And they have tested that. Why can not they build ships cheaper?

Mr. CUMMINGS. That does not affect my statement; I am talking about ships, and not guns. I doubt the veracity of my friend's informant, all the same. Of course every constructor in the Navy wants a job, and would be glad to see all the ships built in the navy-yards; and so would I if they could be built as cheaply. But I think some of these vessels ought to be constructed in the navy-yards, as a matter of justice to the men who work eight hours a day in those yards. Why the Government should give these men eight hours for a day's work and then take the work away from them is something I can not understand.

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. Does twelve hours constitute a day's work in the contract yards?

Mr. CUMMINGS. It has been so, and it may be so in some yards to-day. None of these contracting yards work eight hours a day. We passed a bill long ago making eight hours' work imperative on all contract work done for the Government——

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. I am in favor of that now.

Mr. CUMMINGS (continuing). But on a ruling of the Attorney-General, or in some other way, the men failed to obtain the benefit of it. For instance, a stonecutter would hire a lot next to the Government plat, and work his men ten or twelve hours, and then take the stone over to the Government building and put it in place on the eight-hour schedule.

Mr. SIMS. Did we not pass a bill at the last Congress, which failed to go through the Senate, to correct that very evil which you refer to?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am speaking of the one that passed both Houses long before that. I am sorry that the other did not pass the Senate. And right here I may say, Mr. Chairman, that there is an eight-hour bill now pending in the Committee on Labor, intended to correct the defects of the present law. Those opposing it have declared, if it is passed by Congress, that they will not make any bids for Government work. They declare that it would be ruinous for them to accept Government work under its provisions. If this is so, it may be necessary for the Government to have all its ships built in the Government yards.

Now, Mr. Chairman, no man can find any fault with the contract work done for the Government in the way of building ships. The contractors have been amply paid for the work, in the way of

speed premiums, in addition to the contract price. But they have given us the finest ships in the world. No vessel has ever sailed the seas that could surpass the *Oregon*, or the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, and the *Iowa*. If the Government can produce ships equal to them in the navy-yards, under an eight-hour schedule, and complete them as promptly, I am in favor of its doing so, if it does cost from two hundred thousand to five hundred thousand dollars more for each vessel.

Mr. PEARCE of Missouri. Right on that point. Is it not true that the Government has already constructed equally good ships in the navy-yard?

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Government never constructed a battle ship.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. The *Texas*.

Mr. CUMMINGS. She is not a first-class battle ship, but is known as a second-class ship. Her plans were brought from England by Secretary Whitney, and they were altered in every way before she was completed.

Mr. PEARCE of Missouri. She is a battle ship according to the testimony of the officers.

Mr. CUMMINGS. She is not a battle ship in the class with the *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*.

Mr. PEARCE of Missouri. She has the best gun platform in the Navy to-day.

Mr. CUMMINGS. She ought to have something good about her, as either she or the *Raleigh* sank before she left her dock. Various other disasters happened to her before she became the serviceable vessel she is to-day. She did good work at Santiago.

Mr. RIDGELY. Does the gentleman from New York believe it is best for Congress to legislate so as to provide Government plants for the construction and equipment and finishing of these vessels, and also for the protection of labor?

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Government has plants already. The old *Maine*, the one that was blown up, and the *Cincinnati* were built in Brooklyn; the *Texas* and the *Raleigh* were built in Norfolk.

Mr. RIDGELY. I understood the gentleman to be arguing against the building of battle ships by the Government——

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, sir; you did not understand me correctly.

Mr. RIDGELY (continuing). Because we have to take labor at eight hours a day.

Mr. CUMMINGS. No, sir; I adduced that as an argument why we ought to build some of them in the yards. We have no right to concede our employees eight hours a day and then take the work away from them because firms who exact ten hours a day from their workmen can build them cheaper.

Mr. RIDGELY. That is what I say.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is what I say. [Laughter.]

Mr. RIDGELY. I am in favor of that and of making armor plate too; that is my position.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, when you come to armor plate, we have the *Indiana*, the *Massachusetts*, the *Oregon*, the *Iowa*, the *Kearsarge*, and the *Kentucky* finished. We have the *Illinois*, the *Alabama*, and the *Wisconsin* nearly finished. We have the *Maine*, the *Missouri*, the *Ohio*, the *Pennsylvania*, the *New Jersey*, the *Georgia*, the *West Virginia*, the *Nebraska*, and the *California* unfinished. Why? Because you have refused to pass any law in this House or in the other by which armor plate can be provided for them. Six battle ships and three armored cruisers held up for want of armor, and you propose to throw eight more ships into the same category until an armor-plate factory is established. Seventeen great men-of-war authorized to be built by the vote of the very House that refuses to provide armor for them unless it can get it at half the price paid by England, France, Germany, Russia, and Japan.

Mr. RIDGELY. And because the influence of contractors has been sufficient to defeat the provisions under which we could have done this work ourselves.

Mr. CUMMINGS. And you want to delay the construction of these ships five years more until we can have an armor-plate factory built by the Government. Why, it will take you full two years to select the site alone.

Mr. RIDGELY. No, sir. I want, simultaneously with the provisions for the completion of these vessels, a provision for the construction of a Government armor-plate factory. Let us do both at once.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Why do you not have a Government tin factory, a Government nail factory, a Government ham factory? We get all these things under contract.

Mr. RIDGELY. That is the point I have been trying to get the gentleman to confess—that he is absolutely opposed to the Government building its own armor factory.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Nonsense! I confess nothing. I want these ships completed, and am not in favor of holding them up for the establishment of a Government factory as long as we can get the armor at a less price than European and Asiatic nations pay. Nine ships are already held up, some of them authorized four years ago, and it is proposed to make the number 17, all because this House will not vote money to get armor for them.

Mr. RIDGELY. And because Congress will not vote to establish a Government armor-plate factory.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I compliment the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER]. He very sensibly agreed to provide armor for three of these ships at any price that the Secretary of the Navy might see fit to pay. But after that he wanted the others reserved for the building of an armor plant. While I sympathize with him in some respects, I believe that we can not construct these ships too soon.

I know—it has been demonstrated before the committee by the naval authorities in a way that cannot be revealed to the House—that if we pay $545 per ton for this Krupp armor, we are getting it lower than any nation in Europe pays to-day for the same armor. England has on the stocks under contract a vessel for the armor of which she pays $587 per ton. The Cramps are building a Russian war vessel to-day for which Russia pays $565 per ton for Krupp armor. They have built a vessel for Japan, the armor of which cost $575 per ton. The French are building a vessel for which $605 a ton is being paid. And I have the assurance of one of the officers of the Navy Department, who has had the figures before him, that Japan has paid in one instance $700 a ton for the same armor. The Krupps take out of the German Government nearly $600 per ton for their armor. Now, Mr. Chairman, as long as the United States can obtain this Krupp armor cheaper than it can be obtained in Europe, I am in favor of buying it until we even up on the Navy. Then I will talk to you about an armor-plate factory, if desirable.

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. The price has been going up ever since the first discussion of this question.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes; it has. And I think it very likely it may reach $645 a ton if we delay these ships longer.

A MEMBER. And we are getting better armor.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes; armor that has no blowholes in it; no harveyized stuff, but the genuine article; something you would not be ashamed to wear yourself if you could. [Laughter.]

Mr. RIDGELY. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] yield?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Oh, yes.

Mr. RIDGELY. I understand the gentleman's position to be that after we are fully supplied with battle ships, after we are virtually through with this great stress of construction, he will then take up and consider whether we had not better prepare ourselves for the making of this armor by the Government.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I would either build the ships we have authorized or I would stop authorizing them; one or the other.

Mr. RIDGELY. And I would authorize the building of a plant in connection with the building of the ships.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The market is being bulled all the time by the course we are pursuing.

Now, Mr. Chairman, my friend from West Virginia [Mr. DAYTON] said that the total cost of the entire Navy of the United States as it stands to-day is not more than we pay in one year for pensions. I do not know how that remark struck my friend from South Carolina [Mr. TALBERT], whom I do not see in his seat, but it struck me as a surprising statement. I do not know whether he counted in the vessels authorized or not.

Mr. DAYTON. My friend will pardon me a moment. I did not make my statement quite so broadly as the gentleman puts it. I said, "little more than." The ships authorized would be about $40,000,000 more than the annual pension bill. I hope he will permit me to say that I meant no disparagement of the pension bill, because I believe that measure to be just and right. I simply referred to it by way of illustration.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, if the Navy should cost double that amount and should reach a maximum where it insured the safety of the country, I would say we were getting it pretty cheap.

My friend from Illinois referred to the German navy. That navy is to-day within 2,700 tons of the strength of the American Navy, and that is what made Admiral Diedrich so cockey in the Bay of Manila. [Applause.]

The Emperor of Germany is "some pumpkins;" he "feels his oats." [Laughter.] For two years he has been struggling to surpass this country in the size of its Navy, and to-day in the German Riechstag a bill is pending, which will undoubtedly pass, doubling the size of the German navy—increasing her tonnage over 400,000 tons. I think that is a strong argument in favor of our building the ships we have already authorized as soon as possible, and of authorizing the building of as many others as we can afford to pay for.

I was not unsusceptible to the inquiry made by the chairman of the great Committee on Appropriations [Mr. CANNON] while my friend from Illinois [Mr. FOSS] was occupying the floor. He is

one of the men who hold the purse strings of the nation. He takes account of stock in every session of Congress, and in view of the great volume of appropriations made at each session he wants to cut his cloth according to its length. He wants to know where "he is at," and he received the desired information, and in the same breath told you he was not opposed to your bill. [Applause.]

Nor are the people opposed to it. They will tolerate no more delay in this armor-plate matter. You can not take up a newspaper from the St. Croix to the Rio Grande or from Puget Sound to Key Biscayne Bay without finding paragraphs advocating the prompt increase of the Navy. They recognize the fact that the bombardment of New York by an enemy would entail thribble the cost of our entire Navy.

I have always advocated its increase. No man in this House rejoiced more than I rejoiced when men from the South dominated the committee, and Mr. Herbert, of Alabama, was made its chairman. Talk about politics! You should have been here in the Fifty-third Congress, when the leader of the minority, the gentleman from Maine [Mr. BOUTELLE], used two hours of the time of the committee in general debate, taking in forty minutes of my time, using it in denunciation of the South, charging you with being inimical to the Navy. In the twenty minutes left I demonstrated the secret of your former enmity, and prophesied a great change.

The Robeson frauds were enough to sicken every honest man of the Navy, and it was not until the advent of Secretaries Chandler and Whitney that full confidence was restored. Under Secretary Herbert's administration the prophecy was fulfilled.

Mr. GAINES. Did not Secretary Herbert recommend a Government armor-plate factory and did he not state the reason why, saying that the manufacture of armor was in the hands of a monopoly that was holding up the Government?

Mr. CUMMINGS. I do not know that he did.

Mr. GAINES. He did.

Mr. CUMMINGS. But he put in figures showing what it would cost to establish an armor-plate factory. He made no recommendation whatever in his report.

Mr. SNODGRASS. What were those figures?

Mr. GAINES. They are in his report. He said it would cost about $1,700,000.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The figures were from an English firm, and I think he said $1,700,000 or less than $2,000,000, and he also said that they could establish it in nine months, but it has since been demonstrated that no man can build an armor-plate factory under two or three years.

Mr. GAINES. But that armor-plate board had Mr. Frick before them as a witness to prove that. Mr. Frick was then a member of the Carnegie firm.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, when it comes to the question of proving things, Secretary Herbert proved by the Rohrer board that it cost $425 a ton, I think, to manufacture the plate of which my friend from Kansas [Mr. RIDGELY] complained so bitterly a while ago.

Mr. WATSON. If my friend will pardon me, I will say that after all his investigation and research along that line he made no recommendation whatever as to the establishment of an armor-plate factory by the Government.

Mr. CUMMINGS. That is my understanding.

Mr. GAINES. He certainly did, and told me so a few days ago personally. He makes the recommendation in his report.

Mr. DAYTON. I beg the gentleman's pardon. He will find that statement is not verified by the facts.

Mr. GAINES. It is verified by the record, and he said it was on account of being in the hands of a monopoly.

Mr. WATSON. I do not know what Mr. Herbert stated to the gentleman personally, but the record shows that no such recommendation was made, and the gentleman can not show any record that discloses any such statement on the part of Secretary Herbert.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think the gentleman from Indiana is correct.

Mr. GAINES. It is in his report, and if you will get it you will see it.

Mr. WATSON. The gentleman from Tennessee had better get the report. I am familiar with it, and the recommendation which the gentleman speaks of is not there.

Mr. CUMMINGS. As I said before, I do not care what it costs, as long as it does not cost more than $545 per ton to supply armor for our vessels to-day. We want the vessels completed. We do not want them hung up here where nobody can reach them—hung up over the table like a mackerel in Ireland, where you can point at it, but not eat it.

If we are to have an increased navy, it is time to stop talking and begin work. Authorizing it will not build it; you must provide armor and do it promptly. Either do this or stop the authorization of vessels. Do one thing or the other. I believe that the people of the country, ten to one, demand a decrease in the Army and an increase in the Navy; and as long as I remain in this House I intend to voice that demand.

Mr. WM. ALDEN SMITH. Foreign powers are doing that, are they not?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes; that is what foreign nations are doing. Germany is doing it, England just now is increasing her army, and at the same time utilizing her navy on land; for without the guns that were dragged toward Ladysmith and across the Modder River by English sailors, the Boers probably would have been to-day holding the Britons at bay at both Kimberley and Colenso. So that you see the navy in some cases is equally as efficient on land as on sea. And American sailors are not behind the English in this respect. Such men when on the sea are entitled to the protection of the best armor that the world can produce. To haggle about the price when it is imperatively needed is unmanly; to haggle about the price when it can be procured at a lower rate than that paid by any other nation is more than unmanly; it is little short of treason.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the committee for its kind attention and also the gentlemen of the Committee on Naval Affairs for yielding the increased time. [Applause.]

APPENDIX.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN SIGSBEE REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF SHIPS IN FOREIGN NAVY-YARDS.

The following tables give the list and tonnage of Government ships building at Government dockyards and at private shipyards in the three principal shipbuilding countries of Europe.

The total cost is in every case taken from the official reports, and is probably correct so far as it goes. In the case of England and Germany, a ship is laid down, few modifications are made, and the construction is pushed through to completion. In the case of France, the time occupied in completion after the ship leaves the launching ways is often several years, and many changes are made, involving considerable expense; therefore it is probable that French construction costs even more than here represented.

The table of Italian construction shows that in a given time Government shipping to the amount of 353,000,000 lire was built in Government dockyards, and only 41,000,000 lire in private shipyards. It is of importance, however, in this connection to mention the fact that a period of six to ten years has elapsed between the beginning and completion of large vessels in Italian dockyards, and in striking contrast is the work done by the two private firms of Ansaldo & Co. and Orlando Bros.

In 1895 the Italian Government placed an order with the firm of Ansaldo & Co. for an armored cruiser named *Garibaldi*, and before she was launched the Argentine Government wished to purchase her. The Italian Government agreed to the sale on the condition that a second ship be built on the same lines and within the period fixed for the delivery of the first. The new vessel was fitted with water-tube boilers, whereby certain advantages were gained; but when this second vessel was completed the Spanish Government was allowed to purchase, and she became the *Cristobal Colon*. A third was laid down, rapidly completed, and again the Argentine Republic coveted her and got her, the ship being named the *Pueyrredon*. And now Messrs. Ansaldo have launched their fourth vessel of the same type. She continues, so far, an Italian ship, and is named the *Garibaldi*.

All these four vessels, it will be seen, have been floated within about four years from the beginning of the first, which is a splendid performance. In the case of the last—the fourth vessel—the keel was laid on September 21, 1898, while the launch took place on June 29 last, about nine months from the laying of the keel. The vessel was not a mere shell, either, for all the shafting was in place and finished up to the engine room. All the auxiliary engines in the engine and boiler rooms were fitted, and where possible their pipes were coupled up to them. All double-bottom pipes and valves and bilge pipes and valves were fitted in place and finished. Thus, instead of building only one ship leisurely, Messrs. Ansaldo, by arrangement with the Government, have been able to build four in about four years, representing a gross turnover of some 2,680,000 lire instead of 680,000 lire.

The Italian papers mention with considerable interest and pride that there are now five firms in Italy competing for the construction of a class of battleships of 8,000 tons displacement, now offered for bids by the Italian Government.

In the same connection, the German papers mention the fact that now there are in Germany five (formerly four) private yards prepared to build first-class battle ships, and nine (formerly six) firms prepared to build cruisers. It will be noticed that the latest battle ships are principally assigned to private yards.

In the tables the money values are given in the coin of the several countries, except in the last two tables in which, for purposes of comparison, all are reduced to United States gold.

Comparative cost of ships abroad built in government and in private dockyards.

SHIPS BUILT IN GOVERNMENT DOCKYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
ENGLAND.		*Tons.*			
Canopus	B. S	12,950	Portsmouth	£924,398	£71.50
Ocean	B. S	12,950	Devonport	936,048	
Goliath	B. S	12,950	Chatham	915,588	
Formidable	B. S	15,000	Portsmouth	1,087,701	72.51
Implacable	B. S	15,000	Devonport	1,077,797	
Irresistible	B. S	15,000	Chatham	1,067,735	
London	B. S	15,000	Portsmouth	1,091,641	
Venerable	B. S	15,000	Chatham	1,078,823	
Bulwark	B. S	15,000	Devonport	1,086,919	
Albemarle	B. S	14,000	Chatham		
Montagu	B. S	14,000	Devonport		
Drake	Cr	14,100	Pembroke		
Kent	Cr	9,800	Portsmouth		
Essex	Cr	9,800	Pembroke		
Andromeda	Cr	11,000	do	601,356	54.67
Spartiate	Cr	11,000	do	596,341	
Gladiator	Cr	5,750	Portsmouth	300,612	52.17
Pomone	Cr	2,135	Sheerness	154,968	72.58
Pandora	Cr	2,200	Portsmouth	170,446	77.47
Pioneer	Cr	2,200	Chatham	154,480	70.02
4 sloops	Unpr. Cr.	3,920	Sheerness	297,688	75.94

BUILT IN PRIVATE SHIPYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
ENGLAND.		*Tons.*			
Albion	B. S	12,950	Thames Iron Works.	£854,283	
Glory	B. S	12,950	Laird Bros.	894,115	
Vengeance	B. S	12,950	Vickers	869,704	£67.16
Duncan	B. S	14,000	Thames Iron Works.	1,050,317	75.02
Cornwallis	B. S	14,000	do	1,050,378	
Exmouth	B. S	14,000	Laird Bros.	1,073,460	
Russell	B. S	14,000	Palmer's Co	1,074,748	
Leviathan	Cr	14,100	Brown & Co	1,023,577	
Good Hope	Cr	14,100	Fairfield Co	1,000,841	70.98
King Alfred	Cr	14,100	Vickers	999,432	
Aboukir	Cr	12,000	Fairfield Co	771,174	
Cressy	Cr	12,000	do	771,516	
Hogue	Cr	12,000	Vickers	776,585	
Sutlej	Cr	12,000	Brown & Co	779,881	64.99
Euryalus	Cr	12,000	Vickers	798,580	
Bacchante	Cr	12,000	Brown & Co	769,294	
Monmouth	Cr	9,800	London and Glasgow Co.		
Bedford	Cr	9,800	Fairfield Co		
Ariadne	Pr. Cr	11,000	Brown & Co	564,441	51.31
Amphitrite	Pr. Cr	11,000	Vickers	575,962	
Hyacinth	Pr. Cr	5,600	L. & G. Co	304,139	
Highflyer	Pr. Cr	5,600	Fairfield Co	298,863	
Hermes	Pr. Cr	5,600	do	300,593	53.67
Perseus	Pr. Cr	2,135	Earle's Co	138,264	64.28
Prometheus	Pr. Cr	2,135	do	135,916	
Pyramus	Pr. Cr	2,135	Palmer's Co	141,008	
2 sloops	Unpr. Cr.	1,960	Laird Bros.	137,824	70.31
Bramble	G. B	700	Potter & Co	53,652	76.64
Britomart	G. B	700	do	53,634	
Dwarf	G. B	700	L. & G. Co	54,369	
Thistle	G. B	700	do	54,133	
42 boats	T. B. D	14,280	Various		167.09
2 boats	T. B	350	Thornycroft		

SHIPS BUILT IN GOVERNMENT DOCKYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
FRANCE.		*Tons.*		*Francs.*	*Francs.*
Charlemagne	B. S	11,275	Brest	26,405,592	2,341.9
Saint-Louis	B. S	11,275	Lorient	27,583,857	
Gaulois	B. S	11,275	Brest	26,231,867	
Henri IV	B. S	8,948	Cherbourg	20,031,177	2,238.6
Jéna	B. S	12,052	Brest	27,856,496	2,311.3
Suffren	B. S	12,728	do	29,889,080	2,348.3
(A 8)	B. S	14,865	do	35,542,704	2,391.0
(A 10)	B. S	14,865	Toulon	35,542,704	2,391.0
Jeanne d'Arc	Ar. Cr	11,270	do	21,415,928	1,900.2
Dupetit-Thouars	Ar. Cr	9,517	do	20,484,177	2,152.3
Gueydon	Ar. Cr	9,517	Lorient	20,807,193	
Condé	Ar. Cr	10,014	do	22,561,519	2,252.9
Gloire	Ar. Cr	10,014	do	22,561,519	
La Marseillaise	Ar. Cr	10,014	Brest	22,561,519	
(C 11)	Ar. Cr	12,416	Cherbourg	28,982,500	2,334.3
Dupleix	Ar. Cr	7,700	Rochefort	16,308,847	2,118.0
Jurien de la Gravière.	Cr	5,685	Lorient	11,337,439	1,994.3
D'Estrées	Cr	2,452	Rochefort	5,139,223	2,095.9
Dunois	T. B. D	896	Cherbourg	3,053,113	3,407.5
La Hire	T. B. D	896	do	3,038,492	
6 others	T. B. D	1,819	Rochefort	10,336,050	5,682.2
Décidée	G. B	645	Lorient	1,443,357	2,237.7
Zélée	G. B	647	Rochefort	1,579,556	
Vaucluse	Des. B	1,613	do	2,061,414	
9 boats of Narval Cl.	Sub	1,350	5 at Cherbourg 4 at Rochefort	5,840,800	
6 boats	T. B	508	2 at Cherbourg 2 at Toulon 2 at Saigon	889,844 1,051,246	

Comparative cost of ships abroad built in government and in private dockyards—Continued.

BUILT IN PRIVATE SHIPYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
FRANCE.		*Tons.*		*Francs.*	*Francs.*
Montcalm	B. S	9,517	La Seyne	22,284,000	2,341.5
Sully	B. S	10,014	do	23,733,394	2,370.0
Amiral-Aube	AB. Cr	10,014	Saint-Nazaire	24,217,550	
Desaix	Ar. Cr	7,700	do	17,782,047	2,309.2
Kléber	Ar. Cr	7,700	Bordeaux	17,776,047	
Guichen	Cr	8,277	Saint-Nazaire	15,506,301	1,873.4
Chateaurenault	Cr	8,017	La Seyne	15,467,287	1,929.3
Infernet	Cr	2,452	Bordeaux	4,816,222	1,976.4
5 boats	T. B. D	1,529	Le Havre	8,412,281	5,501.8
2 boats	T. B. D	926	Nantes	3,320,150	
8 boats	T. B. D	2,426	Normand	13,492,600	
2 river	G. B	606	Thornycroft	1,121,108	
10 boats	T. B	1,086	Various	10,297,200	
31 boats	T. B	1,746	do	13,523,205	
G. H. I	T. B	44	Le Creusot	383,300	
Libellule	T. B	40	Le Havre	343,850	

SHIPS BUILT IN GOVERNMENT DOCKYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
GERMANY.		*Tons.*		*Marks.*	*Marks.*
Kaiser Friederich III	B. S	11,081	Wilhelmshaven	19,830,000	1,789.55
Kaiser Wilhelm II	B. S	11,081	Wilhelmshaven	19,830,000	1,789.55
"G"	B. S	11,081	do		
Fürst Bismarck	L. Cr	10,650	Kiel	17,210,000	1,615.96
"A"	L. Cr	8,880	do	15,000,000	1,700.43
Freya	L. Cr	5,628	Danzig	*9,110,000	*1,618.69
Vineta	L. Cr	5,900	do	*9,250,000	*1,567.79
Ersatz Wolf	G. B	895	do	1,570,000	1,754.19
Ersatz Habicht	G. B	895	do	1,570,000	1,754.19

BUILT IN PRIVATE DOCKYARDS.

Name.	Class.	Displacement.	Name of yard or builders.	Cost.	Cost per ton of displacement.
GERMANY.		*Tons.*		*Marks.*	*Marks.*
Ersatz König Wilhelm.	B. S	11,081	Germania Works	19,830,000	1,789.55
"A"	B. S	11,081	Schichau Works	19,960,000	1,801.28
"B"	B. S	11,081	Blohm & Voss	19,960,000	1,801.28
"D"	B. S	11,081	Schichau Works	19,960,000	1,801.28
"E"	B. S	11,081	Germania Works	19,960,000	1,801.28
"F"	B. S	11,081	Schichau Works		
"H"	B. S	11,081	Vulcan Works		
"I"	B. S	11,081	Germania Works		
Hertha	L. Cr	5,628	Vulcan Works	*9,110,000	*1,618.69
Victoria Louise	L. Cr	5,628	Weser Works	*9,110,000	*1,618.69
Hansa	L. Cr	5,900	Vulcan Works	*9,250,000	*1,567.79
Gazelle	S. Cr	2,645	Germania Works	4,620,000	1,746.69
"A"	S. Cr	2,645	do	4,620,000	1,746.69
"B"	S. Cr	2,645	Weser Works	4,620,000	1,746.69
Iltis	G. B	895	Schichau Works	1,570,000	1,754.19
Jaguar	G. B	895	do	1,570,000	1,754.19

* These figures are inclusive of the costs of hull and machinery and gun armament: the costs of torpedo armament are not included, as the figures are not available.

Comparative cost per ton of displacement of dockyard-built and contract-built ships; items stated in United States dollars.

Name of ship.	Displacement.	Date of laying keel.	Cost per ton of displacement in United States dollars of ships built in—	
			Government dockyards.	Private Shipyards.
ENGLAND.				
Battle ships, first class:	*Tons.*			
Canopus	12,950	Jan., 1897	$347.30	
Vengeance	12,950	Aug., 1897		$326.80
Cruisers, first class:				
Andromeda	11,000	Dec., 1895	266.10	
Ariadne	11,000	Oct., 1896		249.70
Cruisers, second class:				
Gladiator	5,750	Jan., 1896	253.90	
Hermes	5,600	Apr., 1897		261.20
Cruisers, third class:				
Pomone	2,135	Dec., 1896	333.20	
Perseus	2,135	May, 1896		312.80
Sloops:				
Condor class	980	Jan., 1898	352.90	
Mutine class	980	Nov., 1898		342.20
Some other classes:				
Bramble	700	Dec., 1897		373.00
Torpedo-boat destroyers:				
Fawn, as type	324	Dec., 1898		813.10

Comparative cost per ton of displacement of dockyard-built and contract-built ships; items stated in United States dollars—Continued.

Name of ship.	Displacement.	Date of laying keel.	Cost per ton of displacement in United States dollars of ships built in—	
			Government dockyards.	Private Shipyards.
FRANCE.				
Battle ships:	*Tons.*			
Charlemagne	11,275	July, 1894	$452.00	
Suffren	12,728		453.20	
Henri IV	8,948	July, 1897	432.05	
Armored cruisers:				
Jeanne d'Arc	11,270	Oct., 1896	366.75	
Condé	10,014		434.80	
Sully	10,014			$457.40
Dupetit-Thouars	9,517		417.30	
Montcalm	9,517			451.90
Cruiser, first class:				
Guichen	8,277			361.60
Cruisers, second class:				
Chateaurenault	8,017			372.35
Jurien de la Gravière	5,685	Nov., 1897	384.90	
Cruisers, third class:				
D'Estrées	2,452	Mar., 1897	404.50	
Infernet	2,452			381.45
Armored cruisers:				
Dupleix	7,700		408.80	
Desaix	7,700			445.70
Some other classes:				
La Hire (torpedo vessel)	896	Dec., 1896	657.60	
Torpedo-boat destroyers	303		1,096.60	
Do	306			1,061.85
GERMANY.				
Battle ships:	*Tons.*			
Kaiser Friedrich III	11,081	1894	$425.90	
Battle ship "A"	11,081	1898		$438.70
Armored cruisers:				
Fürst Bismarck	10,650	1895	384.60	
Cruiser "A"	8,880	1898	404.70	
Protected cruisers:				
Freya	5,628	1895	385.25	
Gazelle	2,645	1896		415.70
Gunboat:				
Ersatz Wolf	895	1898		417.50
Torpedo-boat destroyers	350			668.65

COMPARISON.

Cost of ships of various classes per ton of displacement.

Nation.	B. S., over 10,000 tons.	Ar. Cr., about 11,000 tons.	Cr., about 5,700 tons.	Cr., about 2,400 tons.	G. B., about 1,000 tons.	G. B., about 700 tons.	T. vessel, about 900 tons.	T. B. D., about 300 tons.
England	$347.30	$266.10	$253.90	$353.00	$342.30	$373.00		$813.00
France *	452.00	366.75 457.40 451.90 361.60 372.30	384.90	404.30 381.40		431.87	$657.60	1,096.60 1,061.80
		†401.98		†392.90				†1,079.20
Germany	425.90	384.60 404.70	385.10	415.70	417.50			668.60
		†394.65						

*It is necessary to give so much data concerning France, because there seems to be so much variation in the cost of vessels of the same class.

†Average cost for the class.

C. D. SIGSBEE,
Captain, U. S. Navy, Chief Intelligence Officer.

APRIL 14, 1900.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. LOUDENSLAGER having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message in writing from the President of the United States, by Mr. PRUDEN, one of his secretaries, announced that the President had approved and signed bills of the following titles:

On April 7, 1900:

H. R. 153. An act granting a pension to Elizabeth Johns.

On April 9, 1900:

H. R. 7649. An act authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to issue patent to the city of Elreno, Okla., for cemetery purposes;

H. R. 5049. An act to settle the title to real estate in the city of Santa Fe, N. Mex.;

H. R. 8463. An act ratifying an appropriation by the legislature of Oklahoma, out of the Morrill fund, for the use of the university at Langston for colored students; and

H. J. Res. 216. Joint resolution for appointment of members of Board of Managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers.

On April 12, 1900:

H. R. 60. An act to create the northwestern division of the Northern district of Georgia for judicial purposes, and to fix the time and place for holding court therein;

H. R. 9284. An act to attach the county of Foard, in the State of Texas, to the Fort Worth division of the northern district of Texas, and providing that all process issued against d;efendants residing in said county shall be returned to Fort Worth;

H. R. 7939. An act to amend an act approved June 10, 1880, governing the immediate transportation of dutiable merchandise without appraisement;

H. R. 10311. An act to authorize the Shreveport and Red River Valley Railway Company to build and maintain a railway bridge across Red River, at or near the town of Alexandria, in the Parish of Rapides, State of Louisiana;

H. R. 9713. An act permitting the building of a dam between Coon Rapids and the north limits of the city of Minneapolis, Minn., across the Mississippi River; and

H. R. 8245. An act temporarily to provide revenues and a civil government for Porto Rico, and for other purposes.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. DAYTON. Mr. Chairman, in the absence of the acting chairman [Mr. FOSS] momentarily, I want to call the attention of gentlemen who represent the minority report to the fact that substantially the arguments made by the chairman of the committee and by the ranking member on the other side have been on one side of the disputed questions here, and I submit that it is but fair and right that some one who favors the minority report should express the views of that minority following the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS]. I see the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. KITCHIN] here.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, though I did not intend to speak to-day, I will proceed on this bill, and if the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER] comes in I shall desire to yield to him.

Mr. Chairman, advocating the views of the minority, I wish to state that if nothing but ordinary matters of appropriation were involved in this bill there would have been no views of the minority presented, but we would have contented ourselves with trying to amend the bill upon the floor. But in it are several features which we think involve matters of important public policy. One is the absence of any requirement that part of the cruisers be built in the navy-yards, and especially that the three 8,000-ton cruisers authorized by this bill be built, one at the navy-yard at Brooklyn, one at the Mare Island Yard, and one at the Norfolk Navy-Yard. We think this largely involves the question whether this Government shall ever build another ship in its own yards. The fight is on. If ever in the history of this country in the building up of its great Navy, that nearly every gentleman seems to want, any ships are to be built in Government yards, now is the time to begin their construction.

Another point of difference between the majority and the minority is on the armor-plate question. I shall discuss this at some length presently. If we are ever to escape the exorbitant prices of what we conceive to be a monopoly in the armor-plate business; if we are ever to be free from charges that vessels are being delayed on account of the lack of armor; if we are ever to allay the suspicion that the country is being grossly overcharged upon armor plate, we ought now to undertake to settle these questions. Year after year we make the fight in this House, and so far, year after year the armor-plate manufacturers have succeeded, and we who believe that the Government should begin an armor-plate factory in order to reduce the price of armor plate have been defeated.

Mr. HAWLEY. Will my colleague permit a question just there?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. HAWLEY. You desire to build a plant in order that you may reduce the cost. Suppose you had the experience in the construction of armor plate that the Government has had in so many other lines of construction; that you found it cost you more than it costs to-day to buy it. Would that affect your opinion on the question?

Mr. KITCHIN. In the first place, I do not believe that what the gentleman thinks is true is true.

Mr. HAWLEY. I have not said it is true, but I am asking you whether that would have a relation to the question.

Mr. KITCHIN. I do not feel called upon to debate every hypothetical question that may be submitted. If the gentleman has any reason to think it would cost the Government more than the Government is now paying and can state that as a fact, then I will have no hesitation in expressing my views upon it. I will even now say that if I thought we could buy plate as cheaply as we can make it after an honest and fair trial, I would favor buying it; but this I do not believe, as I shall try to show in a few

moments. I favor cheaper prices for it or building a factory, because I despise extortion. Mr. Chairman, one other difference is based upon items which we consider extravagant and unwise. There are several of these items, and especially one to which I will presently call the attention of the House, and to which I hope the House will give its attention. It is the "emergency fund." For what purpose is it? No one knows; but it is to be at the disposal of the President, giving him $500,000 to expend as he may see fit in time of peace.

I will take these matters up, not as I have stated them, but in the order, as I believe, of their importance at this time.

I will first consider the armor-plate business. I am sorry I do not see my distinguished friend from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS], the first Democrat on this committee, who has just advocated in an earnestly delivered argument that the Government shall not go into the armor-plate business. This eminent gentleman, however, agrees with the views of the minority as to building some of our ships in our navy-yards.

Mr. Chairman, there have been page upon page of testimony in regard to armor plate. I take it that no man can find from Secretary Herbert's report, the most complete report on the subject ever submitted to the House, or from Admiral O'Neil's testimony before our committee, that armor plate will cost this Government anything like $545 per ton, the price the manufacturers demand for it. I have not my papers before me, as I did not expect to speak to-day, and would not have undertaken to speak except for the absence of the gentleman from Kentucky, who is rarely out of his seat. But my recollection is that the price of labor in a ton of armor plate in Secretary Herbert's report is placed at $165 per ton.

Mr. BARBER. Will the gentleman allow me a question there?

Mr. KITCHIN. I will.

Mr. BARBER. On the question of labor, was that for the labor and material only, or is that the total cost?

Mr. KITCHIN. That is not the total cost, according to my recollection.

Mr. BARBER. That is for what kind of armor?

Mr. KITCHIN. He was discussing the harveyized armor, as I understand.

Mr. BARBER. Was that single or double forging? This is important.

Mr. KITCHIN. I do not know, but suppose he was discussing the best armor known at that time.

I am giving the facts as I understand them. Admiral O'Neil puts the present price of labor and material at $250 per ton in some of his various illustrations.

The raw material in it rarely exceeds $20 per ton. I believe it is more than $20 per ton at the present time, but the average cost of material in a ton of armor plate is, I think, about $20 a ton for a number of years.

Mr. BARBER. Will the gentleman allow me a question right there?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BARBER. What do you mean by material?

Mr. KITCHIN. I mean the steel.

Mr. BARBER. Is it not a fact that the Rohrer board, in making the estimate which Secretary Herbert made, said the basis of material was $30 in 1896, at a time when pig iron was worth about one-half of what it is to-day?

Mr. UNDERWOOD. I will state to the gentleman that the Rohrer board placed the price of pig iron at $20 a ton. I have that fact here.

Mr. BARBER. What page is that?

Mr. KITCHIN. Now, Mr. Chairman, I read from page 10 of Admiral O'Neil's testimony.

If we discard, therefore, the consideration of interest charges on plant, which ex-Secretary Herbert claimed should not be considered, and on working capital, the charges against the appropriation for making armor, in the first case of 3,000 tons (the cost being on the same basis as in the preceding cases), would become—

10 per cent for deterioration of plant and its maintenance	$500,000
Cost of 3,000 tons of armor, at $273 per ton	819,000
Total	1,319,000

So Admiral O'Neil has placed it in this calculation at $273 a ton, and in that he includes labor and all material.

Now, he says this divided by 3,000 gives $439.66 per ton. Then if you make 5,000 tons instead of 3,000 tons, he says you would get it at $374 a ton instead of the $545 that the other side think a fair price. Then he says:

A more accurate estimate, in my opinion, would perhaps be—

6 per cent on plant valued at $4,000,000	$240,000
6 per cent interest on working capital of $600,000	36,000
8 per cent for deterioration and for maintenance of plant	320,000
Cost of making 3,000 tons of armor, at $250 per ton	750,000
Total	1,360,000

One million three hundred and forty-six thousand dollars divided by 3,000 equals $448.66 per ton, which does not make any allowance for royalty or for profit unless interest charges be so considered.

If 5,000 tons were manufactured, the figures on the same basis would be—

6 per cent interest on plant valued at $4,000,000	$240,000
6 per cent interest on working capital of $1,000,000	60,000
8 per cent for deterioration and for maintenance of plant	320,000
Cost of making 5,000 tons of armor, at $250 per ton	1,250,000
Total	1,870,000

One million eight hundred and seventy thousand dollars divided by 5,000 equals $374 per ton exclusive of royalty or profit as above.

If we discard interest charges on plant and on working capital, the charges for making armor on the above basis would be—

8 per cent on $4,000,000 for deterioration and maintenance of plant	$320,000
Cost of making 3,000 tons of armor, at $250 per ton	750,000
Total	1,070,000

One million and seventy thousand dollars divided by 3,000 equals $356.66 per ton.

And for 5,000 tons—

8 per cent on $4,000,000 for deterioration and maintenance of plant	$320,000
Cost of making 5,000 tons of armor, at $250	1,250,000
Total	1,570,000

One million five hundred and seventy thousand dollars divided by 5,000 equals $314 per ton.

You will notice, Mr. Chairman, that in all these interest charges for this great plant he has placed the rate at 6 per cent, while we know that the Government can get its interest charges for half that.

Mr. BARBER. Were not these estimates made on the basis of 3,000 and 5,000 tons?

Mr. KITCHIN. They are made on estimates of 3,000 and 5,000 tons.

Mr. BARBER. Is it not a fact that up to this time these armor-plate factories never received orders for more than 2,000 tons in any one year, and that they have never manufactured more than 2,000 tons in a year? That is the average up to this time. All the tonnage has been about 35,000 tons, and less than 2,000 tons have been manufactured in one year.

Mr. KITCHIN. I think the gentleman is in error. I think that each of these American factories has made more than 2,000 tons in a year, and that their capacity is much more than that. I admit that it is probably true that in some years they have made less than 2,000 tons.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I say this is the latest testimony that has been before the committee; and if we make 5,000 tons a year, we can make it for $314 a ton. Of course that would be an immense saving to the Government. That that is a reasonable proposition, I will state that we have in sight to-day, if we pass this bill as is now reported, besides that armor plate for which there is a present necessity for the three battle ships, the *Maine*, the *Ohio*, and the *Missouri*, an additional amount of 31,000 tons, enough to give a factory 5,000 tons a year for the next six years. And in the next six years, if gentlemen determine to increase the Navy at the rate indicated in this bill, we would have not only 5,000 tons for a long time to come, but I make the statement, which I think is true, that we will require ten or twelve thousand tons annually for the next forty years, if we try to keep up with Germany, England and all those countries who stand over the sea, side by side, with daggers drawn upon each other. If the American factories together can not supply annually more than 6,000 tons, then at last will you be driven to a Government factory.

Mr. BARBER. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. I will.

Mr. BARBER. As to the basis of 5,000 tons of Krupp iron in Admiral O'Neil's testimony, does not the gentleman know, assuming the capacity of the plants to be as they are, and the cost upon which he has made the estimate, that they can manufacture, as matter of fact, from their present experience, only 2,000 tons of Krupp armor a year?

Mr. KITCHIN. You mean the Carnegie Works and the Bethlehem Works? My information is that it is 3,000 tons of Krupp armor each.

Mr. BARBER. Two thousand tons from present experience; they are only manufacturing Krupp armor.

Mr. KITCHIN. I remember asking some gentleman when the committee was down at the Bethlehem Works, and he told me that their capacity was 3,000 tons, as I recall it.

Mr. BARBER. Of harveyized iron.

Mr. KITCHIN. I understood it was the best iron. The armor involved in the report of Admiral O'Neil is the Krupp iron. Why, gentlemen, if you would go down and see one of the little armor plates—I will admit that they are both powerful and expensive—you will find here and there a piece of iron plate that will astonish you by its cost and size. It is perhaps 8 or 10 feet wide and 14 or 16 feet long and 9 or 10 or 12 inches thick, and what do you reckon it costs the Government? Twelve or fifteen thousand dollars—enough to buy a good plantation in any State in the Union.

Whenever you look at it the first thing that strikes you will be "What? Does that cost $12,000?" You can not conceive it; you can not understand it until you go down into the figures of these men who have been selling armor plate to us and other nations of the world. I believe there is a general feeling throughout the country from one end to the other that the Government is being, as it were, held up by the armor-plate factories. A piece about 20 inches each way is sold for $545.

Mr. LANDIS. May I suggest to the gentleman that diamonds not so large as that would cost more money?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes; and if the gentleman is as hard put to sustain his side of this matter as to ask that question, I do not think I am called upon to answer him.

Mr. LANDIS. You are judging of value by the size; and I say that you will find diamonds not so large as that more valuable.

Mr. KITCHIN. But we will not find diamonds which men have made from rough material quite so expensive as those you wear, and but little more expensive than Krupp armor plate at present prices. Now, this is what Admiral O'Neil says, and I commend it to the gentleman from Indiana. He says:

> In my opinion, the price asked for armor plate has no very direct bearing on the cost of production. It is practically in the hands of a monopoly, which naturally desires to get as high a price for it as it can.

That is in Admiral O'Neil's testimony, showing that it is practically a monopoly. Of course they will hold us up as high as they can. Have you not heard the advocates of buying the plate from private corporations say that these factories will sell to one nation at $700 a ton, to another at $600 a ton, to another at $545 a ton? This shows to common-sense men that there is no way of estimating the true cost of the armor by any prices which they demand. That is my opinion of it.

Mr. WATSON. Will my colleague permit a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes.

Mr. WATSON. How long, in your opinion, would it be, if we should authorize a Government armor-plate factory, before we could manufacture armor plate?

Mr. KITCHIN. I think if the Secretary of the Navy is in thorough accord with the Government armor-plate factory, we could begin work in two years to make armor plate, perhaps earlier; but I am not an engineer of sufficient skill to state exactly. Much will depend upon the spirit of those charged by law with its construction.

Mr. WATSON. Would the gentleman suspend the completion of the three battle ships now ready for armor until that time?

Mr. KITCHIN. No, sir. My friend knows that in the committee (perhaps he was not present at the time) every member of the minority said that we were in favor of the Government going ahead, notwithstanding it was held up, and buying armor plate enough to complete these three ships—the *Maine*, *Ohio*, and *Missouri*—let the cost be whatever it might. But what I would do is to look out for the future, so that we should not be held up again.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. WATSON] has an opportunity to provide for the future, and he declines to do it.

Mr WATSON. No.

Mr. KITCHIN. The same condition will confront you next year that confronts you this.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. The gentleman from North Carolina will understand that the bill originally provided that all the armor plate should be paid for at this price; that the Secretary of the Navy should be authorized to purchase all the armor plate—31,000 tons—at these prices.

Mr. KITCHIN. The gentleman from Kentucky is correct; but this is the point I wish to impress on the gentleman from Indiana: Unless you take steps now to provide for the reduction in the general price of armor plate, year after year you will be put in the same position in which we now find ourselves in regard to these three battle ships—on the dock ready for armor plate. Then the cry will come that we must have the armor plate at once, and all will be compelled to yield to exorbitant prices for armor plate as a specific pressing necessity. That is what we want to provide against. We want to stop the conditions which will annually hold us up on this matter. Congress should act now, so that hereafter no monopoly can dictate extravagant prices upon the taxpayers of our country.

If you are determined that nothing shall ever be done to reduce the high prices of armor plate, that we shall never have a Government armor-plate factory to compete with other factories, then I ask you in the name of common candor to bring the matter to a test here, to raise no technical objections to this amendment when it shall be presented, but to settle this question fairly and squarely, so that the American people may know upon whom rests the responsibility of armor at $545 per ton.

I will read from the views of the minority, prepared with great care by the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky, to whom I have referred and who I say deserves large credit for the fight we intend to make in behalf of the people on this important question:

> Now, since this statement was made the gentleman's company has furnished the Government armor for $400 per ton.

This referred to the statement of Mr. Schwab, who was then as now with the Carnegie factory.

Mr. Schwab's testimony was:

> I have no hesitancy in saying that if you will give us 3,000 tons a year we will give you a very nice rebate in price for every ton over 3,000.

If the Government undertakes this business, it will make five or six thousand tons a year and perhaps ten or twelve thousand tons annually.

Mr. Schwab continues:

> If you will give us 3,500 tons a year we will give you a rebate of $100 a ton on every ton over 3,500, so important is this item of keeping our works occupied. We could well afford to make that reduction if we had the same quantity of armor to make that other people do.

We understand further that since this statement was made they have taken contracts at $400 a ton.

Mr. BARBER. For what kind of armor?

Mr. KITCHIN. Probably harveyized.

Mr. BARBER. But not the Krupp.

Mr. KITCHIN. I will come to your distinction presently. I think I will show that there is not all this difference between the cost of making Krupp armor and harveyized armor that the gentleman from Pennsylvania seems to think there is. But however that may be, we have here the statement that if we will give these people a contract for 3,500 tons a year, they will give us a rebate of $100 a ton on every ton over 3,500; and since that statement was made they have made this harveyized armor for us at $400 a ton. If we had given them a contract for 3,000 tons over 3,500 tons a year, they would have made it for $300 a ton, according to that statement, would they not?

Mr. BARBER. Does the gentleman want an answer?

Mr. KITCHIN. No, sir; it carries its answer on its face.

Now, as to the Krupp armor, every gentleman knows that within the last three or four years all the great armor-plate factories have improved their plants by providing labor-saving machinery, etc., and in my opinion they can to-day make Krupp armor as cheaply as they could harveyized armor five years ago.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. The gentleman will allow me to say that I am in possession of information which I am not at liberty to disclose, because the person imparting it declined to give me that privilege, showing that Krupp armor can be made for $100 a ton cheaper than harveyized.

Mr. BARBER. Let me reply to that statement.

Mr. KITCHIN. I am afraid my time will not allow me.

Mr. BARBER. The Secretary of the Navy does not admit that statement to be correct.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. He does not know anything more about this than the man in the moon.

Mr. BARBER. But he has his experts to give him information.

Mr. GAINES. May I interrupt the gentleman?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes; for a moment.

Mr. GAINES. As has been stated here, Secretary Herbert recommended the building of an armor-plate factory. I read from page 86 of his report:

> I therefore recommend that if Congress shall determine by law upon any limit of price to be paid, it shall also authorize the Department to erect or buy an armor plant and a gun plant, and, if need be, to lease such plant until it can construct its own.

Mr. WATSON. I do not know that I ought to inject this controversy here; but I call attention to the use of the word "until" in the paragraph just read.

Mr. KITCHIN. I can not yield for a controversy between other gentlemen. I call attention to the fact that although gentlemen connected with the armor-plate factories were formally or informally invited to come before our committee and give us further information on these subjects—the information with which the gentleman from Pennsylvania seems to be filled—yet they did not come. They responded that they stood by their former statements, one of which I have read you from Mr. Schwab. They did not come to us and give us openly and fully the information which we desired.

Secretary Herbert believed, like thousands of other good people in this land, some of whom, I suppose, have taken as much pains in this matter as the gentleman from Pennsylvania (with all due respect to him), and the great country believes, that we are being "gouged" in this armor-plate business; and we believe that in the light of past events—events of the recent past—there is no escape from the position in which the Government is placed except by meeting these makers of armor plate boldly like men and telling them that we will no longer submit to the prices demanded by their monopoly (which Admiral O'Neil calls it), but that we will make our own plate.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Taking advantage of your information and committee service, is it not your belief that if this Congress were to pass an amendment to this bill to the effect that the Government should establish an armor-plate factory and appropriate the money for it, unless on or before the last day of the present fiscal year the Secretary of the Navy should have received bids at a rate that we consider reasonable—is it not your opinion that we never would have to erect an armor-plate factory at all?

Mr. KITCHIN. That is my opinion, and I will state that in the views of the minority we say that we believe in buying our armor plate wherever we think we can get it at reasonable prices. We do not believe in the Government creating more offices; we do not believe in giving the Government more business to attend to; but we say that rather than to have extortion practiced upon us, we believe that, in defense of the great masses of the people who are back of us, we should resort to the building of an armor-plate factory, considering it a necessity for fair treatment.

Mr. GAINES. Will my friend yield right on that point?

Mr. KITCHIN. My time is very limited, but I will yield.

Mr. GAINES. On the question of monopoly and combination between the two companies, the Carnegie and the Bethlehem companies, Mr. Herbert says:

Here, then, we have the pregnant facts that the two companies in the United States have had a perfect understanding with each other as to what they should charge their own Government; that the five companies in France seem to have had a like understanding with each other as to what they should charge their Government; that the price of armor in France rose gradually from 1891 to 1894, as improvements were adopted, to about the same price as that which was charged by the Bethlehem and Carnegie companies to Russia in 1895, after the former company had forced its way into the European market. I am informed, upon authority which I believe to be good that about, or perhaps before, the time of the last contract of the Bethlehem Company with Russia there was a meeting in Paris of the representatives of the principal, if not all, of the armor manufacturers of Europe and America.

Mr. KITCHIN. We have in the views of the minority testimony of that character, to which I may refer later. Mr. Chairman, the minority in our views say:

We have been unable to find, after much investigation, where anyone places the labor cost in a ton of armor plate above $185.50; the decided weight of evidence puts it at $165, and much evidence entitled to weight as low as $156; the cost of the steel ingot will seldom exceed $20, which, together with the royalty (and there is grave doubt in our minds if any royalty whatever is paid; see Admiral O'Neil's testimony), make up the total cost of producing a ton of armor plate. This is, of course, from the standpoint of the purchaser, and does not take into consideration the profit of the company nor interest on the plant or wear and tear of same.

And we came to the conclusion from all we could learn that the armor plate would not cost the Government, after we get our plant in full operation and after a fair trial, more than $230 a ton. This is exclusive of interest charges and royalties.

Now, it is natural that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BARBER], the home of both these American armor-plate factories, should represent his own constituency and do all that he can fairly and squarely, as he is doing, to prevent the Government from coming in competition with his constituents. So I will state candidly that when we appeal to the House of Representatives to authorize the erection of an armor-plate factory, in case we can get no material reduction in prices, we have no good grounds to hope for the support of the gentleman from Pennsylvania or of his colleagues, although we would be glad to have it.

Mr. BARBER. You say that the estimate of the labor cost ranges from $185 down to $156 a ton?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes.

Mr. BARBER. Where do you get that $156 estimate?

Mr. KITCHIN. As I have stated, my distinguished colleague on this committee [Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky] carefully prepared this report; and no doubt when he comes to address you, if you will listen to him, he will give you all the information you desire.

Now, let us see about the building of ships. The question of building ships, the naval constructors seem to think, is of great importance.

Constructor Bowles, as I understand one of the best naval constructors on the pay list of the Government, is at the New York Yard. Constructor Stahl is another eminent naval constructor, now at the Norfolk Navy-Yard, Constructor Baxter is also in the front list of naval constructors——

Mr. DRIGGS. And Admiral Hichborn, Chief of the Bureau.

Mr. KITCHIN. These eminent naval constructors all say, without hesitation, that in their opinion the Government ought to have under construction at least one ship in each of the largest and best equipped navy-yards all the time. These navy-yards are designated to be the Mare Island Navy-Yard, on the Pacific coast, and the Brooklyn Navy-Yard, in New York, and the Norfolk Navy-Yard, in Virginia. One of these gentlemen said if they would today give the order for one of the 8,000-ton cruisers included in this bill to be built in the navy-yards, that he could begin the construction of it to-morrow in either the Brooklyn or Norfolk Navy-Yard. The New York or Brooklyn Navy-Yard has cost the Government and the Government now has invested in that yard more than $19,000,000. It has invested in the Norfolk Navy-Yard more than $5,000,000, and it has invested in the Mare Island Navy-Yard over $4,000,000. This very bill increases the amount for construction and repair of vessels in the navy-yards $3,000,000 over last year's bill, and yet fails to recommend the construction of a single vessel in those yards. The appropriation for this purpose was last year $3,000,000. In this bill it is $6,000,000.

Mr. DENNY. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. DENNY. I desire to ask the gentleman whether he proposes any amendment to conform with the recommendations of the constructors?

Mr. KITCHIN. I will state in reply to the gentleman that we shall make the attempt, and we hope no points of order will be made against it, to amend this bill so as to build at least three ships—that is, to authorize the building of three ships, one each in these navy-yards which I have just named—and we shall also offer an amendment providing that if the Government can not get the armor plate that is now required at a certain price—I think, $400 per ton—in that event the Secretary of the Navy shall proceed to buy at any price the armor plate that is now needed; but if he has to buy it at a higher price than the figure which I have mentioned, or than we think is reasonable, then he shall at once proceed to construct an armor-plate factory.

Now, I have stated the amount invested in these navy-yards, and of course we have our naval officers there; but I believe I can give the House more information by reading some extracts from the testimony taken before the committee, and I take it that no man here can contradict this testimony in any case.

First, Mr. Constructor Bowles, of New York, makes this statement:

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. I would like to ask a question. In your judgment—you speak of it being wise for the Government to construct ships in some yards for the advantages that will accrue—do you have any hesitancy in stating what you deem those advantages to be?

Mr. BOWLES. I endeavored to go over those advantages in the beginning, and, generally, they are these:

That it provides a means of maintaining the efficiency of the mechanical force and the machinery and plant; it renders repair work economical and rapid; it removes the tendency to increase alterations and repairs to existing vessels; it maintains a standard of workmanship with which we can require the contractors to comply, and it provides training for those who must inspect the contract work. Those are the material things for which you will pay. * * *

I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in the navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards of the United States, because I believe it to be good business; and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept for, I should say that it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each of the important yards all the time, simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

Mr. METCALF. I want to ask Mr. Bowles, if he has no objection, to state what navy-yards are now ready to build ships.

Mr. BOWLES. I am familiar with the New York yard and the Norfolk yard, and I believe on this coast those two yards are ready to take up any work you see fit to give them. I do not know about the Mare Island yard of my own knowledge, but Mr. Baxter was the constructor there for a number of years, and he is fully qualified to express an opinion about it. I believe it is capable of taking up the work.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, gentlemen, for your instructive statements.

I also want to quote from the statement of Constructor Stahl, now of the Norfolk Navy-Yard, and I wish gentlemen would pay attention to this for this reason——

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Will it disturb my colleague if I ask him a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Not a bit.

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Did Mr. Bowles also state in that hearing that that same degree of efficiency could be obtained if sufficient repair work was given to the navy-yard?

Mr. KITCHIN. I do not recall it, but I presume he did say that if they had sufficient repair work to occupy them all the time it could be done; and I should think myself that that would be true if you could occupy your navy-yards fully with repair work of all kinds.

Mr. DAYTON. Will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. DAYTON. You will be frank enough to state that Constructor Bowles gave nine reasons for and nine reasons against, and it is a question to be determined by a man's judgment whether the nine reasons for or the nine reasons against are the stronger.

Mr. KITCHIN. The gentleman from West Virginia can bring out the differences and develop those facts when he comes to speak; but whatever he may develop, he can not escape the conclusion that the gentleman, Constructor Bowles, who gave those pros and cons and who weighed those things before coming before our committee was strongly in favor of building some ships in the navy-yards, showing that certainly, to his mind, the reasons for building some ships in our navy-yards were entitled to far more consideration than those against the proposition.

Here is what Constructor Stahl, of the Norfolk Navy-Yard, says.

I hope every gentleman will give this matter attention. When a question is asked what the cost of a ship built by private shipbuilders is, they give you the amount authorized by the bill, say $3,000,000, and it is rare that they will include in the statement of cost armor and armament, furniture, and other kindred things. None of his evidence has been denied, and I take it none of it can be denied.

Constructor Stahl, of the Norfolk yard, says:

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I would like to ask you a question, going back to the matter that we have had under discussion. You have Mr. Bowles's statement. Summarizing his statement, or answering, what in your judgment would be the wisest thing for the Government to do—construct or not to construct vessels in the navy-yards?

Mr. STAHL. I think there is no doubt whatever about the advisability of constructing a certain proportion of our ships in the principal navy-yards. To me this seems so self-evident a proposition that it hardly needs argument.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Is that answer predicated upon the same reasons assigned by Mr. Bowles?

Mr. STAHL. Substantially the same. There is one thing I might add. Briefly, I think we can build at some of our principal yards, equipped with modern tools as they are, even more cheaply than Mr. Bowles thinks, and I see no reason why we should not build as cheaply there as can be built at any private yard.

Right here I will say that when we built ships ten or twelve years ago in our navy-yards we were not prepared to build them as we are now. We did not then have the immense strong machinery for lifting and moving large parts of the vessels. We have improvements in the navy-yards now that they have in the private shipyards.

Mr. METCALF. In your judgment would it lessen the cost of repairs if they had one or two vessels on the stocks?

Mr. STAHL. There is no question whatever; it is as certain as anything can be.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the navy-yard and the private yard can build a certain ship at exactly the same cost. Let us further assume that the cost of hull and machinery, say for a ship like the *Indiana*, is $3,000,000, and that the contractor or the Norfolk yard can either of them build it for this sum. With the contractor you make a contract for $3,000,000. With the navy-yard you simply give the order to build the ship. The navy-yard spends $3,000,000 for hull and machinery. The contractor also builds the hull and machinery, for which the Government pays him $3,000,000. Now, then, in the navy-yard we go on; we make necessary changes the same as in a private yard. We provide armor, we run her speed trial, and do all other necessary work not covered by the contract or original order.

In all these ways we spend, say, another $3,000,000 before the ship is finally completed in the yard. That work has to be done in the case of the contract-built ship just the same, and the Government has to pay for it just the same. In the case of the *Indiana* the Government paid out for this extra work—I did not just now mean to say $3,000,000; in the *Oregon* it was nearly $3,000,000—but in the *Indiana* the Government paid out for this identical work $2,300,000. In the one case the navy-yard spends $3,000,000, and then $2,300,000 more. Then we say, and say truthfully, that the navy-yard ship has cost $5,300,000 altogether. But you go and ask the price of the corresponding ship that was built at the private yard, and, unless the man you ask is well informed, he will say the contract price was $3,000,000, leaving you to infer, if you choose, that that was the total cost.

Mr. MUDD. That is what I want to get at.

Mr. STAHL. That is the erroneous comparison. The contract price is not the total cost. It is only a portion of the total cost; and in some cases it has been barely half the price.

Mr. MUDD. From the result of your observations, I would judge that in past times building in navy-yards did not cost any more.

Mr. STAHL. No; I am of the opinion that many of the comparisons made in the newspapers have been very misleading.

One word more about this inspection. You paid $60,000, plus a good deal more, to inspect the work on the *Kentucky*. If you built that ship at a Government yard, you would have to inspect the work also, but the same men who do the designing and superintending would do the inspecting, and it would not begin to cost you anything like that sum. Furthermore, consider the contract price of the *Kentucky*, $2,250,000. I tried to get the cost of the changes on her, which I know to be large, though doubtless entirely proper, but I could not get them in time. When you contracted for that ship, you did not include the furniture, or the blocks, or boats, or cooperage, and lots of other things in the contract. I built those articles at the Norfolk Navy-Yard. They cost $50,000. What did the *Kentucky* really cost? That $50,000 must be added to her contract price. So must also the cost of inspection, cost of authorized changes, and many other items. That sort of thing goes right straight through. There lies the danger of making a wrong comparison. A comparison of the contract price in the one case and the actual cost in the other is utterly misleading.

Now, Constructor Baxter says:

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Do you think it would be wise or unwise for the Government to construct one or more ships at this yard?

Mr. BAXTER. I do consider it would be very wise for the Government to construct a certain number of ships at its yards.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Do you indorse the view taken by Mr. Bowles and Mr. Stahl in regard to keeping a ship constantly under construction in a yard?

Mr. BAXTER. I think that is a great advantage.

Mr. DAYTON. What is your opinion under present conditions, if we should undertake to do any work in navy-yards; what character of vessels do you recommend should be given to the yards and what given to contract?

Mr. BAXTER. I should give armored cruisers to the navy-yards.

Mr. DAYTON. The great big ones?

Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAYTON. The largest vessels ever undertaken—the new types?

Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir.

Mr. DAYTON. Will you give your reasons for that?

Mr. BAXTER. Because in doing that the yards are able to do anything else they will ever be called upon to do; that is the reason.

Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Would that be in any sense an experimental construction on the part of the yards?

Mr. BAXTER. No, sir; not at all; no more than any other work that is undertaken here. There are certain set plans and certain set specifications, and the people in charge use skill, and knowledge, and judgment in directing and carrying on the work.

Mr. HAWLEY. Could you give the construction of an armored cruiser as large as 12,000 tons to a navy-yard?

Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir.

These extracts are not exceptional, but are fair samples of the testimony. [Applause.]

Now, Mr. Chairman, the other point which I said I would charge on this bill was the extravagance. I ask the Chairman how much time have I remaining?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has twelve minutes remaining.

Mr. KITCHIN. Well, I have not time to yield to anyone; and I want to run over some of the items of extravagance, as I see it. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, this bill carries an appropriation of $13,000,000 in excess of any bill heretofore reported, and an excess of $26,000,000, or nearly double, of any naval bill heretofore reported in time of peace. This enormous excess shows a strong tendency of the American Congress to extravagance.

Gentlemen have spoken here, the gentleman that preceded me, our able and distinguished acting chairman, who has the highest respect of every member of the minority, and, I take it, certainly of the majority, and the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS], and both have shaken in our faces here what Germany is going to do, what Italy is going to do, and what England is going to do. The very paper that the acting chairman read showed you that in sixteen years from now, according to the German programme, that the German navy would double itself in tonnage.

But, gentlemen, if we were only asked to double ourselves in tonnage in sixteen years, there would certainly be no necessity for the two battle ships. I do not think they are necessary, and to them I object as one of the minority, though there are some who do not object to them. If we should proceed for the next sixteen years increasing our Navy as is done in this bill, then, instead of doubling our Navy in tonnage in the next sixteen years, we would quadruple it. [Some gentlemen shook their heads.] Yes, sir; this bill makes a provision for about 90,000 tons of war ships, according to my estimate, and a like tonnage for sixteen years, added to our present Navy, would equal the navy that England has to-day. But if the German programme is carried out, which I understand would add 422,000 tons to the German navy—am I correct? I will ask the gentleman from Illinois if his statement was not to the effect that the German navy would be increased by 422,000 tons in the next sixteen years?

Mr. FOSS. That is true.

Mr. KITCHIN. Then, if that is true, my statement is true, because in this bill the two battle ships are of 12,500 tons each. That is 25,000 tons, and three armored cruisers, each of 13,000, is 39,000, which make 64,000 tons; and then the three smaller cruisers, of 8,000 tons each, making 24,000 tons, run it up to 88,000 tons this year, while the German navy in all that time would increase a little over 26,000 tons a year, and we will be more than trebling the increase of the German navy annually. While she may double her navy in sixteen years, we will, at the rate of this bill, quadruple our present navy and have a navy more than twice as large as the German navy then, according to the figures on which the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from New York based their calculation.

Therefore I shall follow the recommendations of the Secretary of the Navy. When he sent his report to Congress he did not recommend the building of these two battle ships, but did recommend the building of cruisers, both large cruisers and small cruisers.

Mr. FOSS. Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question right there?

Mr. KITCHIN. Yes, sir.

Mr. FOSS. If you are against the building of the battle ships, why are you in favor of the armor-plate factory plant? Battle ships use armor plates, but armored cruisers use not more than 10 or 12 per cent of the amount of their displacement.

Mr. KITCHIN. That is a fair question. I do not hesitate to answer the gentleman. I state that in this conflict we expect to be run over on this battle-ship question, and I want to meet the doubt by settling the armor-plant question in favor of the people. And of course, whether we strike out the battle ships in this bill or not, we will have to provide over 25,000 tons of armor besides that now needed, and we will probably continue for some time to come to build a battle ship or two now and then. I do not believe that we need the two extra battle ships. The Secretary of the Navy did not recommend them.

Mr. DAYTON. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. DAYTON. Do I understand the gentleman to mean that his advocacy of the armor-plate factory is in order to avoid the construction of battle ships?

Mr. KITCHIN. No; the gentleman from West Virginia does not so understand me, nor does anybody else. I gave what I considered a proper reply to the question propounded by the gentleman from

Illinois. If we never authorize another battle ship, we already have in sight the necessity for more than 20,000 tons of armor, and the armored cruisers will require armor. It is probable that we will continue to need armor for a long time. But that question will come up under the five-minute debate, and perhaps some of us will have something more to say at that time about it.

Now, another increase. Let me read from the minority views just this:

> But to this particular bill: It seems to us that some appropriations are practically duplicated in the bill by stating a sum total in one part of it for some purpose and then also stating in other parts of the bill specific amounts for the same purposes in each navy-yard. As for example, "For repair and preservation" of navy-yards and stations in one item is given $500,000. Also, for the maintenance of yards and docks is given $475,000. Then under each navy-yard is given a specific sum for repairs and improvements, in the aggregate amounting to $210,000. If the committee were to put these items together, it would tend to attract the attention of the public more closely, for they amount to $1,185,000.

In addition to this, Mr. Chairman, every single item of new repairs and improvements that have occurred to the Secretary of the Navy were, as I understand it, recommended in his report or in his letter to the committee.

Another thing for the civil establishment. Mr. Chairman, I suppose it is not known to all that our different civil establishments in the different navy-yards cost this Government $255,000 for civil-clerk hire. It is a result of our bureau system. There are nine different bureaus, if I make no mistake, and each bureau at every navy-yard has to have its own department and its own quarters, its own clerical force, and everything else pertaining to it; and if one department gets a little ahead of the other in dignity or expense, they all try to even it up. I think it encourages a spirit of emulation in extravagance, and I believe the bureaus ought to be consolidated in some way, and diminish their number. I believe it is a cumbersome system and occasions a great deal of unnecessary expense to the Government.

Mr. FOSS. Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. KITCHIN. Certainly.

Mr. FOSS. Does the gentleman think $255,000 for clerk hire is extravagant, in consideration of the fact that we are spending millions of dollars at the navy-yards and have invested there in property to the value of probably $50,000,000?

Mr. KITCHIN. I do think it is an extravagant appropriation on account of your bureau system. I understand this is an appropriation for nine different bureaus; that means for the civil establishment about $30,000 for each bureau, when if we only had two or three bureaus, the same clerical force which now acts for one bureau could act for three or four, and instead of its requiring $30,000 for clerk hire, I believe it could be done for less than $10,000. I am not as old in naval affairs as the gentleman from Illinois, but I am giving the House the honest conclusions I have arrived at in my service upon that committee and trying to do it plainly.

Mr. DAYTON. If my friend will pardon me, do you think one head is capable of performing the duties and managing the Bureau of Steam Engineering, of Navigation, of Medicine and Surgery, and Equipment and Supplies, and the many other branches that require experts in the Navy Department?

Mr. KITCHIN. In response to that I will say that I understood the theory of the majority is that it is now under one head, the Secretary of the Navy; and whenever we attack it, they say it is practically under one head. I do say, however, that one man who is master of his business would have intelligence enough to surround himself, not with independent heads of independent bureaus, but with competent men to advise him. He would have such help as he could depend upon. I imagine he would have the finest engineer he could get; he would have the best other officers under him; he would have the best men obtainable, and take their advice, and then he would not require so much clerical force in these different situations.

Mr. DAYTON. Would it make any difference whether he was called a head of a bureau or a surgeon-general?

Mr. KITCHIN. I claim nothing on account of their titles. Under the present conditions we know there are independent bureaus with independent heads, making independent reports, and all trying to take care of themselves, and, incidentally, of each other. If they were all under one head, one controlling mind, one brain to guide and direct this entire naval business of the United States; if the man at the head had sufficient wisdom to gather about him the experts of these different divisions, it would not be the same as it is now. It would be a superior system, a more economical system, and not be liable to the charges that can be made against the independent-bureau system.

Mr. DAYTON. One other question. Is not that substantially the fact now?

Mr. KITCHIN. I think not.

Mr. DAYTON. The Secretary of the Navy, the head, had these bureau chiefs and other men gathered around him because they are experts in these matters.

Mr. KITCHIN. The gentleman's statement is doubtless true, but these bureau chiefs, as I understand, are independent of each other, have their own establishments, etc., which makes the system extravagant, expensive, and cumbersome. The gentleman might go on and say that the President is at the head of everything.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. KITCHIN] has expired.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman, I dislike very much to ask for an extension of time; but I would like to have about ten minutes more; I have been interrupted very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to extending the gentleman's time for ten minutes? The Chair hears none.

Mr. KITCHIN. Now, Mr. Chairman, only one other item, and I will be through the discussion of this bill. There is in the aggregate for contingent expenses of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, the Bureau of Equipment, the Bureau of Construction and Repair, the Ordnance Bureau, the Bureau of Steam Engineering, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Marine Corps, etc., the sum of $467,300. Now, gentlemen, in all candor, would it not seem that $467,000 would be sufficient for all contingent expenses—for anything that may be contingent or unexpected? But in addition to this appropriation for contingent expenses there is inserted in this bill a new item, in which there is given as an "emergency fund" the sum of $500,000, to be used at the discretion of the President.

Now, Mr. Chairman, in my opinion it would be unwise at any time or on any occasion to give this vast sum of $500,000, to be disposed of as an emergency fund by the President. It is true that we unanimously voted in the last Congress to give the President $50,000,000, because we knew what he wanted to do with it. He wanted to prepare our Navy at once to meet the Spanish enemy. But here is an emergency fund in time of profound peace—an emergency fund of half a million dollars to be placed at the disposal of the Executive. I believe that under the Constitution it is the duty of Congress to appropriate money; and I believe we ought never to exercise that duty unless we know for what specific purpose, as nearly as may be, the money is to be used. I believe that on a question of this kind it is the judgment of Congress that ought to be taken, not the judgment of the Executive.

One other thing, and I say it in all kindness to the other side of the House and to the Executive. We have to-day an Executive who has not been stable in his convictions on great questions affecting this Government. We certainly do not know what position he may occupy six months from now. We know not whether he may, in order to maintain the Navy, decide under his expansion theories to buy some little island out in the South Seas and there entangle us. We know not what he may do. We have heard him declaring at one time the good American doctrine that "forcible annexation is criminal aggression"—a doctrine which we, at least, on this side of the House believe—and then a few months later we have seen him reject that doctrine and advocate oppressive principles under the name of "benevolent assimilation."

We have seen him in December send to this House a well-considered message telling us that free trade was our "plain duty" with the Porto Ricans, and then before the flowers had bloomed change his mind upon the subject. He can not well say, and no other man can well say that he changed in hostility to the trusts; because if his motive was hostility to the trusts, why did he make any reduction at all? If 15 per cent was to be maintained, because he wished to defeat the trusts, why did you not maintain the whole 100 per cent? That cry of being against the trusts will deceive no American citizen.

When we see the President, when dealing with the very basic principles of American government and American liberty, change his mind so quickly, I hesitate to put into his hands an emergency fund of $500,000 to be expended wherever upon the earth or the sea he may see fit.

If the gentleman from Illinois will pursue the argument that he made when he said we could build better ships than any other nation on the face of the earth; that our nation would be the great shipbuilding nation of the world; that we had the steel and the coal and the labor and the intellect to build a great American navy and a great merchant marine—if we can do that; and if foreign nations are to-day, as he told us, having their ships built here, I want the gentleman to consider whether that argument will not lead him to antagonize the Hanna-Payne ship-subsidy bill when it reaches this House. [Laughter and applause.]

I do not share the general opinion that our Navy should be constantly increased to the size of England's. We do not need one so large. We need a strong, well-equipped, well-built, well-armored with the best armor, and well-manned navy. I favor a larger navy, but I do not favor the rate of increase embodied in this bill. Great navies are of great cost, which must be borne by the people. It is proper for the Government officials to submit to Congress their estimates, but it is the duty of the representatives of the people to carefully scrutinize those estimates, and to do so

fearlessly. It is easy for high-salaried officials to forget how and from whom the United States gets its revenues. This bill carries more than $61,000,000 cash appropriations, and authorizes contracts for millions more. The ships alone authorized by this bill will probably cost complete $50,000,000, none of which is appropriated by this bill. Internal taxation is bearing heavily upon the people. The question of how to raise our money will be with us always. When the country learns fully of this enormous bill the people will exclaim, "Is it imperialism? Is it colonialism? Is it to keep the Constitution from following the flag?" When they think of the burdens being placed upon them unnecessarily it will be a sad day for the Republicans.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that I have covered the main points upon which I differ with the majority of the committee with regard to this bill. I know that we all have the same patriotic love for America; that we all desire that when we put battle ships on the seas they shall be the best battle ships, the best armored, the best manned of any in the world. No one wants us to face an enemy with inferior machines. And however much gentlemen on the other side may think we on this side are in error, no man can say that any expression or intimation, either by countenance or by word of mouth, has ever escaped the members of the minority contrary to the principles I have just announced, and no man ever will, because we on this side have as much at heart the glory and the honor and the preservation of the American Union as any Republican ever dared to have. [Applause.]

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. DALZELL having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. PLATT, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed bills and joint resolution of the following titles; in which the concurrence of the House was requested:

S. R. 114. Joint resolution for the relief of Garfield Hospital;

S. 2762. An act to authorize the Secretary of War to correct the military record of Wynn W. Pefley;

S. 2259. An act for the relief of Jeronemus S. Underhill;

S. 943. An act to provide for the erection of a public building in the city of Great Falls;

S. 3286. An act to diminish the number of appraisers at the ports of Philadelphia and Boston;

S. 879. An act for the relief of Levi Stoltz;

S. 558. An act to make increment and accretions upon the sums reserved by the Department of State from the fund received by the United States upon the account of the payment of the awards of the late Spanish and American Claims Commission, and to pay and distribute the same;

S. 3465. An act to provide an American register for the steamship *Garonne;*

S. 3679. An act granting a deed quitclaim and release to Lorillard Spencer, his heirs and assigns, of all the right, title, and interest in and to certain land in the city of Newport, R. I.;

S. 78. An act granting a pension to Samuel W. Childs;

S. 314. An act granting a pension to Rosa L. Couch;

S. 825. An act granting an increase of pension to Joseph B. Coons;

S. 1031. An act granting an increase of pension to Thomas H. Kearney;

S. 1126. An act for the relief of Mrs. Narcissa G. Short;

S. 1274. An act granting an increase of pension to Augustus C. Pyle;

S. 1347. An act granting an increase of pension to Marie Sharpe;

S. 1569. An act granting a pension to Phebe E. C. Priestly;

S. 1776. An act granting a pension to John Carr;

S. 1901. An act granting a pension to Elvira Hunter;

S. 1975. An act granting an increase of pension to Annie D. M. Wood;

S. 2101. An act granting an increase of pension to George E. Scott;

S. 2142. An act for the relief of Anna Whitney Tarbell;

S. 2400. An act granting an increase of pension to Edith Lockwood Sturdy;

S. 2570. An act granting an increase of pension to John M. Swift;

S. 2729. An act granting a pension to Eliza L. Reese;

S. 2795. An act granting an increase of pension to Christina Noll;

S. 3058. An act granting an increase of pension to Hariet E. Meylert;

S. 3082. An act granting a pension to Elizabeth F. Wolfley;

S. 3099. An act granting an increase of pension to Melancthon McCoy;

S. 3119. An act granting an increase of pension to Lewis Terry;

S. 3137. An act granting an increase of pension to Lunsford Ellis;

S. 3139. An act granting a pension to John B. Wetherbee;

S. 3268. An act granting an increase of pension to Elisha F. Barton;

S. 3314. An act granting a pension to Mary I. Bradbury;

S. 3337. An act granting an increase of pension to Buren R. Sherman;

S. 3436. An act granting a pension to Catherine Weinheimer;

S. 3467. An act granting a pension to Hellen Lang;

S. 3470. An act granting a pension to Rosalia Tejidor Brinckerhoff;

S. 3480. An act granting a pension to John Holland;

S. 3534. An act granting an increase of pension to Helen G. Heiner;

S. 3549. An act granting an increase of pension to William A. Keyes;

S. 3708. An act granting a pension to John H. Harrison;

S. 3790. An act granting an increase of pension to Anna M. Collins;

S. 3899. An act granting a pension to James Cook;

S. 3900. An act granting a pension to Sarah Clark;

S. 3922. An act granting an increase of pension to Mary Corinne Blandin;

S. 4007. An act granting an increase of pension to Bernard Dunn;

S. 4030. An act granting a pension to Helen M. Glenny; and

S. 3670. An act authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Interior to issue a patent to the heir or heirs of one Tawamnoha, or Martha Crayon, conveying to them certain lands in the State of North Dakota, confirming certain conveyance thereof, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed without amendment bills of the following titles:

H. R. 625. An act granting an increase of pension to Wesley Reed;

H. R. 963. An act to extend the privileges of the seventh section of the act approved June 10, 1880, to the port of Greenbay, Wis.;

H. R. 1147. An act granting an increase of pension to Luke H. Cooper;

H. R. 3654. An act granting a pension to Calvin E. Myers;

H. R. 1681. An act granting an increase of pension to Isaac M. Locke;

H. R. 1677. An act granting an increase of pension to Missouri B. Ross;

H. R. 8599. An act granting a pension to Ellen J. Williams;

H. R. 3821. An act granting an increase of pension to Frances D. Best;

H. R. 3758. An act granting an increase of pension to Joshua Ricketts;

H. R. 8397. An act granting an increase of pension to John White;

H. R. 4795. An act granting an increase of pension to John O'Connor;

H. R. 6486. An act granting an increase of pension to Orange F. Berdan;

H. R. 6731. An act granting an increase of pension to William F. Tait;

H. R. 6900. An act granting an increase of pension to Benjamin F. Kurtz;

H. R. 1946. An act granting a pension to Jane F. Chalmers;

H. R. 8339. An act granting an increase of pension to Charles H. Gates;

H. R. 4562. An act granting a pension to Lois A. Fields;

H. R. 3312. An act granting an increase of pension to Ellen V. Myer;

H. R. 4836. An act granting an increase of pension to Wilbur F. Loveland;

H. R. 6089. An act granting a pension to Alfred T. Moreland;

H. R. 1768. An act granting an increase of pension to George J. Stealy;

H. R. 4657. An act granting a pension to Laura S. Pontious;

H. R. 8045. An act granting an increase of pension to Wilford Cooper;

H. R. 7323. An act granting an increase of pension to Harrison Canfield;

H. R. 6019. An act granting a pension to Mrs. Therese W. Hard;

H. R. 5170. An act granting a pension to Cyrus Johnson;

H. R. 5171. An act granting an increase of pension to William R. Wallace;

H. R. 3962. An act granting an increase of pension to Alanson C. Eberhart;

H. R. 8605. An act granting a pension to Joseph Champlin;

H. R. 6356. An act granting an increase of pension to Lewis R. Armstrong;

H. R. 7799. An act granting an increase of pension to Franklin M. Burdoin;

H. R. 5961. An act granting an increase of pension to Charles A. Hausman;

H. R. 4654. An act granting an increase of pension to Simon Van Der Vaart;

H. R. 5134. An act granting an increase of pension to Joseph F. Allison;
H. R. 3214. An act granting a pension to John S. Dukate;
H. R. 4089. An act granting a pension to Emily Burke;
H. R. 1172. An act granting a pension to Rebecca J. Jones;
H. R. 2303. An act granting an increase of pension to Levina M. Payne;
H. R. 3454. An act granting a pension to Joseph E. Baldwin;
H. R. 3941. An act granting a pension to Samuel B. Weeks; and
H. R. 8390. An act granting an increase of pension to Joshua Mitchell.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed with amendments bills of the following titles; in which the concurrence of the House was requested:

H. R. 10449. An act making appropriations to supply additional urgent deficiencies in the appropriations for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1900, and for other purposes;
H. R. 856. An act granting a pension to Mary McGrath;
H. R. 4267. An act granting an increase of pension to Ezra A. Bennett;
H. R. 4335. An act granting a pension to William H. Edmunds;
H. R. 4606. An act to amend the charter of the East Washington Heights Traction Railroad Company; and
H. R. 5970. An act granting a pension to Phebe S. Riley.

NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the majority—and I mean by that those who are in favor of the report of the committee—have consumed two hours, and we have had only one speech from the minority, I suggest that it is proper that we should at least have another speech from that side before we proceed further upon this side.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. That is not right, Mr. Chairman. I do not think it would be fair to say that the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] represents the majority, because he very specifically stated that while he did not sign the minority report he differed very radically with the majority on many of their propositions.

Mr. CUMMINGS. What is the proposition?

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. The proposition is that he is charging you to his side as having occupied a part of the two hours which he says have been occupied on that side, and he desires us to occupy still more of the time. I will state, Mr. Chairman, that it is customary in debates of this sort to alternate.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think you ought to alternate.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I think you ought to alternate. I think it would be hardly fair to require some gentleman of the minority to proceed now without giving us any opportunity to hear from any member of the majority who proposes to go into details in defense of this bill. The chairman generalized and summarized the bill in its presentation to the House. We have had absolutely no opportunity to judge of the position the majority propose to take upon the questions at issue. I do not think it is right to require us to proceed on this side, although we want to be entirely fair about it.

Mr. DAYTON. The report shows the position that we take. We stand in defense of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will recognize any gentleman on the committee who desires to take the floor. If no gentleman desires to take the floor, the bill will be read by paragraphs.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I was interrupted during my speech, so that I failed to continue a line of argument on which I had started, and that was with regard to the building of ships in the navy-yards of Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair understands that the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] consumed all of his time.

Mr. CUMMINGS. The Chair said he would recognize anybody on the committee who wished to take the floor.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair, of course, intended that the gentleman should understand that he would do so under the rules of the committee. He meant any gentleman who had not spoken.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I think if the gentleman from New York [Mr. DRIGGS] wants to take any time he had better go ahead now.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. CUMMINGS. If the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER] is to be recognized, I ask the privilege of extending my remarks in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. FOSS. I ask unanimous consent that I may extend my remarks in the RECORD, and also that I may make a part of my speech the report which I prepared as a part of the bill, including the illustrations.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair hardly thinks that latter request is within the province of the committee. That will have to be done in the House. The gentleman from Illinois asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. Does that include the illustrations?

The CHAIRMAN. As far as printing illustrations is concerned, that is a matter in the control of the House and not of the committee.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. That is what I thought.

Mr. KITCHIN. I should like to ask permission to extend my remarks also in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. GAINES. I should like to ask consent——

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognized the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER].

Mr. KITCHIN. Before that, if the gentleman from Kentucky will yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Kentucky yield?

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I will yield; yes.

Mr. KITCHIN. I should like to state that I think some one on the other side ought to speak now, because, as I recollect just now, after the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] has spoken——

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will suggest that that is a matter for private arrangement.

Mr. KITCHIN. I am going to ask the gentleman to see if that was not the understanding at that time——

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if no gentleman desires to take the floor, there is but one thing to do and that is to read the bill.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER] has yielded to the gentleman from North Carolina, and he has the right to say what he chooses during the time yielded to him.

Mr. KITCHIN. I just want to state again, to see if I have the correct recollection of the matter——

The CHAIRMAN. Of course this comes out of the time of the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER].

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. That is all right. Let it come out of my time.

Mr. KITCHIN. There is a gentleman here who I think ought to speak on the other side, and I will state why. A short time ago, after the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS] had spoken, and after the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] had spoken, then I did not want to speak this evening, as the Chair well remembers, but the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER] was momentarily absent from the Hall, having been here all day, and when the question came up, as I understood it, the gentleman over here said that both the speeches which had been made had been on the same side, that is, the speeches of the gentleman from New York [Mr. CUMMINGS] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FOSS], and that therefore one of us ought to proceed on the minority side. Now, if that is true, then certainly one of the gentlemen on the other side, it seems, ought to follow me.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I understand that is a matter which is entirely under the control——

Mr. WILLIAMS of Mississippi. The gentleman from North Carolina is just making the point, though.

Mr. KITCHIN. I was just making the point that was made just now.

Mr. DAYTON. I will say in response to my friend that I do not care to speak unless something else is said against this report.

Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I will yield my hour of time to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DRIGGS], and if the gentleman from West Virginia has anything to say, then I will have something to say.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. WHEELER] yields one hour to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DRIGGS]. The gentleman from New York is recognized.

Mr. DRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, it is a source of the deepest gratification to me, not only as a Representative upon the floor of this House, but also as a citizen of the Republic, that the Committee on Naval Affairs has deemed it wise to recommend so liberal and important an increase of the Navy. It is also a source of satisfaction to me to realize that upon the question of the increase of the Navy the members of this House stand united, Democrats, Populists, and Republicans alike, all being in favor of the construction of more ships. This policy, if adhered to during the next few years, will demonstrate to the world that we propose at all times to be ready to defend the rights of American citizens, protect American ships, and uphold the honor of the nation wherever it may be necessary.

There are, however, several features of the bill to which the

minority members of the committee filed an adverse report, and while I know nothing about an armor-plate plant, I desire to express my concurrence in their views in relation to the policy of constructing some one of the proposed ships in the navy-yards. I will also endeavor to demonstrate that it would be advisable for the Government to inaugurate the policy of constructing a certain proportion of its ships in its own navy-yards.

I propose to commence my remarks by going back to the time when Great Britain first authorized the construction of war ships in her own yards; then coming to a later period, to treat of her method of comparing the relative cost of vessels constructed in her dockyards with those built by contract in private yards, and then to the time showing what we, the United States, did, and why, if we adopted the same system, the same fair plan of action that Great Britian had adopted, there would be no question whatever as to whether we could construct our own ships to-day in our own yards as cheaply as they are to-day constructed in the contract yards.

An account was presented to the British Parliament in 1896 by the admiralty showing the comparative cost of war vessels built under the provisions of the national defense acts of 1889 to 1893, by contract and in the government dock, or, as we say, navy-yard. The report concludes by stating that—

For the first time a standard, imperfect though it may be, appears to be available by which to test the result of work in Her Majesty's dockyards.

The comptroller and auditor-general, Sir Charles L. Ryan, appended to this report the following statement:

The comparative results show that dockyard shipbuilding is more favorable in the case of first-class battle ships, but not so economical, so far as can be judged by aggregate cost under the other types; while it is noticeable that dockyard results under the same types vary considerably inter se.

Note carefully that notwithstanding the extra cost of all classes of war ships, excepting battle ships, built in the English dockyards as compared with private or contract dockyards, the English Government, alike famous for its navy and the most economical administration thereof of all its various departments, adheres rigidly to this day to its policy of constructing a certain number of war vessels in its own dockyard.

Now, then, Mr. Chairman, you will notice it was in 1889 that the English national-defense act was passed. Four years transpired, to 1893, and still no comparisons were allowed by the English Parliament between the Government-built ship and the contract-built ship. Three years longer went by, to 1896, before these comparisons were allowed or were made, and why? These statements that I am now giving in relation to the English-built ships are from a paper written by Mr. Francis Elgar, delivered before the Institute of Naval Architects in 1896 in Great Britain.

Mr. Elgar is considered by all naval authorities the world over to be the most expert in this line of evidence now living. I believe that is conceded by most naval architects and most naval theorists, at least so far as the construction of ships is concerned.

When they first commenced building war vessels in the Government dockyards what did they find? They found in the contract yards, or private yards, as I shall call them, different systems in every single solitary particular. They had different methods of bookkeeping, different methods of acquiring material, and different labor-saving devices unknown to the dockyards. They found the private machine shops better equipped, better located, and more convenient to the work to be performed than those in the dockyards.

When the Government started in to compare, it did the only just and fair thing. It reformed and revised its entire system of constructing ships and account keeping in the English dockyards. It appointed a commission, which went all over Great Britain to the great private yards. The owners of the private yards allowed comparisons to be made between their systems of bookkeeping and the Government system of bookkeeping; I mean account keeping in every single particular; and after the Government had made a most careful study of the subject, it adopted the best system that could be conceived, namely, the best of the various systems of all other yards.

It then found, in addition to that, that the machine shops and other buildings, to which I alluded a while ago, were not as conveniently located in Government dockyards as in the private yards. They made an allowance for each and every one of these things, and then came the question of labor. In the Government yards it was ascertained, and beyond any question of doubt whatever, that the laborers first employed in the Government dockyards were not equal in productive ability to the laborers employed and engaged in the private yards. And why? Because the private yards had for a great many years—some of them established in 1853 and one of them established in 1849—been making merchant ships, been building the merchant marine, and therefore their laborers better understood the art of shipbuilding. The men employed by the Government in the Government dockyards when the Government commenced building warships therein, in 1883, understood practically nothing about their construction and therefore were at a great disadvantage.

There are many little details in relation to these yards that I do not care to allude to just now; but I will say that from the time the national-defense act was passed until 1893 70 ships were built. There were 8 first-class battle ships, 2 second-class battle ships, 9 first-class cruisers, 29 second-class cruisers, 4 third-class cruisers, 18 torpedo boats, and nearly all these ships were building or built at the time of the comparison made by Elgar. The construction of the ships were carried out as follows:

Vessels.	Private yards.	Government dockyards.
Battle ships	2	3
Second-class battle ships	Not completed.	Not completed.
First-class cruisers	3	4
Second-class cruisers	17	4
Third-class cruisers	None.	All built in.
Torpedo boats	6	5

The remainder of ships were not in an adequate state of completion for comparison.

Now, I desire to give the figures as to the cost of these ships in relation to their construction in comparison with all these English ships. I regret exceedingly that neither the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. LOUDENSLAGER] nor the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BUTLER] is present, because I would like them to hear this, as it relates to one of the questions asked in the Committee on Naval Affairs:

Average costs of the dockyard and contract vessels of various classes built under the naval defense acts of 1889 and 1893.

[Direct charges, exclusive of reserve gun mountings.]

	Hull, fittings, and equipment.				Gun mountings, torpedo tubes, etc.	Steamboats.	Admiralty inspection.	Total of direct charges, as per naval defense act.	Dockyard incidental charges.	Total cost, including incidental charges.
	Hull, etc., exclusive of vertical armor.	Vertical armor.	Total.	Propelling and other machinery.						
First-class battle ships:										
Dockyard	£331,454	£261,250	£592,704	£102,316	£80,281	£7,430	----------	£782,731	£60,859	£843,590
Contract	423,429	260,000	682,978	97,645	77,908	6,663	£8,068	872,962	9,830	882,792
First-class cruisers:										
Sheathed—										
Dockyard	210,805	21,000	231,805	96,693	28,496	6,022	----------	363,016	34,010	397,026
Contract	----------	----------	234,256	97,238	29,943	3,505	4,246	369,188	4,993	374,181
Unsheathed—										
Dockyard	203,398	21,000	224,398	102,914	32,947	4,181	----------	364,440	37,791	402,231
Contract	----------	----------	223,521	95,340	29,233	3,850	3,633	355,577	4,988	360,565
Second-class cruisers:										
Sheathed—										
Dockyard	112,226	6,000	118,226	60,466	11,022	660	----------	190,374	24,096	214,470
Contract	----------	----------	106,947	66,088	9,153	644	1,202	184,034	2,597	186,631
Unsheathed—										
Dockyard	92,197	6,000	98,197	67,090	9,080	689	----------	175,038	14,734	189,772
Contract	----------	----------	97,130	64,804	9,184	633	1,034	172,785	2,151	174,936
Third-class cruisers:										
Dockyard	----------	----------	77,280	54,898	7,618	667	----------	144,663	16,759	157,222
Contract	----------	----------	64,234	46,421	10,642	----------	1,753	123,050	----------	123,050
Torpedo gunboats:										
Dockyard	----------	----------	28,257	23,984	5,625	434	----------	58,300	8,015	66,315
Contract	----------	----------	25,663	20,077	4,660	430	846	51,676	742	52,418

The above table is from page 87 of the Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects of Great Britain for 1896, and while it might be profitable for me to make comment thereon in my own language, I deem it advisable to use the comments of the great naval authority, Francis Elgar, esq., who is the compiler of the same. On page 88 Mr. Elgar uses the following language:

The average amounts shown in Table B show the average cost to the admiralty of the dockyard-built and the contract-built ship, respectively. * * * The expenditure upon the hulls, fittings, and equipment is the actual cost of the work in the case of the dockyard ships, but in the case of contract ships the expenditure shown in the tables includes the unknown but important item of profit or loss to the contractor. This requires to be remembered in judging of the figures.

He also states in other parts of his argument that there was practically no difference in the cost of the principal materials, such as steel, timber, and other large items between the admiralty and the contract built ships. He states, further, that there were differences of rates of wages, and especially in the individual earnings of certain classes of piece workers, and then in detail we are told the various classes of labor in the private yard, which received higher wages than those in the Government yards. I might mention, taken at random from that list, riveters, drillers, wood workers, and ordinary mechanics.

But their output of work was greater than the work of the same class of men in the Government yards. It is also demonstrated beyond question that another reason for the additional labor cost on the Government-built ships in these English dockyards, as compared with the contract ships, was the fact that the various machine shops, hoisting cranes, and other large pieces of machinery absolutely essential in the construction of a ship were not as centrally located as the machine shops, hoisting cranes, etc., in the private yards. This point is so very important that I would respectfully ask every member of this House to take it into careful consideration when finally voting upon the proposition submitted in the report of the minority.

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully apologize to the House for quoting so liberally from the article written by Mr. Elgar, but I can not make too emphatic the fact that he is considered by naval architects the world over as the most eminent specialist on the subject here under consideration. He states in relation to the labor that—

The differences of cost of work, whatever these may be, apart from the profits or losses upon contracts, appear to be due not very much to difference in prices of material or rates of wages, but chiefly to the extent to which the various yards are laid out and are equipped with machines and appliances for performing this class of work with facility and economy and at a minimum of expenditure for the transport and handling of materials and the employment of labor upon them; and also to the good organization of the labor with reference to the special requirements of the work, * * * and at such rates as contribute most effectively to the general progress and economy of the whole.

You will probably notice in the table above given that some of the English dockyard-built ships are cheaper than the contract ships, while others are more expensive, the greater expense of the Government-built ships being particularly noticed in the case of first-class cruisers. This, however, was easily explained away by Sir Nathaniel Barnaby, K. C. B., one of the Admiralty, who stated that the additional cost was brought about entirely through the changing of the gun mounts on the dockyard ships and not changing the gun mounts on the contract ships; that is to say, that the first-class cruisers built in the dockyards were arranged with heavy muzzle-loading rifles. But as these rifles became obsolete prior to their completion, the Admiralty was forced to have the gun mounts sufficiently heavy for the satisfactory support of the guns of heavier tonnage.

The total cost, including the incidental charges, of the first-class battle ships built in the Government dockyards, was £843,000 (see table), while in the contract yards it was £882,000; or, in other words, a difference of about £39,000 in favor of the Government-built ships. That is as to the battle ships.

The next item is that of the first-class cruisers. There are two classes given, and in all these classes in mentioning cruisers two classes are referred to—the sheathed and the unsheathed. The first-class sheathed cruisers built at the Government dockyards cost £397,000, while the cost of the contract-built first-class sheathed cruiser was £374,000. The cost of the unsheathed first-class cruiser in the Government dockyards was £402,000, and the contract-built cost £360,000.

In the second-class cruisers you will find that the difference is so small that it is hardly worth mentioning. In the sheathed class the difference in favor of the contract ship was about £14,000, and in the case of the unsheathed ship it was about £15,000.

In the third-class cruisers it amounted to some £24,000. In the case of torpedo boats and torpedo gunboats it amounts to about £14,000 difference. Great Britain and France through their reports have conceded that torpedo boats can not be built as cheaply in the Government yards as they can in private yards. They also concede that torpedo gunboats can not be built as cheaply in Government yards as they can in private yards and that third-class cruisers can not be built as cheaply; but battle ships and first and second class cruisers, sheathed and unsheathed, can be built more cheaply to-day in these Government yards than they can be built in private yards.

The expense given in these items which I read a moment ago upon the hulls, fittings, and equipments is the actual cost of the work in the case of the dockyard ships, but in the case of contract ships the figures contained in the tables include the unknown but important item of profit or loss to the contractor, and to that I will allude later.

In the case of English ships built in the Government yards note carefully that everything conceivable except the armament, stores, and ammunition was included, and by everything I mean hull, machinery, masts, spars, dynamos, derricks, cables, anchors, lifeboats, rafts, gun mounts, and so on.

I mention these different things because when I arrive at one stage of my argument I propose to compare this system with the system in vogue in the United States when our comparisons were made. Under the head "Dock-yard expenditure" you will notice a vast difference in favor of the contract ships, that demonstrates more than any other feature the absolute fairness of the English comparison, inasmuch as these charges were largely made up of surveys of ships on receipts from contractors, steam launches, carrying out the steam, gunnery, electric and torpedo trial trips, and making alterations and repairs.

In our yards at the time ships were constructed, according to an article by Mr. Baxter, a naval constructor of this country, in a paper read by him on navy-yard expenses, he most emphatically states that in many cases the masts, rigging, electrical plants, and miscellaneous articles were not included in the specifications given out to the contractors for the contract-built ships in our country, and when provided by the shipyard additional compensation was paid.

He says, further, with every war ship numerous small but expensive fittings and many minor changes and additions are necessary after some experience with the crew on board. This work has usually been done by the navy-yards, but when done by the shipyards they have received additional compensation. During the greater portion of the decade premiums were offered for trial results which exceeded the contract requirement; the amounts thus earned varied with different ships, but their totals caused increased expenditure on the part of the Government amounting to no small proportion of the total contract price. The contractors were also reimbursed for the cost of these trial trips.

I do not wish at present to go extensively into the subject of cost of labor in our yards, but will prepare for the treatment of this subject by submitting the following statement of cost per ton of the labor employed in the construction of certain ships in Her Majesty's dockyards:

Statement of cost per ton, weight of hull, fittings, and equipments, exclusive of armor and protective-deck plating, of the labor employed in the construction of the undermentioned ships in Her Majesty's dockyards.

Name of ship.	Period of construction.	Cost per ton.
BATTLE SHIPS.		£ s.
Colossus	1879-1886	57 8
Conqueror	1879-1886	48 14
Rodney	1882-1888	50 14
Camperdown	1882-1889	45 16
Trafalgar	1886-1890	36 6
Royal Sovereign	1889-1892	32 0
CRUISERS.		
Mercury	1876-1883	50 0
Mersey	1883-1887	41 18
The Fourth	1884-1891	39 12
The Barham	1888-1891	34 18
The Crescent	1890-1893	33 4

This table is in many ways fully as instructive and important as the table first given, for you will note in the construction of the *Colossus* seven years were necessary for its full completion from the date of first laying the keel, and the cost was about $285 a ton for wages; while in the case of the *Royal Sovereign*, the last-mentioned battle ship, you will observe that the time required for her complete construction was only about three years, and that the cost for wages was only $160 a ton.

Without going into a full argument on the subject of the cruisers, comparing the length of time and the amount of wage saved from the construction of the *Mercury* to the building of the *Crescent*, it is sufficient to say that it is a remarkable fact, demonstrated by the above tables, that as the shipbuilding mechanics became more proficient in their work the length of time necessary for the complete construction of the ships was greatly reduced, and the reduction of wage per ton was also cut down in proportion.

To-day it is a well-known fact to every foreign naval architect that first-class battle ships can be constructed in government dockyards where the equipment is as thorough as in contract yards, at a cost varying from 5 to 10 per cent less, exclusive of incidental charges, than in contract yards. First and second class protected and unprotected cruisers are also being constructed in foreign

governmental dockyards from 2 to 3 per cent cheaper than contract charges; while it is freely admitted, on the other hand, that gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo boats can not be built as cheaply in the government yards as in the contract establishments.

Shipbuilding work in the foreign dockyards has progressed with rapid strides in a straightforward manner, and the friendly rivalry between the mechanics employed by the government and those employed by contract yards has become so great that the work done for the government itself, whether in government or private yards, has been considered infinitely superior to the work prior to 1876, when almost all the work was performed by private contractors. The construction of ships in foreign dockyards is now considered as essential an arm to the national defense as the proper maintenance of a navy or the thorough equipment and training of an army.

Now, Mr. Chairman, why, in all fairness, should we not, in view of the grave responsibilities which have been thrust upon us on account of the war with Spain, take an interest equally as great in our national defense and providing for the common welfare as do those in authority in the nations and countries of the Old World? Some one, however, may say that the figures given by me above, and the authority so liberally quoted, simply deal with the proposition of English dockyards, and before giving in detail the work being done in the various dockyards of the different countries of the Old World allow me to quote the exact language of Bienayme, inspector-general of naval construction of France, in re France:

> In France the cost of war ships, whether constructed in public or private dockyards, is very much the same. In no one case does one see in France the wide differences which have been brought to notice by Mr. Elgar.

Now, you can see from the comparisons made in the English yards they were eminently fair to the Government; and I contend that at the time the comparisons were made in this country we were eminently unfair to the Government. All through England, prior to the date of the comparisons as to the cost of their ships, there was a great hue and cry among the people as to the vast amount of money expended for Government-built ships, and in the House of Commons a member of the House of Commons, whose name I have forgotten, rose in his place on the floor and said it was not right that Great Britain should construct ships in her own yards when they could be constructed so much more cheaply in private yards. The reply then was that the time had not arrived for comparisons to be made between contract ships and Government dockyard-built ships.

From 1883 down to 1896, after thirteen years of continuous construction had passed, the English Admiralty said, "We are ready to compare the cost of ships built in the Government yards and the cost of ships built in the contract yards." I might say, too, that in Great Britain the cost of material to the Government and contractor is practically the same. There large contracts are made, and naval constructors are able to call for any kind of material they may require in the construction of a ship. Suppose, if you please, there has been a thousand tons of steel contracted for; or, if you like, four or five hundred tons of beams, nuts, and bolts that are necessary for the construction of a ship; the naval constructor has the right to telephone or order just such material as he needs on that contract.

Now, I believe our naval constructors in this country are just as honest, and just as capable, and just as fair as any naval constructors on the face of the earth; and if they had that system in this country, they would be able to go into the markets and purchase, as they do in Great Britain, in the cheapest places. [Applause.] The system in this country is all wrong. Mr. Bowles, in his statement before the Committee on Naval Affairs, said that under the system in vogue in this country we are compelled to buy everything of the very best quality; and he also states in another place that in many parts of the ship it is not always absolutely essential to place material of the very best quality.

I mean around the small work—brass and so on used in railings; but under our law everything has to be of the very best. I contend now, on the floor of this House, that in the contract-built ship of the United States built at the private yards contractors do not put in first-class material in all parts of the vessel, such as is called for by the plans and specifications, because it is not necessary for the strength or safety of the ship. I make no invidious comparison or any unjust charges.

Mr. CANNON. Will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DRIGGS. Certainly.

Mr. CANNON. The gentleman, I perceive, is in favor of constructing ships in the navy-yard?

Mr. DRIGGS. Yes; some of them.

Mr. CANNON. He speaks of buying material out of which to construct ships. Why not go to the end logically and mine the coal, quarry the limestone, erect the furnace and make the steel, cut down the trees and build the sawmills, saw and plane the lumber? Why stop with the construction in the navy-yard; why not make it dead sure and give labor proper employment and prepare all the material? Why not prepare the material that is to enter into the construction of the ship at the Government expense?

Mr. DRIGGS. I will answer with pleasure, because the gentleman from Illinois has been exceedingly courteous to me since I have been a member of the House.

I will say that later in my argument—for I have been granted an hour—I propose to take up the subject of the national defense in connection with Government war-ship building. I believe it should be the policy of this Government, following the policy of England, France, Russia, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Austria, to construct some of our ships in our own yards, simply as an auxiliary branch of the national defense. If we deem it necessary to have a standing army, if we deem it necessary to arm our militia, if we deem it necessary to man our ships and our guns, I contend it is just as necessary to have shipbuilding mechanics in our yards as it is to have an efficient small standing army, an efficient militia, and a competent navy. [Applause.]

Mr. CANNON. That does not answer my question.

Mr. DRIGGS. I believe that if the Government is authorized to buy its own material at the cheapest rates obtainable there will be no room for dispute when the comparison comes to be made between the cost of the Government constructing ships in its own yards and the construction of them by contract.

Mr. CANNON. But, if the gentleman's argument is good, why should not the Government manufacture its own steel, mine its own coal, cut down its own lumber, erect its own sawmills, etc.?

Mr. DRIGGS. I can understand exactly the point of the gentleman's question, which is, Why should not the Government go into all sorts of business enterprises so far as it needs any kind of material for Government work? On that subject I fully agree with the gentleman. I do not believe it would be advisable for us to erect sawmills, to mine coal, and everything of that kind. But when a question of national policy comes up, then I believe that we as legislators should use our best judgment as to what it is best for the nation to do in that particular case, looking at the business of the nation as a practical question. I do not know that I have answered the gentleman's question, but I have tried to do so.

Mr. CANNON. I do not see that the gentleman has met my question satisfactorily. He, coming from Brooklyn, represents a navy-yard district. In the navy-yard of his district ships may be constructed. I represent a district where we have furnaces, where we mine coal, where we have steel mills (and you can not build ships without steel), where we have lumber also. Now, why should not the Government found a plant in my district where it can manufacture steel, where it can mine coal, where it can cut lumber, etc.? Why should it not make dead sure that the raw material, so to speak, entering into our ships is provided? We have competent mechanics and other workmen there. I desire the gentleman to tell me why this proposition would not be on all fours with the proposition to establish an armor plant?

Mr. DRIGGS. I understand what the gentleman from Illinois wants me to say. I have tried to answer his question. I am not in favor of the Government going into all sorts of business enterprises. But where a question of national policy and national defense is involved I would have the Government take up the question exactly as I believe it should take up a question of financial policy, such as has recently been settled in this House.

Where the honor of the nation may be involved, where it is proper that we should have at all times an able and efficient corps of men to do the work of the Government, where important work is to be done for the defense of the Government, I would have the Government establishments work side by side with those engaged in private business, because in that way they can be a check one upon another, and would do far better work than under a different system. We will procure far better results where private and Government workmen are placed in competition with each other than we could if certain men were allowed to have a monopoly of a certain line of industry. In view of these considerations I believe it can be demonstrated that it is advisable for us to build some of our own ships in our own navy-yards. [Applause.]

Mr. GAINES. Can the gentleman tell us what governments of Europe have their own armor factories?

Mr. DRIGGS. I do not know anything in regard to the armor-plate question. I am not talking about that.

Mr. GAINES. I know that Russia, Italy, and France have their own armor factories.

Mr. DRIGGS. I know nothing about that. I am simply talking of the proposition in regard to Government ships.

To continue, Mr. Bowles explained in his statement before the Committee on Naval Affairs that under our system of yard management requisition upon requisition is frequently needed for the procurement of the simplest necessities. Why this is I know not. It may be the result of a system which is intended as a protection for the Government against extravagance. I simply repeat what I said a few moments ago, that I do not believe our constructors in this country are more extravagant or wasteful of the public money than those of foreign countries.

The labor in foreign yards, taking it as a whole, is of equal productive ability. I gave the reason for that a few moments ago. The mechanics, the foremen, the boys, and the laborers of every description in English dockyards are on a par with those in the English private yards. It is true that in all English ship or dock yards the hours of labor are the same, but the rates of pay are not the same. The rates of pay in private yards are higher than in Government yards, so that the Government has had considerable difficulty in obtaining the best laborers for work in its own dockyards. But at the same time it is said by Professor Elgar that in all probability the average wages, with several exceptions, earned by each of the two classes of men—the one in Government yards and the other in private yards—are about equal, and their productive ability is also equal.

Mr. GAINES. Can the gentleman give us the modus operandi of manufacturing guns at the Government armories at Springfield, Mass., and other places? The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HULL] stated some time ago that the best guns in the world were made at those Government gun factories.

Mr. DRIGGS. I know nothing about the manufacture of guns.

Proceeding with my argument, the following table will show the status of the different navies according to a report issued by the British Parliament in July, 1898:

	Completed.							Under construction.						
	England.	France.	Russia.	Germany.	Italy.	United States.	Japan.	England.	France.	Russia.	Germany.	Italy.	United States.	Japan.
Battle ships	52	27	12	9	15	5	3	12	3	6	5	2	3	3
Armored cruisers	18	9	10	3	3	2	1	8	10	1	3	3	...	6
Protected cruisers	95	30	3	7	15	14	10	24	10	3	3	3	1	6
Unprotected cruisers	16	16	3	21	1	10	8	...	...	...	...	...	...	1
Coast-defense ships	15	14	15	19	....	*20	3	...	...	1	...	...	...	...
Torpedo vessels	35	13	17	2	15	....	1	...	2	...	...	...	...	...
Ships for special purposes	3	1	5	1	2	1	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Torpedo-boat destroyers	50	...	1	...	...	....	...	46	8	28	1	1	20	8
Torpedo boats	98	211	114	113	142	†8	44	...	38	...	9	2	22	12

*Including 6 double-turret monitors, 13 old single-turret monitors, and the ram *Katahdin*. The 13 old monitors would hardly be included in computing the strength of the Navy on the usual basis of age, speed, etc. (O. N. I.)

†Torpedo boats completed, 13; under construction, 13. (O. N. I.)

Vessels launched in 1899.

ENGLAND.

Name.	Class.	Tonnage.	Built at—
Bulwark	Battle ship, first class	15,000	Devonport.
Glory	do	12,950	Birkenhead.
Implacable	do	15,000	Devonport.
London	do	15,000	Portsmouth.
Venerable	do	14,700	Chatham.
Vengeance	do	12,950	Barrow.
Victoria and Albert.	Royal yacht	4,700	Pembroke.
Britomart	Gunboat	700	Liverpool.
Pioneer	Cruiser, third class	2,200	Chatham.
Sandpiper	Gunboat	85	
Thistle	do	700	Glasgow.
Woodlark	do	150	Shanghai.
Woodcock	do	150	Do.
Lee	Torpedo-boat destroyer	283	Poplar.
Spiteful	do	322	Newcastle.
Viper	do	210	Hebburn on Tyne.

FRANCE.

Jeanne d'Arc	Cruiser	11,270	Toulon.
Suffren	Battle ship, first class	12,278	Brest.
Henri IV	Battle ship, second class	8,948	Cherbourg.
Jurien de la Gravière.	Cruiser	5,685	L'Orient.
Infernet	Cruiser, third class	2,452	Bordeaux.
Admiral de Gueydon.	Armored cruiser	9,517	L'Orient.
Zélée	Gunboat	646	Rochefort.
Décidée	do	645	L'Orient.
Hallebarde	Torpedo-boat destroyer	308	Havre.
Durandel	do	308	Do.
230	Torpedo boat	86	Bordeaux.
Morse	Torpedo boat (submarine)	141	Cherbourg.
Narval	do	106	Do.

RUSSIA.

Gromboi	Armored cruiser	12,336	St. Petersburg.
Diana	Cruiser	6,630	Do.
Waryag	do	6,630	Philadelphia.
Pallada	do	6,630	St. Petersburg.
Yenesei	Transport	2,500	Do.
Delphin	Torpedo-boat destroyer	350	Elbing.
Som	do	350	Birkenhead.

Vessels launched in 1899—Continued.

GERMANY.

Name.	Class.	Tonnage.	Built at—
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse.	Battle ship	11,180	Kiel.*
Niobe	Cruiser	2,645	Bremen.
Tiger	Gunboat	896	Danzig.*
S-91	Torpedo-boat destroyer	350	Elbing.

ITALY.

Garibaldi	Battle ship	7,398	Sestri-Ponente.
Varese	do	7,400	Leghorn.
Agordt	Gunboat	1,320	Castellamare di Stabia.*
Coatit	do	1,320	Do.*
Lampo	Torpedo-boat destroyer	320	Schichau.
Pellicano	Torpedo boat	147	Sestri-Ponente.

JAPAN.

Hatsuse	Battle ship, first class	15,000	Newcastle.
Asahi	do	15,200	Glasgow.
Yakumo	First-class cruiser	9,800	Stettin.
Idzumo	Armored cruiser	9,800	Elswick.
Miyako	Torpedo-boat destroyer	1,800	Kure.
Kagerou	do	279	Thornycroft.
Sazanama	do	300	Yarrow.
Inadzumi	do	311	Do.
Yuguri	do	279	Thornycroft.
Oboro	do	311	Yarrow.

AUSTRIA.

Kigyo	Torpedo boat	133	Poplar.*
Aspern	Torpedo cruiser	2,437	Pola.*
Python	Torpedo boat	133	Poplar.*

CHINA.

Kiam Wei	Torpedo-boat destroyer	850	Fu Chau.

DENMARK.

Herluf Trolle	Armored cruiser	3,470	Copenhagen.*

BRAZIL.

Marechal Floriana	Cruiser	3,162	

HOLLAND.

Utrecht	Armored cruiser	4,033	Amsterdam.*

PORTUGAL.

Donna Amelia	Cruiser	1,660	Tagus.

*Government yard.

ENGLAND.

The following, from Sell's Commercial Intelligence, London, April 8, 1899, shows the tonnage of war ships built by the Government for nine years, the total cost, and the cost per ton:

"It is generally known that the rise in the prices of materials and the increased complexity of ships of war have caused the cost of naval shipbuilding to rise greatly during late years. The following figures show the course of this movement:

Output of Government dockyards.

Year.	Vessels.	Displacement.	Total cost.		Cost per ton.	
		Tons.			£ s.	
1890	8	22,520	£1,230,910	$5,990,224	49 0	$238.46
1891	8	68,100	3,847,590	18,724,296	56 10	274.95
1892	9	50,450	2,920,430	14,212,273	58 0	282.26
1893	9	32,400	1,729,450	8,416,368	53 0	257.92
1894	8	26,700	1,803,510	8,776,782	67 10	328.49
1895	8	70,350	4,399,690	21,411,091	60 10	294.42
1896	9	73,970	4,287,000	20,863,685	59 12	290.04
1897	4	31,885	1,752,700	8,529,515	55 0	267.66
1898	9	73,090	4,575,120	22,264,821	67 14	329.46

"These figures show that between the years 1890 and 1898 there was an increased cost of nearly £19 per ton for the completed ship of war, which is, of course, a serious factor in the annual naval expenditure." This includes everything, hull, machinery, armor, and armament.

GERMANY.

The German Government owns three shipbuilding yards—one at Kiel, one at Wilhelmshaven, and one at Danzig—which are exclusively used for the building of vessels for naval purposes. Since 1873 the following war ships have been built for the German navy: Five armored frigates, 8 armored corvettes, 13 gunboats, 2 artillery ships, and 10 torpedo boats. Besides the imperial shipbuilding yards, private yards are to a great extent employed in building vessels for naval purposes, as the three imperial yards do not have sufficient capacity to supply the demand. However, the building of ships in private yards does not affect the cost. * * *

Germany was handicapped in the start by want of resources and experience in iron working, and still more by a general lack of confidence—even on part of German shipowners—that the shipyards of this country could turn out iron vessels comparable in quality and price with those produced by

British constructors. The managers of the Lloyd and Hamburg companies shared this distrust, and down to as late a date as 1880 their steamers were practically all built on the Clyde and the Mersey.

Meanwhile, ten years earlier, and just before the memorable epoch of 1870, the Prussian Government had established at Kiel and Wilhelmshaven yards for the construction and repair of war vessels, which work had been hitherto done almost exclusively in this country at Danzig. The events of 1870 made it imperative for the newly consolidated German Empire to build and equip a navy in its own shipyards and at the earliest possible moment.

The Government yards were inadequate to the task, so a contract was given to the private Vulcan shipyard at Stettin for the construction of the armored frigate *Preussen*, which was so quickly and satisfactorily executed that a second vessel, the armored corvette *Hansa*, was ordered. The building of the *Preussen* marks the date of the revival. The confidence of the admiralty was secured; it was shown that armored war vessels could be designed and constructed in Germany. * * *

ITALY.

In the last thirty years the building of war ships has become one of the great industries of the country. Italy has four national and three private important shipyards.

The war ships are built in the Government navy-yards at Castellamare di Stabia, both by the Government and under private contract. The Government has approved the recommendation of the Italian minister of marine for building four new first-class battle ships. These will be given out to private contractors.

There are now in the course of construction at the navy-yard in Venice the *Ferruccio;* at Spezia, the battle ship *Regina Margherita;* at Castellamare di Stabia, the *Benedetto Brin*, the *Agordat*, and the *Coatit*—the last one being about ready to launch and the *Agordat* now receiving her armament.

At the Naples yard they are finishing the war ship *Emmanuele Filiberto*, and in the private shipyard Orlando, at Leghorn, they are building the *Varese*, and at the private arsenal at Sampierdarena the *Garibaldi*. The Government is also reported to have concluded a contract with the steel works at Terni for furnishing 5,000 tons of armor plates for the ships now building, and a further contract for 35,000 tons to complete said ships will be given out in the immediate future. At Naples no ships are built, but only finished as to machinery and equipments.

JAPAN.

Aside from the construction of small cruisers, gunboats, torpedo boats, and launches, but little has been attempted in the more difficult work of building men-of-war. After the establishment of the large government iron and steel foundry efforts in this direction may be expected. At present nearly all material for steamship building is imported. Steel plates are now laid down here at from £8 5s. to £9 15s. ($40.15 to $47.44) per ton.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Nearly all the war ships of Austria-Hungary have been built at home, the majority in the imperial navy-yard at Pola, and five or six cruisers and a dozen torpedo boats by the Stabilimento Tecnico, of Trieste. The last-mentioned company has also built a number of war ships for the Argentine Republic, Uruguay, and Roumania. The building of war ships at Trieste is said to have no noticeable effect upon the cost of constructing merchant ships.

NETHERLANDS.

The following list of war ships built since the year 1894 was sent by this official:

"LIST OF WAR SHIPS BUILT IN THE NETHERLANDS SINCE 1891.

"*Government dockyard, Amsterdam (Rijkswerf te Amsterdam).*—An armored vessel of 3,500 tons displacement, 4,700 horsepower, and 16 knots speed was launched in 1894 and completed in 1896. A protected cruiser of 3,900 tons displacement, 10,000 horsepower, and 20 knots speed was launched in 1896 and completed in 1898. Another protected cruiser of the same type was launched in 1898 and completed in 1899. An armored vessel of 4,950 tons displacement, 6,000 horsepower, and 16 knots speed has been laid down in 1898.

"*Private dockyard, Flushing (firm Koninklijke Maatschappij de Schelde te Vlissingen).*—An armored vessel of 3,500 tons displacement, 4,700 horsepower, and 16 knots speed was launched in 1894 and completed in 1896. A protected cruiser of 3,900 tons displacement, 10,000 horsepower, and 20 knots speed was launched in 1897 and completed in 1898. Another protected cruiser of the same type was launched in 1897 and completed in 1899. Two unprotected cruisers of 820 tons displacement, 1,290 horsepower, and 13 knots speed were launched in 1896 and completed in 1897.

"*Private dockyard, Rotterdam (firm Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij te Tijenoord).*—An armored vessel of 3,500 tons displacement, 4,700 horsepower, and 16 knots speed was launched in 1894 and completed in 1896. A protected cruiser of 3,900 tons displacement, 10,000 horsepower, and 20 knots speed was launched in 1896 and completed in 1898. Another protected cruiser of the same type was launched in 1897 and completed in 1899. An armored vessel of 4,950 tons displacement, 6,000 horsepower, and 16 knots speed has been laid down in 1899.

"*Private dockyard, Amsterdam (firm Thijgens en van Gelder, Amsterdam).*—One unprotected cruiser of 820 tons displacement, 1,300 horsepower, and 13 knots speed was launched in 1894 and completed in 1895. Another unprotected cruiser of the same type was launched in 1895 and completed in 1896.

"*Private dockyard, Amsterdam (firm Nederlandsche Stoomboot Maatschappij te Amsterdam).*—Two unprotected cruisers of 790 tons displacement, 1,400 horsepower, and 13.5 knots speed were launched in 1897 and completed in 1898."

DENMARK.

The royal Danish war ships are built exclusively by the Government itself, at the royal navy-yards, and their building has no effect whatever upon the cost of constructing merchant ships.

Relative to the cost of American battle ships in different countries, the chief constructor of the English navy publishes some figures, according to which the English battle ships *Nile* and *Trafalgar*, 1885, cost 17,000,000 marks each, while those of the *Royal Sovereign* class cost something less, and those of the *Majestic* type something more. The cost of the *Powerful* was 13,000,000 marks.

These figures indicate the cost of construction exclusive of armament and ammunition. The new French battle ships cost 20,000,000 marks each, the United States *Indiana* 18,000,000, and the latest German battle ships 14,000,000 marks. By figuring the price per ton for the purpose of comparison, using that of the *Majestic* as a base, and calling it 1, the *Nile* costs 1.28 per ton, the French battle ships 1.39, the *Indiana* 1.42, and the *Kaiser Friedrich Wilhelm* only 1.06 per ton.

If we take into consideration that the last-named ship has been equipped with the new Krupp armor, which costs about one-fifth more than the armor employed on the *Majestic*, it will be seen that Germany is able to build her warships as cheaply, or even more cheaply, than England, which, in view of the very recent beginnings of German naval construction, must be considered an excellent result. In France the high cost of ships for war and commercial purposes appears to be due to the sluggish working of the administration. As to Russia, Sir William White was unable to give figures, but it is his opinion that they will be very high as regards the new Russian cruisers.

The above information is compiled from Notes on Naval Progress, issued by the Office of Naval Intelligence in November, 1899, and special Consular Reports, volume 18, issued by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce in February, 1900.

Russia has its own shipyard, but lets some of its ships out to contract, and no authoritative statement can be found as to what ships are being built at the Government yard. It will be noted that the governments which build their own ships do so more cheaply than do those who let the ships out to contract.

The gentleman from North Carolina alluded to what some of the foreign countries were doing in relation to the construction of their own ships in their own yards. I have given above statements of that in detail, and I would say that Germany, when it started on its naval programme a few years ago, found it was a very good plan to construct some of its war ships in its own yards for national reasons.

The idea of it is they say that the Government adopted the policy of France and Great Britain because they recognized the fact that they were the two greatest naval powers; and each of them had contended that it was an arm of the national defense to have ready a skilled corps of mechanics to work in government shipyards, for no one knew at what time their services might be necessary to the welfare of the country. Germany therefore decided to do exactly the same as these other countries were doing; and we find that the German Government itself now has three yards, one at Kiel, one at Wilhelms Haven, and the other at Danzig, and we find that the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* is now being constructed at the Government yard at Kiel. That is an 11,000-ton battle ship.

I heard the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs allude to the wonderful progress that Germany was making in her navy, and I also heard the gentleman from New York say that the German Emperor was a believer in a great navy. Now, Mr. Chairman, I say the very nation, the very man, they were praising believe in constructing, irrespective of the cost, some of their war ships at the Government yards; and one of their very finest ships now under construction is being built, as shown, at one of the Government yards. The *Tiger*, a small gunboat, is also being built in the Government yard at Danzig. Germany does not say for one moment that it is necessary to construct all the ships in the Government yards. It simply says, "We will construct a portion of the ships in the Government yards;" and there is not one advocate on the floor of this House in favor of the policy of constructing Government ships at the Government yards that will get up here and advocate the policy of constructing every one of the Government ships in the Government yards.

The Government would then be in exactly the same position that it was. There would not then be two different branches, one acting as a check against the other, each one full of the spirit of rivalry with the other, one set of mechanics and artisans striving to do better work than the other. Therefore I say that those who advocate building ships in the navy-yards only want to build a fair and square proportion.

I find that Italy also constructs some ships in her own yards, and in the last twenty years the building of war ships has become one of the great industries of the country. Italy has four national and three private important shipbuilding yards. I find that there were building in the Government yards two gunboats—the *Agordt* and the *Coatit*—each with 1,320 tons displacement.

In Japan they have not started the construction of war ships in their own yards.

I find that Holland constructs all the ships that she now has in her own yards, and has constructed them, and has one, the *Utrecht*, now on the stocks.

Russia and France I will not go into extensively. The tables are self-explanatory.

Mr. GAINES. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman yields to me to read a short letter, addressed to me in reply to one I wrote to M. Jules Bœufve, chancellor of the French embassy here, dated January 24, 1898:

EMBASSADE DE FRANCE, AUX ETATS UNIS,
Washington, D. C., January 25, 1898.

DEAR SIR: My inability to confer before this with the military attaché of this embassy prevented me, to my regret, from replying any sooner to your favor of the 13th instant. France builds a part of her men-of-war, armor plate, and artillery in government establishments. The rest is constructed by private industries. This mode is followed so as to allow the Government to be independent of private industries in time of peace. On the other hand, in case of war, the Government needs the assistance of private industries, and it would be too late to improvise them in cases of emergencies. For these reasons recourse is had to both sources of production.

Very truly, yours,

JULES BŒUFVE, *Chancellor.*

Hon. JOHN W. GAINES, M. C.,
Washington, D. C.

I also received a letter at the same time from Count Vinci, of the Italian embassy, stating the same fact and about the same

reasons; while the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. DALZELL] admitted in debate with me last session that Russia had one.

Mr. DRIGGS. I am very much obliged to my friend from Tennessee, because his remarks are in the nature of corroborative evidence.

Mr. GAINES. It corroborates what you say.

Mr. DRIGGS. Mr. Chairman, coming away from all these foreign yards—and I know this discussion is rather lengthy and technical—but coming away from these foreign yards to construction in our own yards; and so far as the comparing of the policy of the two is concerned, everything was done by Great Britain and other foreign nations to aid the Government in its comparison and everything the reverse was done in this country.

Every member of the Committee on Naval Affairs knows the navy-yards were not able or capable of building a Government ship at the time the comparisons were made in this country, not to mention war ships, as economically as those on the outside, for the very reason that the plants were not equipped as well as they should have been, and they had no machinery or anything to facilitate construction.

I desire to allude, Mr. Chairman, to the report of the then Chief of Bureau of Construction and Repair to the Secretary of the Navy for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1897, and would have every member understand, in reading these comparisons of the completeness of the navy-yards in 1897, that they did not begin to be in the condition that they were in 1888, when we first started to build our own ships in our own yards. I find in 1888 in the Norfolk Navy-Yard and in the Brooklyn Navy-Yard they had practically no machinery whatever.

Constructor Stahl, in a statement before the Naval Committee, practically said that at the time the *Texas*, *Maine*, *Raleigh*, and *Cincinnati* were built the Norfolk Navy-Yard and the Brooklyn Navy-Yard were equipped for the construction of wooden ships and had no modern machinery, nothing for the amalgamation of steel or for the placing of plates in position, etc., and the Government, through absolute necessity, authorized Constructor Bowles at Norfolk to put up a shed in order that he might have some place to make tools and other essentials for shipbuilding.

We find in 1897 a long list of things necessary in the Brooklyn and Norfolk navy-yards. I notice that the constructors in their recommendations as late as 1897 say they needed a new construction foundry, pattern shops, machine shops, equipment shop, joiners' shop, new machinery in the block shop, and so on. To-day—1900—it is entirely different.

The gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. KITCHIN] stated how many million dollars had been appropriated by the Government for the thorough equipment of the navy-yards at Norfolk and at Brooklyn. I say now, taking into consideration the fact that Great Britain was able to construct ships as cheaply in the Government yards as in private yards, that to-day in this country, with this thorough equipment of our own Government yards, we are able to construct ships as cheaply there as in the private contract yards. [Applause.]

Mr. GAINES. And that is true in the face of the fact that we work on the Government plant only eight hours a day, while the private concerns work ten hours.

Mr. DRIGGS. Yes; that is right. Secretary Long has told us that the length of time that was required for the construction of a ship in the Government yard was very much longer than it was in a private yard. I did not know until to-day why it was that there had been such great delay in the construction of some of our ships. I thought it advisable to look into the statement of the Secretary, and I went up to the Department and procured from them tables stating the state of completion of each and every one of our ships, which is as follows:

Vessels under construction, United States Navy.

BATTLE SHIPS.

No.	Name.	Speed.	Where building.	Degree of completion.
		Knots.		*Per cent.*
5	Kearsarge	16	Newport News	99
6	Kentucky	16	do	98
7	Illinois	16	do	75
8	Alabama	16	Cramp & Sons	93
9	Wisconsin	16	Union Iron Works	88
10	Maine	18	Cramp & Sons	22
11	Missouri	18	Newport News	1
12	Ohio	18	Union Iron Works	15

SHEATHED PROTECTED CRUISERS.

	Albany	20	Armstrong's, England	99
14	Denver	17	Neafie & Levy	0
15	Des Moines	17	Fore River Engine Co	0
16	Chattanooga	17	Lewis Nixon	0
17	Galveston	17	William R. Trigg Co	0
18	Tacoma	17	Union Iron Works	0
19	Cleveland	17	Bath Iron Works	0

Vessels under construction, United States Navy—Continued.

MONITORS.

No.	Name.	Speed.	Where building.	Degree of completion.
		Knots.		*Per cent.*
7	Arkansas	12	Newport News	19
8	Connecticut	12	Bath Iron Works	41
9	Florida	12	Lewis Nixon	25
10	Wyoming	12	Union Iron Works	43

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS.

1	Bainbridge	29	Neafie & Levy	45
2	Barry	29	do	45
3	Chauncey	29	do	45
4	Dale	28	Wm. R. Trigg Co	64
5	Decatur	28	do	63
6	Hopkins	29	Harlan & Hollingsworth	37
7	Hull	29	do	36
8	Lawrence	30	Fore River Engine Co	85
9	Macdonough	30	do	83
10	Paul Jones	29	Union Iron Works	70
11	Perry	29	do	70
12	Preble	29	do	70
13	Stewart	29	Gas Engine and Power Co	15
14	Truxtun	30	Maryland Steel Co	9
15	Whipple	30	do	9
16	Worden	30	do	9

TORPEDO BOATS.

19	Stringham	30	Harlan & Hollingsworth	96
20	Goldsborough	30	Wolff & Zwicker	98
21	Bailey	30	Gas Engine and Power Co	80
24	Bagley	28	Bath Iron Works	15
25	Barney	28	do	15
26	Biddle	28	do	5
27	Blakely	26	Geo. Lawley & Son	77
28	DeLong	26	do	77
29	Nicholson	26	Lewis Nixon	46
30	O'Brien	26	do	46
31	Shubrick	26	Wm. R. Trigg Co	76
32	Stockton	26	do	84
33	Thornton	26	do	76
34	Tingey	26	Columbian Iron Works	43
35	Wilkes	26.5	Gas Engine and Power Co	35

SUBMARINE TORPEDO BOAT.

1	Plunger	8	Columbian Iron Works	85

I would like to ask the chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs the reason for the fact that while there has been no armor for the *Missouri*, she is only 1 per cent completed to-day? I notice that she was authorized, that the contract was signed, on the 11th of October, 1898. I am merely asking this for information.

I also notice that the battle ship *Maine* is only 22 per cent toward completion, and she was authorized, or the contract signed, on the 21st of October, 1898. I notice that the *Ohio*, another battle ship, authorized on the 5th of October, 1898, is only 15 per cent toward completion. Coming down to the sheathed protected cruisers, where comparatively little armor is necessary, I find there, with the exception of the *Albany*, which we purchased from Armstrong, that upon the cruisers *Denver*, *Galveston*, *Tacoma*, and *Cleveland* there has not been the first iota of work performed. This list was corrected up to March 1, 1900.

I also find under the class of monitors that the *Arkansas*, to be built by the Newport News Shipbuilding Company, is 19 per cent toward completion. The *Florida*, built by the Nixon's, is only 25 per cent, and we find the Maryland Steel Company has the *Truxton*, the *Whipple*, and the *Worden* only 9 per cent toward completion. The Bath Iron Works has the *Biddle* only 5 per cent completed. And so it goes. I contend on the floor of this House that every single one of these private contractors has been using for the last ten years, and up to the present time, the Government work as a nucleus for private work.

It is well known to every man engaged in shipbuilding in this country that it is absolutely impossible to get an agreement out of the Newport News Company, the Cramps, the Bath Iron Works, or the Nixons to build a first-class ship for ocean or sea purposes in less than two years, and I claim now that we are giving them so much Government work to-day that instead of aiding private industry and private enterprise we are injuring the development of our industries to which the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON] alluded.

In these private shipyards to-day the Government is taking up the time needed by private individuals who are engaged in developing our commerce. I read an article in one of the newspapers a few days ago, whether true or not I can not say, that one great transportation company, the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, was unable to have one steamer finished on contract time. The article did not say why, but I say why; because the Government itself is taking up the time of the Cramps, and these other yards,

with work that is the nucleus for the other work. I say the time has come when the Government should construct some ships in its own yards. The time is to-day, when our navy-yards are in magnificent condition.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have explained about the cost of the system of buying material and the hours of labor; now let me allude to the length of hours of labor in this country in the Government yards as compared with the private yards. I find that eight hours constitute a days' work in the Government yards and ten hours in the contract yards.

Notwithstanding the fact that the hours of labor are so radically different—two hours longer in the private yards than in the Government yards—I contend that, allowing for the fact that the Government does not have to pay interest, does not have to pay dividends, does not have to pay taxes, does not have to pay insurance, does not have to allow for plant depreciation, the cost of labor in a Government yard will be more than offset by the expenses which the Government does not have to pay, but which the private contractor does have to pay. While this statement may not be easily proved, I make it because I believe with the perfect machinery now installed in the various great navy-yards of this country the experiment would demonstrate its accuracy.

Each and every one of our naval constructors has said time and again that he desired these ships of ours—some of them, at least—to be built in the Government yards. Mr. Chairman, I contend that the advice and suggestions of the naval constructors should be heeded, for they are the trained experts of the Government and the experts upon whom the Government relies in all questions appertaining to shipbuilding. I can truly say that what the lawyer is to his client, the physician to his patient, the insurance surveyor to the insurance company, the newspaper reporter to the newspaper, the bank president to the director, the naval constructors are to the Government and the people.

I can not make this point too emphatic, because the constructors have been educated at public expense and their lives devoted to study of these very questions. When they recommend the construction of some of our war ships in the navy-yards, there is no higher or better authority that can be appealed to as to the wisdom of such a policy. We rely upon them for the inspection of the ships building in contract yards, and I contend that, expense or no expense, their recommendations should be heeded and given far more consideration than the recommendations of any member of the Naval Affairs Committee or of the Secretary of the Navy himself.

To show how absolutely unbiased our naval constructors are in making these recommendations and their desire to be thoroughly frank and just, permit me to submit the statement of Naval Constructor Bowles on page 1 of the hearing on shipbuilding in Government yards before the Committee on Naval Affairs March 13, 1900. He gives nine advantages of building ships at Government navy-yards and nine disadvantages. Had Constructor Bowles been anything but an absolutely fair man, he would have said nothing about the disadvantages of building vessels at the navy-yards. I now desire to submit in detail the advantages and disadvantages of Constructor Bowles:

BUILDING SHIPS IN NAVY-YARDS.

Advantages.	*Disadvantages.*
1. Maintains efficiency of force and plant.	1. Cumbersome system of design and management by independent bureaus.
2. Renders repair work economical and rapid.	2. Wages 30 per cent to 40 per cent higher.
3. Will reduce the amount of repair work by removing the necessity for maintenance of force.	3. Boy and unskilled labor is not used to advantage on account of artificial restrictions of labor board.
4. Maintains a standard of workmanship and design on basis of practical experience.	4. Eight hours' work against ten.
5. Provides training for those who must inspect contractors' work.	5. Seven holidays full paid.
6. No profit to be made.	6. Purchase of material by the navy system involves delay and extra cost.
7. The indirect charges in commercial practice which make a large percentage of cost are not included, because they are already provided and are maintained for other purposes, viz: Interest on plant, taxes, insurance, depreciation and care of property, large proportion of office and organization expense.	7. Outside plants are better arranged and no restrictions are placed on utilization of space to the best advantage.
8. Cost of inspection is saved.	8. Per diem compensation is used where piecework is economical.
9. Cost of trial trip is saved.	9. No guaranty of performance under contract conditions.

It hardly seems possible that since we started in to build our new Navy we have constructed 61 new vessels as part thereof. Out of that number there have been only 4 built in Government yards—the *Texas*, *Maine*, *Raleigh*, and the *Cincinnati*. Now, a word as to the comparative cost of these ships. It has gone all through the country that the contract price of a ship is given as the total cost of the ship. Note carefully here that I say contract price of the ship. Now, in the following table, presented to the Committee on Naval Affairs by Constructor Bowles at the hearing above mentioned, you will find the real facts of the case:

Name.	Date of laying keel.	Date of first commission.	Hull and machinery.			Ship without stores, ammunition, or water in boilers.		
			Cost of hull and machinery.	Weight of hull and machinery.	Cost per ton of hull and machinery.	Final cost of finished vessel.	Weight without stores, ammunition, or water in boilers.	Cost per ton of finished vessel.
				Tons.			*Tons.*	
Maine	Oct. 17, 1888	Sept. 17, 1895	* $3,305,409.87	3,836,920	$861.47	$4,677,788.75	5,436.35	$860.46
Texas	June 1, 1899	Aug. 15, 1895	* 2,949,549.12	3,595,690	820.30	4,202,121.49	5,124.69	819.91
Cincinnati	Jan. —, 1890	June 16, 1894	* 1,995,773.30	2,358,183	846.31	2,371,904.52	2,675.92	886.38
Raleigh	Dec. —, 1889	Apr. 17, 1894	* 1,839,965.23	2,358,183	780.24	2,199,729.80	2,691.00	817.43
Minneapolis	Dec. 16, 1891	Dec. 13, 1894	† 2,690,000.00	5,816,760	462.45	3,849,996.44	6,161.20	624.87
Indiana	May 7, 1891	Nov. 20, 1895	† 3,063,000.00	5,691,100	538.20	5,983,371.98	8,943.30	669.03
Detroit	Feb. —, 1890	July 20, 1893	† 612,500.00	1,449,650	412.52	1,233,039.90	1,660.00	740.11

* Amount expended in navy-yards. † Contract price.

Referring to the table, we find that the total cost of these ships varied only slightly from the total cost of ships built in private yards. The total cost of the *Maine* was $4,677,788, or $860 a ton. The cost of the *Indiana* was $5,983,000, or a cost of $669 a ton. But when we compare the contract price of hull and machinery of these vessels we find that the cost of hull and machinery of the *Indiana* was only about $3,000,000, and that the cost of the hull and machinery of the *Maine* was $3,300,000.

It is a most marvelous fact to me that these relative costs were not much larger, because I have shown in a former part of my argument the absolute lack of preparation in the Government yards at that time for the construction of war ships. It has been sent throughout the country that $3,000,000 was the total cost of the *Indiana*, when in truth and in absolute reality her total cost was $5,783,000, everything being included. This point and others on this subject are most carefully and conclusively brought out and demonstrated by the report of Naval Constructor Stahl in the hearing above alluded to, on page 27 of the said report, which is as follows:

Comparison of contract price with total cost of certain ships.

	Monterey.	Olympia.	San Francisco.	Oregon.	Massachusetts.	Indiana.
Payments on account of contract	$1,647,728.64	$1,706,000.00	$1,423,231.50	$3,272,403.99	$3,045,576.48	$3,055,272.39
Extra to contractors for authorized changes	107,093.02	103,831.30	47,739.94	205,862.69	171,111.12	149,900.42
Work done by Government, plans, inspection, etc	73,588.03	70,878.67	141,840.06	248,165.75	209,293.32	257,032.19
Hull armor	237,790.26	----------	----------	828,468.34	828,929.74	837,884.62
Armor for gun protection	190,534.38	141,522.62	----------	1,029,591.42	1,030,051.58	977,134.02
Speed premiums	----------	300,000.00	100,000.00	175,000.00	100,000.00	38,500.00
Trial-trip expenses	11,547.42	39,269.09	25,446.32	22,913.99	16,882.73	17,924.41
Care and preservation, insurance, etc	----------	32,525.86	----------	71,615.72	----------	----------
Total cost	2,268,281.75	2,484,027.54	1,738,257.82	5,914,021.90	5,401,844.97	5,333,708.05
Contract price	1,674,839.60	1,796,000.00	1,428,000.00	3,301,510.00	3,090,000.00	3,090,000.00
Excess of total cost over contract price	593,442.15	688,027.54	310,257.82	2,612,511.90	2,311,844.97	2,243,708.05

Taking the *Monterey*, we find, according to the statement of Mr. Stahl in his evidence before the Naval Committee, that the payment on account of contract was $1,647,000. The excess of contractors' charges for authorized changes was $1,071,000; work done by the Government, $73,000; hull, armor, etc., $237,000; armor for guns' protection, $190,000; total cost, $2,268,000, while the contract price was $1,674,000, the total cost being $593,000 in excess of the contract price.

I would simply say in this connection that the Government yards to-day, according to the very best and most expert evidence, are as thoroughly equipped and ships could be almost as cheaply built there as under contract in private yards. I will, however, qualify that statement. I do not believe that Great Britain has been able to construct a smaller class of war vessels as cheaply in Government yards as in private yards. But I do believe that neither Mr. Bowles, Mr. Baxter, Mr. Stahl, or Admiral Hichborn would recommend the construction of ships in navy-yards unless they deemed it wise, practical, and necessary. I do believe, from the records of other countries, that if they have been able to construct battle ships more cheaply in government yards than in private yards, we in this country will be able to do the same.

Mr. FOSS. Does not the gentleman know that the conditions in England are different from those in this country?

Mr. DRIGGS. Certainly.

Mr. FOSS. Are not the hours of labor in Government yards there the same as in private yards?

Mr. DRIGGS. A few moments ago, while the gentleman was not in the Hall, I referred to this question. I said that the difference in interest charges, insurance, taxes, dividends, etc., would more than offset the difference in other respects between Government yards and private yards, and I am somewhat borne out in this statement by Mr. Baxter, in the statement to which I have alluded. Mr. Baxter figured very extensively on this proposition, and I propose to place his paper in the RECORD.

In consequence of the length of this speech and the vast amount of detail necessary for a fair, careful, and honest demonstration of the advisability of building some of our warships in our navy-yards, I find that I only have a few minutes left for the consideration of two very important items. First, the care and protection of the expensive machinery, tools, and general plant of the navy-yards. I know from my experience as an insurance inspector that plants decrease more rapidly in productive ability when left unused and uncared for than when in full running operation.

Now, why spend millions upon millions of dollars for the equipment of our navy-yards with the finest tools and machinery if we do not intend to keep the tools and machinery in constant use? Constructor Bowles told us that many of the machines in the Government navy-yards had become absolutely ruined through lack of work. It should be the policy of the Government for its own protection and for the economical use of the people's money to keep the Government yards in a state of constant industry.

The other point of which I wish to speak is that of the morale of navy-yard workmen. Every employer of men in every branch of industry knows that there is nothing more demoralizing than periods of intense activity and then periods of great depression. This last expression is that of Constructor Baxter. In no business or manufacturing industry is this truer than in that of shipbuilding. I personally have conversed with many shipbuilding mechanics, and they have universally said that they would prefer to work in shipyards where they could receive constant work and steady weekly compensation than in yards where they receive more than double the pay in other yards, and only work from half to three-quarters of the time.

The reason for this is very plain. Every man engaged in the rearing of a family and of educating his children knows full well that the necessaries of life of all kinds are more readily procured when a weekly compensation is being received. By adopting a policy of having some Government work in addition to the usual and ordinary repair work always in progress at the navy-yards, we are aiding not only the Government itself, but also the shipbuilding mechanics, who are as important a coordinate part of the Republic as are we, their Representatives in Congress.

I have endeavored, Mr. Chairman, in this long argument to show the systems of war-ship construction in all the great foreign nations of the Old World, and have endeavored to prove by the arguments of great naval constructors the world over that it is the height of national wisdom to construct a certain proportion of war ships in a nation's navy-yard. I have compared wages in the dockyards and in the contract yards of the Old World, and I have compared them similarly in this country.

The results of the years of experiment and experience of Great Britain and other foreign powers have most emphatically demonstrated to my mind that the construction of war ships in navy-yards places the Government in an independent position for national defense and relieves it from the danger of any adverse shipbuilding trust or combination; it enables the Government to do its repair work in the most rapid and economical manner; it prevents the depreciation of valuable navy-yard plants; it increases the effectiveness of the productive ability of the wage-earner employed in the navy-yards, and, above all else, as the policy progresses the expense of such construction will be very materially reduced in the Government as well as the private yard.

In the foregoing argument I have endeavored to restrain myself absolutely from the introduction of any partisan or political feature, believing that the proposition is nonpolitical in character and one to be considered in a businesslike manner by this House acting as a business bureau.

Now, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe in or advocate a penny-wise, pound-foolish policy. I do not believe that economy is always the most important item to be considered in governmental affairs.

Imagine, if you will, in time of war—and God forbid that we ever are forced to war—disaster to an American fleet—which also God forbid—with the resultant repairs and new construction absolutely necessary. The question will be raised at once, Where can we repair? Where can we build? If the answer is in private establishments and navy-yards equally as well, a national prayer of relief will be raised by every citizen of the Republic at the wisdom of equipping all Government navy-yards for this character of work, and the money expended will be considered well spent, and the question of the increased expenditure will be forgotten by a grateful people.

APPENDIX A.

REPORT OF MINORITY ON NAVAL APPROPRIATION BILL.

Again, we feel compelled to differ with our colleagues on the subject of constructing ships in the Government yards. We reach this conclusion from the evidence before the committee on the subject. Four of the most distinguished and competent constructors of the Navy were heard by us, as well as the Chief of the Bureau of Construction. They all unqualifiedly recommend the construction of ships in the Government yards. The opinions and wishes of bureau chiefs seem to have been followed by the committee in many instances, and in our opinion it is unfortunate that the opinion of the Chief of the Bureau of Construction was not persuasive in this instance also. Nothing that we could say would throw as much light on this question as the testimony of the expert constructors, and we submit a few extracts from the evidence of three of them. No quotation is made from the others because their evidence has not yet been printed. Constructor Bowles, of the New York yards, says:

"Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. I would like to ask a question. In your judgment—you speak of it being wise for the Government to construct ships in some yards for the advantages that will accrue—do you have any hesitancy in stating what you deem those advantages to be?

"Mr. BOWLES. I endeavored to go over those advantages in the beginning, and, generally, they are these:

"That it provides a means of maintaining the efficiency of the mechanical force and the machinery and plant; it renders repair work economical and rapid; it removes the tendency to increase alterations and repairs to existing vessels; it maintains a standard of workmanship with which we can require the contractors to comply, and it provides training for those who must inspect the contract work. Those are the material things for which you will pay. * * *

"I will say a few words now about the general subject of building ships in the navy-yards. I recommend the building of some vessels in the important navy-yards of the United States, because I believe it to be good business; and if I owned those yards and kept them for the purposes they are now kept for, I should say that it would be a sensible thing to do to build one ship in each of the important yards all the time, simply to keep them in order and maintain a sufficient force ready for all emergencies.

"Mr. METCALF. I want to ask Mr. Bowles, if he has no objection, to state what navy-yards are now ready to build ships.

"Mr. BOWLES. I am familiar with the New York yard and the Norfolk yard, and I believe on this coast those two yards are ready to take up any work you see fit to give them. I do not know about the Mare Island yard of my own knowledge, but Mr. Baxter was the constructor there for a number of years, and he is fully qualified to express an opinion about it. I believe it is capable of taking up the work.

"The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, gentlemen, for your instructive statements, and if there are no further questions we will adjourn."

Constructor Stahl, of the Norfolk yard, says:

"Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. I would like to ask you a question, going back to the matter that we have had under discussion. You have Mr. Bowles's statement. Summarizing his statement, or answering, what in your judgment would be the wisest thing for the Government to do—construct or not to construct vessels in the navy-yards?

"Mr. STAHL. I think there is no doubt whatever about the advisability of constructing a certain proportion of our ships in the principal navy-yards. To me this seems so self-evident a proposition that it hardly needs argument.

"Mr. WHEELER of Kentucky. Is that answer predicated upon the same reasons assigned by Mr. Bowles?

"Mr. STAHL. Substantially the same. There is one thing I might add. Briefly, I think we can build at some of our principal yards, equipped with modern tools as they are, even more cheaply than Mr. Bowles thinks, and I see no reason why we should not build as cheaply there as can be built at any private yard.

"Mr. METCALF. In your judgment would it lessen the cost of repairs if they had one or two vessels on the stocks?

"Mr. STAHL. There is no question whatever; it is as certain as anything can be.

* * * * * * *

"In the case of the *Indiana* the Government paid out for extra work—I did not just now mean to say $3,000,000; in the *Oregon* it was nearly $3,000,000—but in the *Indiana* the Government paid out for this identical work $2,300,000. In the one case the navy-yard spends $3,000,000, and then $2,300,000 more. Then we say, and say truthfully, that the navy-yard ship has cost $5,300,000 altogether. But you go and ask the price of the corresponding ship that was built at the private yard, and, unless the man you ask is well informed, he will say the contract price was $3,000,000, leaving you to infer, if you choose, that that was the total cost.

"Mr. MUDD. That is what I want to get at.

"Mr. STAHL. That is the erroneous comparison. The contract price is not

the total cost. It is only a portion of the total cost; and in some cases it has been barely half the price.

"Mr. MUDD. From the result of your observations I would judge that in past times building in navy-yards did not cost any more.

"Mr. STAHL. No; I am of the opinion that many of the comparisons made in the newspapers have been very misleading.

"One word more about this inspection. You paid $60,000, plus a good deal more, to inspect the work on the *Kentucky*. If you built that ship at a Government yard, you would have to inspect the work also, but the same men who do the designing and superintending would do the inspecting, and it would not begin to cost you anything like that sum. Furthermore, consider the contract price of the *Kentucky*, $2,250,000. I tried to get the cost of the changes on her, which I know to be large, though doubtless entirely proper, but I could not get them in time. When you contracted for that ship, you did not include the furniture, or the blocks, or boats, or cooperage, and lots of other things in the contract. I built those articles at the Norfolk Navy-Yard. They cost $50,000. What did the *Kentucky* really cost? That $50,000 must be added to her contract price. So must also the cost of inspection, cost of authorized changes, and many other items. That sort of thing goes right straight through. There lies the danger of making a wrong comparison. A comparison of the contract price in the one case and the actual cost in the other is utterly misleading."

Says also Constructor Baxter:

"Mr. WHEELER. Do you think it would be wise or unwise for the Government to construct one or more ships at this yard?

"Mr. BAXTER. I do consider it would be very wise for the Government to construct a certain number of ships at its yards.

"Mr. WHEELER. Do you indorse the view taken by Mr. Bowles and Mr. Stahl in regard to keeping a ship constantly under construction in a yard?

"Mr. BAXTER. I think that is a great advantage.

"Mr. DAYTON. What is your opinion, under present conditions, if we should undertake to do any work in navy-yards; what character of vessels do you recommend should be given to the yards and what given to contract?

"Mr. BAXTER. I should give armored cruisers to the navy-yards.

"Mr. DAYTON. The great big ones?

"Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir.

"Mr. DAYTON. The largest vessels ever undertaken—the new types?

"Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir.

"Mr. DAYTON. Will you give your reasons for that?

"Mr. BAXTER. Because in doing that the yards are able to do anything else they will ever be called upon to do; that is the reason.

"Mr. LOUDENSLAGER. Would that be in any sense an experimental construction on the part of the yards?

"Mr. BAXTER. No, sir; not at all; no more than any other work that is undertaken here. There are certain set plans and certain set specifications, and the people in charge use skill and knowledge and judgment in directing and carrying on the work.

"Mr. HAWLEY. Could you give the construction of an armored cruiser as large as 12,000 tons to a navy-yard?

"Mr. BAXTER. Yes, sir."

APPENDIX B.

Table of vessels of the United States Navy.

ARMORED STEEL VESSELS—FIRST-CLASS BATTLE SHIPS.

Name.	Protective deck.		Water-line protection, obturating material.		Extent of fireproofed wood.	Complement.		Contract price of hull and machinery.	Date of act authorizing the building.	Contract signed.	Keel laid.	Launched.	Contract date of completion.	Date of first commission.
	Slopes.	Flat.	Cocoa, capacity in cubic feet.	Corn pith, capacity in cubic feet.		Officers.	Men.							
	Inches.	*In.*												
Alabama	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	*12,464	All joiner work	40	453	$2,650,000	June 10, 1896	Sept. 24, 1896	Dec. 2, 1896	May 18, 1898	Sept. 24, 1899	
Illinois	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	*12,464	All joiner work	40	453	2,595,000	June 10, 1896	Sept. 26, 1896	Feb. 10, 1897	Oct. 4, 1898	Sept. 26, 1899	
Indiana	.....	2½	15,814.40	.....	.....	32	465	3,063,000	June 30, 1890	Nov. 19, 1890	May 7, 1891	Feb. 28, 1893	Nov. 19, 1893	Nov. 20, 1895
Iowa	.....	2½	*19,395.41	.....	All joiner work above protective deck.	36	474	3,010,000	July 19, 1892	Feb. 11, 1893	Aug. 5, 1893	Mar. 28, 1896	Feb. 11, 1896	June 16, 1897
Kearsarge	Forward 3, Aft 5	2½	.....	*10,806.74	All joiner work	40	513	2,250,000	Mar. 2, 1895	Jan. 2, 1896	June 30, 1896	Mar. 24, 1898	Jan. 2, 1899	
Kentucky	Forward 3, Aft 5	2½	.....	*10,806.74	All joiner work	40	514	2,250,000	Mar. 2, 1895	Jan. 2, 1896	June 30, 1896	Mar. 24, 1898	Jan. 2, 1899	
Maine	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	*13,627.00	.....	40	478	2,885,000	May 4, 1898	Oct. 1, 1898	Feb. 15, 1899	.....	June 1, 1901	
Massachusetts	.....	2½	15,814.40	.....	.....	32	463	3,063,000	June 30, 1890	Nov. 18, 1890	June 25, 1891	June 10, 1893	Nov. 18, 1893	June 10, 1896
Missouri	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	*13,627	All joiner work	40	478	2,885,000	May 4, 1898	Oct. 11, 1898	.....	.....	Aug. 30, 1901	
Ohio	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	*13,627	All joiner work	35	478	2,899,000	May 4, 1898	Oct. 5, 1898	Apr. 22, 1899	.....	June 5, 1901	
Oregon	.....	2½	15,814.40	.....	.....	32	462	3,222,810	June 30, 1890	Nov. 19, 1890	Nov. 19, 1891	Oct. 26, 1893	Nov. 19, 1893	July 15, 1896
Wisconsin	Forward 3, Aft 4	2½	.....	11,968	All joiner work	35	453	2,674,950	June 10, 1896	Sept. 19, 1896	Feb. 9, 1897	Nov. 26, 1898	Sept. 19, 1899	

*Estimated.

[Mr. BARBER addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BARBER. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that I may have leave to extend my remarks, or have additional time in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks that he may have leave to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. DRIGGS. I would like to ask the same permission.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York asks permission to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee rise.

The motion was agreed to.

The committee accordingly rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. PAYNE, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R. 10450) making appropriations for the naval service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, and for other purposes, and had come to no resolution thereon.

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF AMERICAN REPUBLICS.

The SPEAKER laid before the House the following message from the President of the United States; which was read, ordered to be printed, and referred to the Committee on Appropriations:

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

In my message to Congress of December 5, 1899, referring to the insured maintenance for another period of ten years of the International Union of American Republics, I stated that "in view of this fact and of the numerous questions of general interest and common benefit to all of the Republics of America, some of which were considered by the First International American Conference, but not finally settled, and others which have since then grown to importance, it would seem expedient that the various Republics constituting the Union should be invited to hold, at an early date, another conference in the capital of one of the countries other than the United States, which has already enjoyed this honor."

Since then the Secretary of State has informed the governments of the various republics of this continent of our wish to see another conference convened and has received formal favorable replies from some of them in response to my suggestion, and an expression of their willingness to send delegates to a second conference. From a majority of the other republics this Government has received oral assurances of a similar tenor, so that at the present time the recommendation made in my message is assured of the approval of the American republics.

In view of these facts and of the desirability that should the conference be called at an early date, the expenses of the delegation to be sent by the United States may be provided for, I recommend to the urgent consideration of the Congress that it appropriate from any funds in the public Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to be made immediately available, the sum of $25,000, or so much thereof as may be necessary, to meet the actual and necessary expenses of the delegates to the conference and of their salaried clerical assistants, said fund to be at the discretion of the Secretary of State.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *April 16, 1900.*

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

Mr. BAKER, from the Committee on Enrolled Bills, reported that they had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the following titles; when the Speaker signed the same:

H. R. 8347. An act making appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1901, and for other purposes; and

H. R. 4696. An act granting an increase of pension to Ruthven W. Houton.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE.

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows:

To Mr. WRIGHT, indefinitely, on account of sickness.

To Mr. BENTON, for one week, on account of important business.

To Mr. ROBERTSON of Louisiana, indefinitely, on account of serious illness.

Mr. FOSS. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to.

And accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 2 minutes p. m.) the House adjourned.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXIV, the following executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Supervising Architect submitting an estimate of appropriation for rent of quarters for public officers at Indianapolis, Ind.—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Public Printer submitting an estimate of appropriation for engines, boilers, etc., at the Government Printing Office—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Attorney-General submitting an estimate of appropriation for repairs of United States jails—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Light-House Board submitting an estimate of appropriation for an auxiliary steam steel light-vessel at Martins Reef, Lake Huron, Michigan—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, recommending an appropriation for establishing quarantine stations at Fleming and Mullet keys, and certain legislation relating thereto—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Light-House Board submitting an estimate of appropriation for a light-ship at Grossepointe, Mich.—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the assistant clerk of the Court of Claims, transmitting a copy of the conclusions of fact and law in the case of the vessel snow *Isabella*, James Helm, master, against the United States—to the Committee on Claims, and ordered to be printed.

A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury, transmitting a copy of a communication from the Secretary of War, submitting an estimate of appropriation for payment to William S. Yeatman for services rendered the Gettysburg National Park Association—to the Committee on Appropriations, and ordered to be printed.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several Calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. MUDD, from the Committee on the District of Columbia, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 8067) to incorporate the National Society United States Daughters Eighteen Hundred and Twelve, reported the same with amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1019); which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

Mr. JONES of Washington, from the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, to which was referred the bill of the House (H. R. 10656) to provide American register for the steamship *Garonne*, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1020); which said bill and report were referred to the House Calendar.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PRIVATE BILLS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, Mr. GRAFF, from the Committee on Claims, to which was referred the bill of the Senate (S. 726) for the relief of Alice Walsh, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 1018); which said bill and report were referred to the Private Calendar.

CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, committees were discharged from the consideration of bills of the following titles; which were thereupon referred as follows:

A bill (H. R. 9410) granting an increase of pension to John G. Tate, of Frogtown, Pa.—Committee on Invalid Pensions discharged, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

A bill (H. R. 3277) for the relief of the Cape Fear and People's Steamboat Company—Committee on Claims discharged, and referred to the Committee on War Claims.

A bill (H. R. 3278) for the relief of Thomas S. Lutterloh—Committee on Claims discharged, and referred to the Committee on War Claims.

A bill (H. R. 7810) granting a pension to Robert P. Currin—Committee on Invalid Pensions discharged, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

A bill (H. R. 10618) granting an increase of pension to Martin O'Connor—Committee on Pensions discharged, and referred to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS INTRODUCED.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. McRAE: A bill (H. R. 10752) to organize a corporation for the purpose of constructing an electric railroad in the Indian Territory, and granting the right of way therefor, and for other purposes—to the Committee on Indian Affairs.

By Mr. GRIFFITH: A bill (H. R. 10753) repealing certain parts of an act entitled "An act to provide ways and means to meet war expenditures, and for other purposes," approved June 13, 1898—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MOODY of Massachusetts: A bill (H. R. 10754) authorizing the Secretary of War to survey the habor of Beverly, Essex County, Mass.—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. STEWART of Wisconsin: A bill (H. R. 10755) relating to the holding of courts of the United States in the western district of Wisconsin—to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LACEY: A bill (H. R. 10756) to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to make a charge for grazing within forest reserves—to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. BROMWELL: A bill (H. R. 10757) to authorize the attaching of union labels to articles subject to internal-revenue taxation—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. YOUNG: A bill (H. R. 10777) in reference to the civil service and appointments thereunder—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. FOWLER: A joint resolution (H. J. Res. 238) authorizing the printing of additional copies of the annual report upon the improvement and care of public buildings and grounds—to the Committee on Printing.

By Mr. WATERS: A concurrent resolution (H. C. Res. 39) authorizing the printing of 17,500 copies of Bulletin No. 20 of the Division of Vegetable Physiology and Pathology, United States Department of Agriculture—to the Committee on Printing.

By Mr. GROUT: A resolution (H. Res. 226) authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to furnish the House certain records of the Internal Revenue Department—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. TAWNEY: A resolution (H. Res. 227) authorizing the Clerk of the House of Representatives to pay Minnie C. Hankness a sum equal to six months' salary and expenses of the last illness and funeral of her late husband, not to exceed the sum of $250—to the Committee on Accounts.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS INTRODUCED.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions of the following titles were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. BARTLETT: A bill (H. R. 10758) granting a pension to Sallie B. Wilson, of Macon, Ga.—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. COUSINS: A bill (H. R. 10759) granting a pension to Margaret M. Walker—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GASTON: A bill (H. R. 10760) granting an increase of pension to George Henderson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10761) granting an increase of pension to Oliver H. Cram—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. GORDON: A bill (H. R. 10762) granting an honorable discharge to Frank Chronabery—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HITT: A bill (H. R. 10763) authorizing the reference to the Court of Claims of the claim of Capt. Andrew H. Russell and Lieut. Col. William R. Livermore against the Government of the United States—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. JOHNSTON: A bill (H. R. 10764) for the relief of Joseph Loudermilk, of Monroe County, W. Va.—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. NORTON of Ohio: A bill (H. R. 10765) granting an increase of pension to Frederick Spier—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10766) granting a pension to Jennie H. Cramer—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. OTEY (by request): A bill (H. R. 10767) for the relief of John B. Ege, of Petersburg, Va.—to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. RIXEY: A bill (H. R. 10768) for the relief of Franklin P. Mauck, late of United States receiving ship *Franklin*—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RUCKER: A bill (H. R. 10769) for the relief of Martin Daughenbaugh—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. SHOWALTER: A bill (H. R. 10770) to grant a pension to Elias C. Wheeler, late a private in Company G, Fifty-sixth

Regiment Pennsylvania Militia—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. DOVENER: A bill (H. R. 10771) granting a pension to Sarah F. Armstrong, widow of George Armstrong, late of Company C, One hundred and thirty-third West Virginia Infantry Militia—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10772) to pension Eliza Peel, late widow of John B. Elliott, of Wellsburg, W. Va.—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10773) for the relief of Richard Crutcher, late private of Company I, Fourth Kentucky Volunteer Infantry, Mexican war—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10774) for the relief of Franklin Woodford, Gilmer County, W. Va.—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 10775) to pension Robert L. Giffin, of Washington, D. C.—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. YOUNG: A bill (H. R. 10776) granting an increase of pension to Mary Weideman, widow of Albert Weideman, late second lieutenant of Company B, Fourteenth United States Colored Artillery—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. RIDGELY: A bill (H. R. 10778) granting an increase of pension to Martin V. B. Winkler—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. CORLISS: A bill (H. R. 10779) to increase the pension of William N. Carlisle—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, the following petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER: Petition of James Cameron and 18 other citizens of Blackhawk County, Iowa, in favor of the Grout bill taxing oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. ADAMS: Petition of the Central Labor Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, against any legislation increasing the tax on oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, resolution of the Civil War Veterans' Association, Customs Service, Port of New York, favoring Senate bill No. 283, in reference to the civil service and appointments, as reported with an amendment—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. BABCOCK: Petition of farmers of Ithaca, Wis., in favor of the Grout bill taxing oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. BARTLETT: Paper to accompany House bill granting a pension to Sallie B. Wilson—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BROMWELL: Petition of the Central Labor Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, against any legislation increasing the tax on oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. BROWNLOW: Petitions of Grand Army of the Republic posts of Mexico, N. Y.; Tropers, Cal.; Copenhagen, N. Y.; Colorado Springs, Colo.; Toronto, Kans.; Omega, La., and Alexandria, Va., in favor of House bill No. 7094, to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home at Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. BURTON: Petition of Memorial Post, No. 141, of Cleveland, Ohio, Grand Army of the Republic, in favor of the bill providing for service pensions—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BUTLER: Petition of the Guernsey Breeders' Association, of West Grove, Pa., to amend the present law in relation to the sale of oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of the Loyal Temperance League of Lenni, Pa., urging the enactment of the anti-canteen bill—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. DALZELL: Papers to accompany House bill No. 10010, granting a pension to Capt. Edward H. Brady—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of Thomas Grant, of New Galilee, Pa., for amendment to pension laws—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STANLEY W. DAVENPORT: Petition of substitute letter carriers of Wilkesbarre, Pa., in favor of House bill No. 1051, relating to grading of substitute letter carriers—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of Men's Alliance and resident voters of Wilkesbarre, Pa., favoring a bill to prohibit the sale of liquor in canteens and in all Government buildings and premises—to the Committee on Alcoholic Liquor Traffic.

By Mr. DAVIS: Petition of 63 citizens of the District of Columbia, protesting against the chapter in the proposed District code reducing the number of justices of the peace—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. DOVENER: Papers to accompany House bill to correct the military record of Richard Crother—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Franklin Woodford—to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, paper to accompany House bill No. 3706, for the relief of Jerry S. Fish—to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Eliza Peel—to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. GASTON: Petitions of Woman's Christian Temperance unions of Union City and Mill Creek Township Baptist Church, of Union City, and Presbyterian Church and citizens of Corry, Pa., to prevent the dealing in intoxicating drinks upon premises used for military purposes—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petitions of citizens of Albion, North Springfield, and Woodcock Township, Crawford County, Pa., to amend the present law in relation to the sale of oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, protest of the Crawford County Medical Society, of Pennsylvania, against the passage of Senate bill No. 34, prohibiting vivisection—to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of druggists of Corry, Pa., for the repeal of the tax on medicines, perfumery, and cosmetics—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GRAHAM: Petition of the Central Labor Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, against the passage of the Grout bill to increase the tax on oleomargarine, etc.—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania: Petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance unions of Reading and Allentown, Pa., against the sale of intoxicants in the Army, etc.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of citizens of Lehigh, Pa., favoring the Grout bill relating to dairy products—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GROUT: Petitions of Peter Houston and 6 other citizens of Hamden; E. C. Graves and 8 others, of Lyndonville; Henry C. Culver and 9 others, of Morris; O. Cass and 77 others, William Case and 40 others, of Sherburne; O. A. Wheeler and 24 others, of West Burke; A. J. Ayer and 29 others, of Putney; J. E. Cowan and 16 others, of Groton, State of New York, in favor of the passage of the Grout bill relating to oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of Harry A. Slade and 54 other druggists of Vermont, for the repeal of the tax on medicines, perfumery, and cosmetics—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, protest of Essex Publishing Company, Essex Junction, Vt., and 26 other citizens of the Second Congressional district of Vermont, against the passage of House bill No. 6071, relating to second-class mail matter—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

Also, petition of R. L. Laughlin and the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, of Barnet, Vt., favoring a clause in the Hawaiian constitution forbidding the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors and a prohibition of gambling and the opium trade—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, resolution of the Mesa County Vermont Society, A. C. Grout, president, urging the passage of Senate bill No. 2868, authorizing the establishment of a public building at Grand Junction, Colo.—to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. HILL: Petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, and citizens of Plymouth, Conn., urging the passage of House bill prohibiting the sale of liquor in Army canteens and in Government buildings and premises used by the United States—to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. HOFFECKER: Three petitions of citizens of Newcastle County, Del., in favor of the passage of House bill No. 3717—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also (by request), petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Delaware City, Del., urging the enactment of the anti-canteen bill—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. JONES of Washington: Petition of Post No. 191, of Colfax, Wash., Grand Army of the Republic, in favor of House bill No. 7094, to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home at Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. KETCHAM: Petitions of Rev. O. P. Dales and 16 others; Althea A. Babcock and 53 others, all citizens of Glasco, Ulster County, N. Y., urging the passage of House bill No. 5457, abolishing the Army canteen—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of Pratt Post, No. 127, of Kingston, N. Y., Grand Army of the Republic, in favor of a bill locating a Branch Soldiers' Home near Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. LITTAUER: Petitions of Ellsworth Post, of Mechanicsville; Dalzell Post, of Waddington; Hooker Post, of Morristown; Sheridan Post, of Waterford, Grand Army of the Republic, Department of New York, favoring the passage of a bill to establish a Branch Soldiers' Home near Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. McDOWELL: Petition of Frank F. Robinson, of Hanover, Ohio, in favor of the Grout bill taxing oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. MANN: Petition of General W. B. Hazen Post, No. 7, of Chicago, Ill., Grand Army of the Republic, in favor of the establishment of a Branch Soldiers' Home near Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. NAPHEN: Resolutions of the Civil War Veterans' Association, Custom Service, Port of New York, in favor of giving preference in appointments to soldiers of civil and Spanish-American wars—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, petition of Frank Tucker and 5 others, of Boston, Mass., for the repeal of the tax on medicines, perfumery, and cosmetics—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, memorial of the United States Brewers' Association, of New York, asking for the repeal of the war tax on malt liquors—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, resolutions of the Building Trades Council of Cincinnati, Ohio, and vicinity, against any legislation increasing the tax on oleomargarine—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. NORTON of Ohio: Paper to accompany House bill granting a pension to Jennie H. Cramer—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, petition of Charles A. Gribble and other employees of the Fostoria (Ohio) post-office, for the passage of House bill No. 4351—to the Committee on the Post-Office and Post-Roads.

By Mr. RIXEY: Papers to accompany House bill for the relief of Franklin P. Mauck—to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. RUSSELL: Petition of Woodstock (Conn.) Grange, No. 150, in favor of Senate bill No. 1439, relating to an act to regulate commerce—to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SCUDDER: Paper to accompany House bill No. 9907, to refer the claim of Joseph Robinson, owner of the brig *Robert and Mary*, to the Court of Claims—to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. SHOWALTER: Petition of Fredonia Post, No. 341, Department of Pennsylvania, Grand Army of the Republic, in favor of the establishment of a Branch Soldiers' Home near Johnson City, Tenn.—to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SMALL: Petition of M. K. King, Brauning Manufacturing Company, John L. Roper Lumber Company, James A. Miller, and others, praying for the improvement of the channel at the mouth of Scuppernong River, in the State of North Carolina—to the Committee on Rivers and Harbors.

By Mr. SULZER: Petition of the Civil War Veterans' Association, Customs Service, Port of New York, asking favorable action on Senate bill No. 283 as amended, giving preference in appointments to honorably discharged soldiers, sailors, and marines who served in the civil war and in the Spanish and Philippine wars—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

By Mr. WEEKS: Resolutions of the Central Labor Council and the Building Trades Council, of Cincinnati, Ohio, opposing the passage of the Grout oleomargarine bill—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petition of Civil War Veterans' Association of New York, favoring the passage of Senate bill No. 283, in regard to preference of honorably discharged soldiers and sailors in Government employ—to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, petition of the Mercantile Association of Michigan, favoring House bill No. 6246, known as the Brosius pure-food bill—to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. YOUNG: Petition of Abraham Lincoln Lodge, No. 445, Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, Columbus, Ohio, opposing the passage of the Grout oleomargarine bill—to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also, petitions of United States Brewers' Association and 29 associations of brewers in all parts of the United States, in favor of a reduction of the internal-revenue tax on beer—to the Committee on Ways and Means.

SENATE.

TUESDAY, *April 17, 1900.*

Prayer by the Chaplain, Rev. W. H. MILBURN, D. D.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on motion of Mr. HALE, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the Journal will stand approved.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED.

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. W. J. BROWNING, its Chief Clerk, announced that the Speaker of the House had signed the following enrolled bills; and they were thereupon signed by the President pro tempore:

A bill (H. R. 625) granting an increase of pension to Wesley Reed;

A bill (H. R. 963) to extend the privileges of the seventh section of the act of Congress approved June 10, 1880, to the port of Greenbay, Wis.;

A bill (H. R. 1147) granting an increase of pension to Luke H. Cooper;

A bill (H. R. 1172) granting a pension to Rebecca J. Jones;

A bill (H. R. 1201) granting a pension to James McNutt;

A bill (H. R. 1677) granting an increase of pension to Missouri B. Ross;

A bill (H. R. 1681) granting an increase of pension to Isaac M. Locke;

A bill (H. R. 1768) granting an increase of pension to George J. Stealy;

A bill (H. R. 1946) granting a pension to Jane F. Chalmers;

A bill (H. R. 2170) granting a pension to Angeline Eyestone;

A bill (H. R. 2303) granting an increase of pension to Lavinia M. Payne;

A bill (H. R. 3214) granting a pension to John S. Dukate;

A bill (H. R. 3312) granting an increase of pension to Ellen V. Myer;

A bill (H. R. 3454) granting a pension to Joseph E. Baldwin;

A bill (H. R. 3654) granting a pension to Calvin E. Myers;

A bill (H. R. 3758) granting an increase of pension of Joshua Ricketts;

A bill (H. R. 3821) granting an increase of pension to Frances D. Best;

A bill (H. R. 3941) granting a pension to Samuel B. Weeks;

A bill (H. R. 3962) granting an increase of pension to Alanson C. Eberhart;

A bill (H. R. 4089) granting a pension to Emily Burke;

A bill (H. R. 4562) granting a pension to Lois A. Fields;

A bill (H. R. 4654) granting an increase of pension to Simon Van Der Vaart;

A bill (H. R. 4657) granting a pension to Laura S. Pontious;

A bill (H. R. 4795) granting an increase of pension to John O'Conor;

A bill (H. R. 4836) granting an increase of pension to Wilbur F. Loveland;

A bill (H. R. 5134) granting an increase of pension to Joseph F. Allison;

A bill (H. R. 5170) granting a pension to Cyrus Johnson;

A bill (H. R. 5174) granting a pension to William R. Wallace;

A bill (H. R. 5966) granting an increase of pension to Charles A. Hausmann;

A bill (H. R. 6019) granting a pension to Mrs. Therese W. Hand;

A bill (H. R. 6089) granting a pension to Alfred T. Moreland;

A bill (H. R. 6356) granting an increase of pension to Lewis R. Armstrong;

A bill (H. R. 6486) granting an increase of pension to Orange F. Berden;

A bill (H. R. 6527) granting an increase of pension to George Myers;

A bill (H. R. 6731) granting an increase of pension to William F. Tait;

A bill (H. R. 6900) granting an increase of pension to Benjamin F. Kurtz;

A bill (H. R. 7264) granting a pension to Hannah C. Smith;

A bill (H. R. 7323) granting an increase of pension to Harrison Canfield;

A bill (H. R. 7799) granting an increase of pension to Franklin M. Burdoin;

A bill (H. R. 8045) granting an increase of pension to Wilford Cooper;

A bill (H. R. 8339) granting an increase of pension to Charles H. Taber;

A bill (H. R. 8390) granting an increase of pension to Joshua Mitchell;

A bill (H. R. 8397) granting an increase of pension to John White;

A bill (H. R. 8599) granting a pension to Ellen J. Williams; and

A bill (H. R. 8605) granting a pension to Joseph Champlin Stone.

PETITIONS AND MEMORIALS.

Mr. FAIRBANKS presented petitions of Reeves & Co., of Columbus; the Perry Manufacturing Company, of Indianapolis; the Hoosier Drill Company, of Richmond, and the South Bend Chilled Plow Company, of South Bend, all in the State of Indiana, praying for the enactment of legislation providing for the construction of a new fireproof Patent Office building; which were referred to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

Mr. MCMILLAN presented a petition of the Conference of the Evangelical Association of Sebewaing, Mich., praying for the enactment of legislation to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors to members of the Army and Navy; which was referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.

He also presented a memorial of Coopers' Union, No. 54, of Detroit, Mich., remonstrating against the enactment of legislation